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STATEMENT OF JURISDICT ON 
This is an interlocutory appeal from the summary judgment entered by the Second 
District Court of Davis County. The Supreme Court granted the Appellant's Petition for 
Interlocutory Appeal on February 11, 2010 (R. at 651-53). 
Jurisdiction in this matter is conferred upon the Supreme Court of Utah pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (2009) and because the Okler from which Defendants are 
appealing is an order of a court of record over which the Cpurt of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW 
Whether the trustor of a revocable trust which expl icitly provides the trustor with 
powers of amendment, modification, or revocation of the trust, ccin whole or in part," has the 
power to intentionally divest, by written amendment or partial revocation, a contingent 
beneficiary's interest in the trust and particularly after said beneficiary abuses and commits 
multiple felonies against the trustor, if the trust also contains a provision stating that Cw[t]he 
interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to divestment which shall 
continue until [the] Trust is revoked or terminated other thaij by death." (R. at 326-35,422-
36, 442-57, 625-28). 
Standard of Review: Correctness. 
Authority for Standard of Review: The validity of a tlrust is an issue of law, reviewed 
for correctness. Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17,1f8, 71 P.3d 589; Groesbeckv. Groesbeck, 935 
P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1997). So long as the reviewing cpurt confines its analysis to the 
language of the trust instrument and does not resort to extrinsic evidence of intent, the 
interpretation of a trust is an issue of law. Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, \1, 169 P.3d 
750; Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) ("A contract's interpretation may 
be either a question of law, determined by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, 
determined by extrinsic evidence of intent"). 
Further, summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c); Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37,1J10, 977 P.2d 1205. When reviewing the trial 
court's ruling in a motion for summary judgment, the reviewing court considers all facts and 
inferences to be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
Peterson v. Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, ^13,48 P.3d 918. The reviewing court reviews the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, according no deference to that 
court's legal conclusions. Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT 4, ^ |7,973 P.2d417; State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). In addition, the reviewing court may affirm a grant of 
summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it was not relied upon 
below. Bailey v. Boyles, 2002 UT 58, |10, 52 P.3d 1158; Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(2009) and Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-606 (2009) are statutes 
that are determinative, or of central importance, to this appeal. Additionally, this court's 
interpretation of and review of the case of Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190, and 
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its progeny, Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589 mdHtiggan v. flbggaw, 2007 UT 78, 
169 P.3d 750, is determinative of, and of central importance to, this appeal. The 
aforementioned statutes and cases are attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CAS|E 
Nature of the Case 
This appeal arises from the Order Granting Plaintiff] s Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Denying Defendants' Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (the 
"Order"), entered on December 21, 2009 by the Second District Court, Davis County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable Michael G. Allphin presiding. (R 
Addendum, Exhibit B). The Order was affected by a Ruling 
at 633-35, attached hereto as 
on Plaintiffs and Defendants' 
Cross Motions for Partial Summary Judgment (the "Ruling"), that was entered by the 
aforementioned court on November 30,2009. (R. at 622-29J attached hereto as Addendum, 
Exhibit C). 
This action, at its most basic level, concerns the interpretation of trust documents, 
including the Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust (the wCFamily Trust"), created and 
executed by Darlene Patterson ("Darlene") during her lifetime, and the effect of a written and 
express partial revocation of this Family Trust whereby, Darlene, as trustee, undisputedly 
attempted to modify the terms of the Family Trust so that 
longer a beneficiary. Before Darlene attempted to partially revoke the Family Trust, thereby 
excluding Ron as a beneficiary, Ron committed several crimes against Darlene. Ron was 
prosecuted for the felony crime of "Elder Abuse" or ^Exploitation of an Elder", which after 
Ron Patterson (uRon") was no 
negotiations was reduced to a felony attempt charge of the same crime. Darlene was the 
complaining witness. In connection with his conviction, Ron was ordered to pay restitution 
to Darlene in the amount of $52,935.00, and was sentenced to jail and probation. See 
Addendum, Exhibit D. Ron also has admitted to unlawfully using Darlene's credit card 
without authorization to make personal purchases. See Supplemental and Corrected 
Affidavit of Randy Patterson, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit E, (R. at 474,1fl|4-5). 
Ron was also the recipient of previous gifts from Darlene. See Final Amendment referenced 
below. 
After Darlene's death, Ron initiated this action, which pertains primarily to the 
parties' dispute over the distribution of the Family Trust's property and the propriety of the 
trust's modifications executed by Darlene prior to her death; more specifically, the validity of 
a Final Amendment executed by Darlene after Ron committed the Elder Abuse crimes 
against her whereby she stated she had provided for Ron during her lifetime and wished to 
remove Ron as a beneficiary from the Family Trust. 
The court's November 30, 2009 Ruling found that Darlene's modification to the 
Family Trust, made on May 30, 2006, which effectively removed Ron as a beneficiary, was 
invalid due to its complete divestment of Ron's vested interest in the Family Trust's property 
without a complete revocation of the Family Trust, as the court determined is required by the 
trust's terms. To come to this decision, the trial court relied heavily on and stated it was 
bound by and must follow the Utah Supreme Court's precedent in Banks, Flake, and Hoggan 
(attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit A). 
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Randy Patterson ("Randy5'), both individually and ab trustee of the Family Trust, 
appeals the Order and Ruling granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
denying Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment because the legal precedent 
relied on to grant Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be overturned. 
Therefore, the Order should be reversed and this case shoulq be remanded to the trial court 
with instructions to uphold and enforce the Final Amendment. 
B. Relevant Course of Proceedings 
Ron filed a Complaint against the Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust and the 
Estate of Darlene Patterson in this matter on October 25,2007, seeking, among other things, 
a declaratory judgment that the Final Amendment to the Family Trust is void and should be 
disregarded in distributing the trust property. (R. at 7-11). Kon claimed the trust should be 
distributed giving no effect to the Final Amendment and hi should take under the Family 
Trust even though Darlene expressly and explicitly intended 
to the Family Trust via her Final Amendment. Id. An Amended Complaint was filed by Ron 
on May 3, 2008, which asked that specific findings of fact be made regarding, among other 
things, the propriety of the Final Amendment. (R. at 78). 
to remove him as a beneficiary 
The Amended Complaint was 
answered by Randy on April 2, 2008, and by other Defendants on August 14, 2008. (R. at 
155-61; 230-28). 
Ron then filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgmeht and Memorandum in Support 
on April 6, 2009, seeking summary judgment on his first 
judgment that the Final Amendment is void and that Ron 
cause of action; a declaratory 
is entitled to receive property 
according to the Restatement of the Family Trust executed March 12, 2001. (R. at 323-97). 
On May 5, 2009, Randy, as trustee of the Family Trust, submitted a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (R. at 422-36), along with a 
Defendants' Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support 
(R. at 418-19,398-411). Randy sought a summary judgment declaring the Final Amendment 
valid and that it controls the disposition of the tmst estate. Id. The parties then stipulated 
that the respective motions for partial summary judgment shall be submitted and considered 
without respect to the parties' disputes of fact over the issue of "undue influence." (R. at 
420-21). 
Complete briefing was had on the respective motions for partial summary judgment, 
and the same were submitted for decision on July 29,2009 (R. at 513-16). The Court held a 
hearing on the motions on September 30, 2009 (R. at 615), and took the matters under 
advisement. 
C. Disposition by the Court Below 
The trial court, in its November 30, 2009 Ruling (R. at 622-29, attached hereto as 
Addendum, Exhibit C) and December 21, 2009 Order (633-34, attached hereto as 
Addendum, Exhibit B), decided the respective motions for partial summary judgment as to 
the validity of the Final Amendment. The Ruling and Order granted Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment and denied Defendants' Counter Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. Id. In sum, the Ruling and Order determined that, as a matter of law, the Final 
Amendment was void in that it attempted to completely divest Ron of his interest in the 
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trust's property without completely revoking the Family Triist. The trial court determined 
that such revocation was necessary to completely divest ope of the trust's beneficiaries 
because the Family Trust contains the language: uthe interests of beneficiaries are presently 
vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or 
terminated other than by death". (R. at 625-28). The trial court placed much emphasis on the 
fact that the Final Amendment caused a "complete" divestment of Ron's beneficial interest; 
intimating that if Darlene would have left him somethin 
Amendment would have been validated by the trial court and the trial court would have 
instructed the trust estate to be distributed according to the teijms of the Final Amendment. Id. 
g, even one penny, the Final 
D. Statement of Undisputed Facts 
1. On or about October 25, 2007, Ron initiated this action, which pertains primarily to 
the parties' dispute over the distribution of trust property and the validity of trust 
amendments and restatements executed by the trustor, Darlepe Patterson, prior to her death. 
(R. at 1-10). 
2. On or about July 30, 1999, Darlene Patterson created The Darlene Patterson Family 
Protection Trust (the "Family Trust"). See Exhibit A of Complaint (R. at 13-36, attached 
hereto as Addendum, Exhibit F). The initial co-trustees of 
Patterson and her husband, Rex E. Patterson. Id. at Art. VII § 7.6 (R. at 29, attached hereto 
the Family Trust were Darlene 
as Addendum, Exhibit F). 
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3. The stated purpose of the Family Trust is "for the primary benefit of the Undersigned 
[Darlene Patterson] during the Undersigned's [Darlene Patterson's] lifetime, [and] for the 
Undersigned's family thereafter." Id. Art I § 1.1 (R. at 13). Darlene Patterson was the only 
beneficiary of the Family Trust entitled to use the trust estate during her lifetime. See id. 
generally, (R. at 338-61). 
4. The Family Trust provides: wCAs long as the Undersigned is alive, the Undersigned 
reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in part, including the 
principal, and the present or past undisbursed income from such principal. Such revocation 
or amendment of this Trust may be in whole or in part by written instrument." Id. at Art. Ill, 
§3.1 (emphasis added), (R. at 15). 
5. The Family Trust provides u[t]he interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested 
interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated 
other than by death." Id. at Art. Ill, § 3.2 (emphasis added) (R. at 15). 
6. The Family Trust lists Plaintiff Ron Patterson among the trust's beneficiaries subject 
to divestment. Id. at Art. I § 1.1-1.2, (R. at 13). 
7. On May 31,2000, Darlene Patterson executed an amendment to the Family Trust (the 
"First Amendment"), which provided Plaintiff Ron Patterson additional property upon the 
distribution of the trust's property. See Exhibit B of Complaint, \\ (R. at 38-39, attached 
hereto as Addendum, Exhibit G). 
8. On or about March 12,2001, Darlene executed a restatement of the Family Trust (the 
"Trust Restatement"); which, among other things, provided Plaintiff Ron Patterson with an 
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additional specific devise and reduced the contingent beneficial interests of Defendants Gary 
E. Patterson, Judy Ann Henry, and Rex A. Patterson. See Exhibit C of Complaint, Art. IX 
(R. at 41-56, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit H). 
9. The terms of the Trust Restatement provided, in part, [that its purpose was to "amend 
and restate in full the [Family Trust]." Id., (R. at 41). 
10. The Trust Restatement, in Article IX.B.5, left a specifib distribution to Ron as follows 
The home and five (5) acres of real estate shall be distributed to Ronald S. 
Patterson, my son. The five (5) acres is a portion off the property located in 
Davis County currently identified as Serial No. 14-040-0067. Such portion 
shall be five (5) acres only (from this 14.34 acre parcel) and shall be the 
approximately five (5) acres located in closest proximity to the North side of 
the current home of Ronald S. Patterson. If Ronald S. Patterson has 
predeceased me then this property shall be divided among the descendants of 
Ronald S. Patterson by right of representation. Distribution of this share shall 
be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and C2 below. This 
distribution is in addition to the share of the Trust Estate to be distributed in 
paragraph C below. 
See id., (R. at 52). 
11. Article IX.C. of the Trust Restatement also devised ojie-third of the "remainder of the 
Trust Estate" to Ron. See id., (R. at 53). 
12. During the time when Ron was living with Darlene Patterson, Ron unlawfully used 
Darlene's credit card without authorization to make personal purchases including four-
wheelers for his business. See Supplemental and Corrected Affidavit of Randy Patterson at 
1J4, (R. at 474, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit E). Ron made many of these purchases 
online through Ebay and PayPal. Id. When Darlene discovered that these transactions had 
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taken place, she objected and notified PayPal that Ron had no authority to use her credit card. 
Id. 
13. In or about February of 2006, Darlene Patterson received a check from the State of 
California in the amount of $52,936.53 payable to Darlene for a project involving real 
property which Darlene owned in California. Id. at ][5. Ron, however, stole the check, 
forged Darlene's signature, cashed the check, and used the check funds for his personal 
benefit without Darlene's knowledge or pemiission. Id. Eventually, Ron's conduct was 
discovered, and Ron was convicted of the felony crimes of "Elder Abuse" and "Exploitation 
of an Elder." Id. In connection with his conviction, Ron was ordered to pay restitution in the 
amount of $52,936.53, and was sentenced to jail and probation. Id; see also court case 
dockets evidencing Ron's criminal actions against Darlene Patterson, attached hereto as 
Addendum, Exhibit D). 
14. After Darlene discovered Ron's wrongdoings indentified in paragraphs 13-14 above, 
she asked Mr. Carver, her attorney at the time, to prepare another Amendment to the Darlene 
Patterson Family Protection Trust. (R. at 474 TJ6). 
15. On or about May 30, 2006, Darlene Patterson executed another amendment to the 
Family Trust (the "Final Amendment"), which was intended to effectively remove Ron as a 
beneficiary of the trust, by stating as follows: 
I have intentionally not provided anything for my son Ronald S. Patterson (or 
his descendants) since I have already properly provided for this son during his 
lifetime as I felt was appropriate. 
See Exhibit D of Complaint, at j^C, (R. at 58-61, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit I). 
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16. Eleven months later, On April 30, 2007, and after executing the Final Amendment, 
Darlene passed away. See Affidavit of Randy Patterson dated April 30, 2009, at TJ12, (R. at 
414). 
17. On or about April 6, 2009, Ron filed his Motion for (Partial Summary Judgment to 
invalidate the Final Amendment. (R. at 323-25). 
18. On or about May 5, 2009, Defendants filed a Counter Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment seeking a ruling that the Final Amendment was valid. (R. at 418-19). 
19. On or about November 30, 2009, Judge Allphin entered the Ruling which granted 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and defied the Defendant's Counter 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment regarding the issi^ e of the validity of the Final 
Amendment, and deeming it void due to the Banks' rationale. (R. at 622-29, attached hereto 
as Addendum Exhibit C). 
20. The Order from which this appeal is taken was entered on December 21,2009. (R. at 
633-34, attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The issue before this court is whether the trial court appropriately exalted form over 
substance in voiding the Final Amendment to benefit Ron Patterson, who was expressly and 
intentionally removed as a trust beneficiary via the Final Antiendment by his elderly mother 
Darlene, acting as settlor, after it was discovered that Ron was exploiting and taking 
advantage of her (which acts resulted in his felony conviction). The trial court erred in 
voiding the Final Amendment because the substantive law relied upon in making said 
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determination {Banks v. Means) has been significantly limited and now should be overturned, 
and because the Utah Legislature has effectively overruled Banks by requiring only 
substantial compliance to amend a revocable trust, giving elevated weight to the settlor's 
intent. Therefore, the trust estate should be distributed according to the Final Amendment 
which evidences Darlene's substantial compliance with the trust's terms and her clear and 
undisputed intent. 
Banks v. Means stands for the proposition that if a revocable trust contains language 
giving beneficiaries a "present interest" or "vested interest subject to divestment" and that 
such interests shall "continue until [the] Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death", 
that the settlor can only divest a beneficiary's interest by complete revocation of the trust and 
not by amendment or partial revocation, even when the settlor reserves powers to amend or 
revoke the trust in whole or in part. Since rendering this decision, this Court has had 
opportunity to reevaluate the position taken in Banks and has taken steps to ameliorate the 
potential inequities and harshness that could result from that decision. In Flake, a 
substantially similar revocable trust was at issue. This Court determined that there is no 
requirement of complete revocation where the beneficial interest is simply modified or 
amended, but not terminated. Therefore, Flake stands for the proposition that had the Final 
Amendment merely reduced Ron's beneficial share in the trust estate to one penny, rather 
than completely divesting his beneficial share, the Final Amendment would be valid. Such a 
result is inequitable and unjust. Further, in the Hoggan decision, this Court questioned the 
12 
purpose and effect of the "vesting" language. The time Ms come to overturn the Banks 
decision. 
The Utah Legislature has taken further action to mitigate the Banks decision. In 2004 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605 was enacted. Said section governs the revocation or amendment 
of revocable trusts and states that a settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust by 
substantially complying with a method provided in a trust, and if a method for amendment is 
not expressly made exclusive, a revocable trust can be amended by a settlor by any method 
manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent. By amending and partially 
te Darlene substantially, if not revoking the trust to divest Ron's interest in the trust esta 
wholly, complied with the terms of the trust governing amendment and partial revocation. 
Further, the method of revocation and amendment provided in the trust is not made 
exclusive, therefore any method manifesting Darlene's clear and convincing intent will 
suffice. The Final Amendment provides as follows: C'I have intentionally not provided 
anything for my son Ronald S. Patterson (or his descendants) since I have already properly 
provided for this son during his lifetime as I felt was appropriate." Darlene's intent could not 
be clearer. She did not want Ron to have a beneficial interest in the trust estate. 
Therefore, because Banks should be expressly overturned by this Court, and because 
Darlene's Final Amendment complied with Utah trust law, the Final Amendment is valid and 
controlling. The trust estate should be distributed according to the Final Amendment. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE SUBSTANTIVE CASE LAW UPON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT 
RELIED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE OVERTURNED 
This appeal, in large part, is dependent upon this Court's interpretation and review of 
the case of Banks v. Means, as it applies to the Family Trust. Appellant asks this Court to 
overturn Banks v. Means as being contrary to accepted principles of law and justice, and 
contrary to the public interest. Particularly in view of the facts of this case, the Banks v. 
Means ruling allows Ron to perpetuate a serious wrong. Also determinative to the issue 
raised are Banks 'progeny Flake v. Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589 mdHoggan v. Hoggan, 
2007 UT 78, 169 P.3d 750. All of these cases deal with trust language similar to that 
contained in the Family Trust; all of which deal with the trustor attempting to modify the 
terms of a trust. However, the following rule must be kept in mind before and while 
reviewing Banks and its progeny: "In interpreting the terms of the trust, the inquiry is as to 
the intent of the trustor." Leggroan v. Zion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 232 P.2d 746, 749 
(1951) (emphasis added). 
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); 
Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37 at ^ 10. As shown above in the Statement of Facts, the 
material facts in this case are undisputed. Therefore, this appeal seeks a ruling that Ron is 
not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, and that the oft-questioned law relied 
upon by the trial court (i.e., Banks v. Means) is no longer good law. 
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A. Analysis of Banks v. Means, Flake v. Flake, and lloggan v. Hoggan, and Utah 
Statutory Trust Law 
In Banks, the Utah Supreme Court had to determine whether a trustor was entitled to 
amend her revocable living trust agreement to change the! 
generally, Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 P.3d 1190 (attached hereto as Addendum, 
Exhibit A). The trustor created a "family protection tmst," t 
the trust, and served as trustee until her death. Id. at ^ [2. The Banks tmst originally provided 
that upon the death of the grantor, her three children were to $hare equally in the proceeds of 
remainder beneficiaries. See 
ansferred certain property into 
the tmst estate. Id. at ^3. 
Approximately seven years after the Banks trust was 
executed an amendment to the tmst. Id. at ]|5. The amendment changed the tmst 
beneficiaries, and allocated the entire tmst estate to the grantor's older sister, with the 
grantor's children being listed as alternate beneficiaries should the older sister predecease the 
grantor. Id. After the death of the grantor, the beneficiaries disputed whether the 1999 
amendment, or the original tmst agreement, governed the disposition of the tmst estate. Id. at 
16-
originally executed, the grantor 
The issue before the court was whether the trustor! 
agreement to amend the tmst and divest the beneficiaries] 
had the power under the tmst 
interest. Id. at *[|6. The tmst 
agreement provided that as long as the grantor was alive, slie "reserves the right to amend, 
modify, or revoke this Tmst in whole or in part". Id. at ^ 4. It continued, "Such revocation or 
amendment of this Tmst may be in whole or in part by written instrument." Id. The Banks 
tmst also contained the following language: "The interests qfthe beneficiaries are presently 
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vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or 
terminated other than by death?" Id. (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court ruled that the italicized language above authorized the trustor to 
divest the beneficiary's interest only if the trustor revoked the trust in its entirety. Id. at ^ 12. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court gave no meaning to the express terms of the trust allowing for 
partial revocations and partial amendments. Id. Although the trustor in Banks expressly 
reserved the right "to amend, modify or revoke this Trust, in whole or in part" the Court ruled 
and read into the trust language a requirement that an amendment or partial revocation could 
not divest a beneficiary's interest. Id. at ^ 14. Because the 1999 amendment to the Banks trust 
did not amount to a complete revocation, the purported amendment was held to be void and 
the Court held that the disposition of the trust estate was governed by the original trust 
agreement - not the 1999 amendment. Id. at ^15-17. 
Since the Banks decision was reported, courts (including this Court), scholars, and 
professionals have struggled to explain and apply its reasoning and logic, and Utah statutory 
law has virtually overturned it legislatively. This struggle to explain the Banks decision and 
attempts to mitigate the Banks decision's wide-reaching and harsh effects is first evidenced 
in the Utah Supreme Court's 2003 Flake decision. In Flake, the Supreme Court was 
confronted with trust language and circumstances substantially similar to that of Banks. See 
generally, Flake, 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589 (attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit A). 
However, in the Flake decision the court ruled that where the amendment reduced, but did 
not completely eliminate, the challenging beneficiary's interest, the amendment would be 
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valid, even if the trust was not completely revoked prior to the amendment. Id. 
In Banks, the trustor's sister who was named beneficiary under the voided amendment 
unsuccessfully argued that the provision in the trust instrument specifying that vested 
interests were created in the children was intended to establish that the trust was not illusory, 
not to restrict the settlor's ability to divest the children's interests. Banks, 2002 UT 65 at 
^[13. In Flake, less than two years after the Banks decision, the Supreme Court was 
distinguishing its Banks decision and analysis, and recognized that the purpose of the 
^vesting" language in the trust was to insure that the revocable living trust was not deemed to 
be an illusory trust. Flake, 2003 UT 17 at ^fl7. The Flake analysis attempted to reduce the 
harshness and inequitable nature of Banks without expressly (jverruling it, and was successful 
in significantly limiting the Banks effect. In short, Flake permitted an amendment partially 
divesting a beneficiary's interest in a trust containing the same or substantially similar 
language to that in the Banks trust. 
Thus, from the Flake case, it is clear that the purpose of the language was not to 
protect the beneficiary's interest from being deleted by an amendment, as seems to be the 
perception in Banks, but rather to insure that the revocable living trust was not deemed 
illusory. 
In the most recent of the Banksy progeny, Hoggan v. Hoggan, 2007 UT 78, 169 P.3d 
750 (attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit A), the Supreme Court of Utah, once again, 
questioned the Banks decision. In Hoggan, the trustor created a trust in 1987. Id. at ^|2. 
Under the terms of the trust, the trust property was to be used for the trustor's benefit during 
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her lifetime, and was to be distributed equally among her three children upon her death. Id. 
The trustor expressly reserved the right to amend, modify, or revoke the trust, and the trust 
contained a clause that stated as follows: 'The interest of the beneficiaries is a present 
interest which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death." 
Id. In 2002, the trustor executed an amendment to the trust modifying the allocation of trust 
property upon her death. Id. at [^3. She passed away two months after executing the 
amendment, and a beneficiary sought to invalidate the 2002 amendment. Id. at TJ4. The 
Supreme Court of Utah held that because the 2002 amendment merely modified the 
beneficiary's interest in the trust, the amendment is valid. Id. at \\6. 
However, in the Hoggan analysis, the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the reasoning 
behind the Banks decision. In doing so, the Court recognized the purpose of the language 
asserting that beneficiaries have a "present interest" or a "presently vested interest" in a trust 
was to ward off potential challenges to the trust on grounds that it is illusory. Id. at FN2. 
The purpose of such language had nothing to do with protecting the beneficiary's interest 
from being deleted by an amendment (this is contrary to the impetus behind the original 
Banks analysis). Id. The Court recognized that the use of this phrase has the potential to 
produce results not within the contemplation of the drafter of trusts or their clients and 
language proclaiming beneficiaries have a "present interest" contradicts the operative terms 
of the trust. Id. The Utah Supreme Court held that the term "present interest" or "vested 
interest subject to divestment" is "more of an oxymoron than a meaningful legal term" and 
expressly "disavowed" the use of the phrase in its entirety and the logic behind its use in trust 
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documents. Id. However, the court did not expressly overrule Banks. 
In its analysis, the Court relied heavily on the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which 
wCadvocates the abandonment of such confusing and disingenuous terminology in favor of an 
open recognition that there is no requirement that a beneficial's interest be either present or 
vested." Id. (citing Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 25 reporter's notes, cmt. B (2003)). 
Statements, such as the one at issue in this case, confuse the issue and the reader, and ignore 
the reality that courts regularly and properly find valid trusts where settlors have retained 
complete control, and where the other beneficiaries have otily future interests that are not 
only defeasible by revocation or amendment, but also contingent upon surviving the settlor in 
addition to other events. Id. 
Finally, the Utah legislature has effectively overruled Banks' strict interpretation of 
trust law by adopting the Uniform Trust Code's position on tlie revocation and amendment of 
revocable trusts. Utah Code Annotated section 75-7-605 governs the revocation and 
amendment of revocable trusts and states, in relevant part, as follows: 
(3) The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable tru$t: 
(a) by substantially complying with a method (provided in the terms of 
the trust; or 
(b) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method 
provided in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by: 
(i) executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to the 
trust or specifically devises property that would otherwise have 
passed according to the terms of the trust; or 
(ii) any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence 
of the settlor's intent. | 
(4) Upon revocation of a revocable trust, the trustee shall deliver the trust 
property as the settlor directs. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)-(4) (2009) (note, this law was enacted by Chapter 89, in the 
2004 General Session, after the Banks decision and before the Final Amendment was 
executed by Darlene). 
Therefore, under current trust law, a revocable trust may be revoked or amended by 
"any ... method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent," unless the 
terms of the trust not only specify a method, but also expressly make it exclusive. Id. 
Further, even if the trust terms expressly provide an exclusive method of revocation or 
amendment, substantial compliance (rather than strict compliance as required in Banks) will 
be sufficient. Id. 
B. Scholarly authorities agree that Banks v. Means should be expressly overruled because 
this court has substantially limited its effect and questioned its analysis in subsequent 
case law and Utah has taken legislative steps that effectively overrule the decision 
In a 2004 Utah Bar Journal article entitled wcCan you Amend that Revocable Trust? 
Utah Estate Planning Lawyers Face a Trap for the Unwary", Charles M. Bennett, a Fellow in 
the American College of Trust & Estate Counsel, a past chair of the Utah Estate Planning 
Section, and an adjunct professor of law at the University of Utah, further questioned the 
propriety of the Banks decision by declaring: 
The Banks analysis is thus revealed to be seriously flawed. It is illogical to 
believe that a trustor reserves the power "to amend, modify or revoke" only to 
restrict the right to amend, but not the right to revoke. Such a reading truly 
exalts form over substance. Under general contract law, uan interpretation that 
will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only where the contract so 
expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no other reasonable 
interpretation to be given it." Pierce v. Pierce, ]fl9, 994 P.2d 193, 386 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 38, 2000 UT 7 (citations omitted). Far from requiring an 
unreasonable interpretation, the Banks trust language supports the opposite 
conclusion. The trustor in Banks did not retain just the power ccto amend, 
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modify or revoke." Instead, she retained the right "to dmend, modify or revoke 
this Trust in whole or in part." Indeed, the trust document reiterated that the 
revocation could be in whole or in part in the very next sentence: "Such 
revocation or amendment of this Trust may be in whole or in part by written 
instrument." The Court should have recognized tnat an amendment that 
deletes one beneficiary and adds another is a revocation of the Trust "in part" 
as to the deleted beneficiary's rights in the trust. 
Charles M. Bennett, Can you Amend that Revocable Trust? 
Face a Trap for the Unwary, 2004 Utah Bar Journal, available at 
http ://webster.utahbar.org^aij oumal^ 
Utah Estate Planning Lawyers 
(attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit J). 
Mr. Bennett is not alone in his disagreement with thi rationale and propriety of the 
Banks decision. Since the Banks decision, Utah courts have peen scrambling to find ways to 
mitigate the decision's harsh effects and explain its rationale 
The court itself has taken proactive measures to substantially minimize the adverse effect of 
Banks (see Flake and Hoggan, Addendum, Exhibit A), and the Utah Legislature has also 
taken action to address Banks by replacing Banks' strict 
(as illustrated above in Part A). 
compliance rationale with an 
intention of the settlor rationale. 
Decisions such as Banks, while arguably at one time supported by traditional trust law 
doctrines, not only are "intention defeating", but also "exalt form over substance" in ignoring 
the practical reality that settlors of revocable trusts commonly use them as will substitutes 
and consider the trust assets as their own, without limitation. 
Trusts and the Law of Wills: An Imperfect Fit, at pp. 11-12, available at 
http ://works .bepress. com/eg^ 
See Alan Newman, Revocable 
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section attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit K). For this reason, the Uniform Trust Code, 
which Utah codified, relaxes considerably the rules followed by some jurisdictions in cases 
such as Banks, under which, if the terms of the trust prescribe a method for revoking or 
amending it, the settlor may do so only by employing the method so specified. Id.; see also 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)-(4) (2009). Rather than requiring the strict, "intention-
defeating" compliance with the trust language the Court specified in Banks, the Utah 
Uniform Trust Code's trust revocation and amendment rules are "intent furthering." Id. 
Based on the foregoing, Ron's argument is flawed. Ron would have this court believe 
that Darlene Patterson intentionally reserved the power to amend, modify, or revoke her trust 
in one part of the trust instrument, only to restrict the right to amend, but not the right to 
revoke, in a latter part of the same instrument. (R. at 331-33). Such a reading of the Family 
Trust truly exalts the form of the trust instrument over its substance. Instead, this court 
should recognize that Darlene intended to reserve the right to disinherit or not provide for any 
beneficiary not only by way of a revocation, but also by way of an amendment. It should also 
be recognized that an amendment which eliminates the beneficial interest of one beneficiary 
(such as the Second Amendment in this case) constitutes a total revocation of the trust as to 
that beneficiary's rights in the trust estate. Thus, the total revocation Ron insists upon has, in 
fact, taken place. 
Further, the case analyses of Banks, Flake, and Hoggan above, evidence a desire by 
this court to "soften" Banks and distance itself from the harsh effects of its earlier decision. 
This worthy desire has, however, lead to the potential for extreme inequities that have been 
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revealed in the case at hand. Under the Court's rationale in 
argued by Ron, it would have been valid for Darlene to have effectively eliminated Ron's 
beneficial interest in the trust estate by signing an amendment which reduced that interest to 
no more than one penny. (R. at 333). Ron argued, however, that it was not valid for Darlene 
to sign an amendment which expressly reduced Ron's interest to nothing. 
Therefore, because this court has taken steps through 
Banks, Flake, and Hoggan, as 
subsequent case law to reduce 
the potential inequities that could result from the Banks decision and acknowledged its 
"vested interest" analysis in Banks may have been flawed, and because Utah law now places 
an elevated interest on the clear intent of the settlor of the trust agreement, Banks should be 
finally and expressly overruled. For these reasons, Defendant's Counter Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment should be granted. 
II. THE ASSETS OF THE FAMILY TRUST SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE FINAL AMENDMENT 
The assets of the Family Trust should be distributed pursuant to the Final Amendment 
dated May 20, 2006. Ron suggests, by way of his Motion ibr Partial Summary Judgment, 
that this Final Amendment ''violated the rules" of the Family Trust because it eliminated 
Ron's interest in the trust estate upon the death of Darlen 
position, Ron relies primarily on the case of Banks v. Means 
its progeny. However, as explained previously, Ron's argument is flawed. The facts and law 
of this case support the enforcement of the Final Amendment and Defendant's Counter 
p Patterson. In support of his 
52 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2002), and 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. 
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A. Darlene Patterson effectively amended and/ or partially revoked the Family Trust, and 
its Trust Restatement, via the Final Amendment pursuant to the Utah Uniform Trust 
Code and the provisions of the Family Trust, and its Trust Restatement 
Because Darlene substantially, if not completely, complied with the terms of the 
Family Trust (as amended by the Trust Restatement) when she amended and partially 
revoked provisions of the trust by means of the Final Amendment, and because the Final 
Amendment manifests the clear and convincing intent of Darlene, as settlor, to remove Ron's 
beneficial interest from the trust, the Family Trust was effectively modified and the trust 
estate should be governed by the terms of the Final Amendment. 
As mentioned above, the Utah legislature, after the Banks decision, enacted trust laws 
relaxing the strict compliance and adherence to traditional trust law which was relied on in 
the Banks case. Rather than requiring strict compliance to a trust's language, Utah trust law 
now requires only substantial compliance with the trust's terms to modify, revoke, or amend 
revocable trust instruments. Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-605(3)-(4) (2009). Further, unless a 
revocable trust instrument ''expressly made exclusive" a means of modifying, revoking, or 
amending a trust, any method will suffice that manifests "clear and convincing evidence of 
the settlor's intent." Id. 
Darlene's execution of the Final Amendment substantially complied with the 
provisions of the Family Trust as restated by the Trust Restatement. The Trust Restatement 
provides, in relevant part, as follows: 
I reserve the right to amend or revoke this Trust in whole or in part. Such 
amendment or revocation shall be by written instrument and shall be effective 
upon the signing thereof by me without notice to any successor Trustee. 
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See Trust Restatement, Art. II (R. at 42, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit H). The Trust 
Restatement also contains beneficiary interest language similar to that in the Family Trust 
ierest which shall continue until and provides: "The interest of the beneficiaries is a present in 
this Trust is revoked or temiinated." Id. at Art. V.B, (R. at 43). 
The Trust Restatement provides that a beneficiary's interest continues until the Trust 
is revoked or terminated. Id. Further, the revoking languag^ states that a revocation can be 
"in whole or in part" so long as the revocation is done by written instrument. Id. Nothing in 
the Trust Restatements language requires the revocation to be a complete revocation to 
discontinue a beneficiary's interest, and, unlike the trust in Banks, there is no specific 
language in the Trust Restatement stating a complete revocation requires the trust property to 
be returned to the settlor, thereby, distinguishing an amendment and a revocation. 
By executing the Final Amendment on May 30, 2006, Darlene substantially, if not 
wholly, complied with the terms of the Trust Restatement 
Ron's beneficial interest in the trust estate. It is respectfully submitted that an amendment 
that deletes one beneficiary (Ron) is a revocation of the trust uin part" as to the deleted 
beneficiary's (Ron's) rights in the trust. The Final Amendment and revocation of Ron's 
rights in the trust was done by a written instrument and signed by Darlene, thereby, satisfying 
the only mandatory revocation requirement established by 
substantially complied with the terms of the Trust Restatement, and effectively, pursuant to 
Utah trust law, removed Ron as a beneficiary by revoking tfye trust provision providing for 
to amend the trust and revoke 
the trust. Therefore, Darlene 
Ron's beneficial interest. 
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Further, there is no language in the Trust Restatement making any method of 
revocation or amendment of its provisions the exclusive method. Therefore, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-7-605(3)(b)(ii) is relevant and provides: 'The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable 
trust ... if ... the method provided in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by ... any 
other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent." This is 
consistent with longstanding common law trust interpretation policy that when interpreting 
the terms of a trust, the proper focus of inquiry is the settlor's intent. See Leggroan v. Zion's 
Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 232 P.2d 746, 749 (1951). Therefore, pursuant to Utah trust law, 
because no means of revocation was made exclusive, Darlene could revoke Ron's beneficial 
share in the trust estate by any method manifesting her clear and convincing intent. 
B. Darlene Patterson clearly intended not to provide for Ron under the Trust 
In this case, and for purposes of the parties' respective motions for partial summary 
judgment, Darlene's intent in executing the May 30, 2006 Final Amendment is undisputed. 
The Final Amendment, executed by Darlene after she had discovered that Ron was 
unlawfully using her credit card to make personal unauthorized purchases, and shortly after 
Darlene discovered that Ron had stolen a $52,936.53 check from her, forged her signature, 
and illegally used the funds, makes the intent of Darlene, as settlor, explicit and 
incontrovertible by stating as follows: 
I have intentionally not provided anything for my son Ronald S. Patterson (or 
his descendants) since I have already properly provided for this son during his 
lifetime as I felt was appropriate. 
See Exhibit D of Complaint, at TJC, (R. at 58-61, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit I) and 
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see Supplemental and Corrected Affidavit of Randy Patterson at 1fl[4-5, (R- a t 474-84, 
attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit E, and court docket, 
Exhibit D). The intent of Darlene is clear that she wishes to 
attached hereto as Addendum, 
remove Ron as a beneficiary of 
the Family Trust. Therefore, Darlene's partial revocation of Ron's interest in the trust estate 
by means of the Final Amendment was sufficient, because it 
not provide any part of the trust estate to Ron, and that she had already properly provided for 
Ron as she felt was appropriate. The trust estate should be qistributed pursuant to the terms 
of the Final Amendment. 
clearly manifested her intent to 
Darlene Patterson Clearly Intended that She be the OAly Beneficiary With a Presently 
Vested Interest in the Trust Estate Prior to the Date d>f Her Death. 
Again, when interpreting the terms of a trust, the proper focus of inquiry is always the 
grantor's intent. In the Banks case, on which Ron so heavily relies, the court seemingly 
ignored the practical intent and purpose of the trust at issue 
on the grantor's use of the phrase "vested interests" in 
^nd, instead, placed great focus 
determining the rights of the 
contingent future beneficiaries. That same mistake should not be made in the case at hand. 
Rather, Utah should acknowledge and follow the increasing national trend to treat the 
interest of a remainder beneficiary in a revocable trust during the lifetime of the settlor as a 
mere expectancy. See, e.g., Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 
a revocable trust who retains both the equitable life interest and the power to alter and revoke 
the beneficiary designation has used the trust form to achieve the effect of testation. Only 
nomenclature distinguishes the remainder interest created 
25 cmt. A (2003). The settlor of 
by such a trust from the mere 
expectancy arising under a will. Consistent with this positioji, under the Restatement (Third) 
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of Trusts, creditors of a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust may not reach her interest 
in the trust during the settlor's lifetime and, therefore, should not be treated as a vested 
interest. See Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 56 cmt. B (2003); see also Alan Newman, 
Revocable Trusts and the Law of Wills: An Imperfect Fit, at p.7, FN44, available at 
http://works.bepress.coiri/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=alan_newman (citing 
John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 
Harv. L. Rev. 1108,1113 (1984)) (relevant section attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit K). 
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 75-7-606(1) (2009) provides cc[w]hile a trust is revocable and the 
settlor has capacity to revoke the trust, rights of the beneficiaries are subject to the control of 
and the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively to, the settlor" (emphasis added). 
Regardless of the inclusion of the phrase "vested interests", when the Family Trust is 
read as a whole, it is clear that only Darlene Patterson held a vested beneficial interest in the 
trust estate, and that she intended for her Children to have only a contingent beneficial 
interest in the trust estate. The Family Trust was established "for the primary benefit of 
[Darlene Patterson] during [her] lifetime," and was designed to benefit her children only after 
her death. (R. at 13, attached hereto as Addendum, Exhibit F). During Darlene's lifetime, 
she was the only beneficiary of the Family Trust who was in any way entitled to the income 
or principal of the trust estate. (R. at 14). 
By contrast, Darlene's Children (including Ron) had no right to use, access, or 
demand any portion of the trust estate during Darlene's lifetime. Accordingly, the interests 
of the Children were contingent and not vested. Based on the underlying structure of the 
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Family Trust, it is illogical for Ron to argue that Darlene intended for each of her Children to 
have a present interest in the trust property that was terminable only by way of a total 
revocation of the entire trust instrument. For all practical purposes, the Children had no such 
interest. Thus, Darlene could properly amend the Trust during her lifetime to eliminate or 
terminate a contingent beneficial interest previously provided in the Trust for Ron, and could 
do so without the necessity of a complete revocation or termination of the entire Trust 
Agreement. Only the trust or contingent beneficial interest for Ron needed to be terminated 
or revoked, as opposed to the termination or revocation of the entire Trust. This is precisely 
what Darlene did, and intended to do, by the Final Amendment. 
D. It Would be Illogical and Inequitable for the Court to Interpret the Plain Language of 
the Family Trust as Creating a Presently Vested Beneficial Interest in Ron or His 
Siblings 
If Ron insists on a literal interpretation of the Family Trust, then the phrase "vested 
interests", as used in Paragraph 3.2 of the original trust agreement, can only apply to those 
individuals who had a present unconditional lifetime benericial interest in the trust estate 
(i.e., only Darlene Patterson). In order for something to be 'Vested5', it must be an 
"absolute", "unconditional", "completed", and "consummated right for present or future 
enjoyment". BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 4837 (8th ed.2004). That is, a vested interest 
cannot in any way be "conditional". Id. In this case, Darlene Patterson was the only 
beneficiary of the Family Trust who had an absolute, unconditional, completed, and 
consummated right to use any portion (or all) of the Fami 
beneficiary had such an interest. In fact, Ron's rights to the 
y Trust estate. No other trust 
rust property (and the rights of 
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the other beneficiary Children) only became absolute and unconditional upon Darlene's 
death, and then only to the extent provided in the terms of the trust as modified. Until that 
time, Darlene retained the absolute power to change the trust terms, to use all or any portion 
of the trust estate for any purpose which she deemed fit, and/or to revoke the trust in part or 
in its entirety. Darlene Patterson was under no obligation to continue the trust, or to 
otherwise protect and preserve the trust property for the benefit of any person other than 
herself. For Ron to claim that he had a vested absolute and unconditional interest in the trust 
estate during the life of his mother, despite the fact that he had no right to any of the trust 
property during that time, ignores the very definition of the term "vested," and defies logic. 
Under the facts of this case, the only rational interpretation of Paragraph 3.2 is to 
construe it as applying only to the active primary trust beneficiaries. "The active 
beneficiaries of a trust, as distinct from the contingent beneficiaries, are the individuals for 
whose benefit and support the property is presently being managed." In re Estate of West, 
948 P.2d 351,355 (Utah 1997). In other words, logic would suggest that the "beneficiaries" 
being referred to in Paragraph 3.2 as having a "presently vested interest" are only those 
beneficiaries who are presently (i.e., at the time in question) entitled to the trust property and 
do, in fact, have an absolute and unconditional interest therein. In this case, the only such 
beneficiary at the time of the creation of the Family Trust was Darlene Patterson. 
Interpreting Paragraph 3.2 along those lines makes practical sense given the obvious fact that 
the future contingent beneficiaries of the Family Trust (i.e., the Children) had no presently 
actionable rights with regard to any trust property during the grantor's lifetime. {See 
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Uniform Trust Code § 603(a) (endorses the general rule that djiring the settlor's lifetime, the 
remainder beneficiaries, i.e., the children, may not enforce the trust). 
This interpretation also coincides with the rulings of courts from other jurisdictions. 
In California, for example, it has been held that "[s]o long as a trust is revocable, a 
beneficiary's rights are merely potential, rather than vested [and] [t]he beneficiary's interest 
could evaporate in a moment at the whim of the trustor . . 
>nd 
f. Johnson v. Kotyck, 76 Cal. 
App. 4th 83, 88 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1999). "Giving a beneficiary with a contingent, 
nonvested interest all the rights of a vested beneficiary is untenable[J [w]e cannot confer on 
the contingent beneficiary rights that are illusory, which the peneficiary only hopes to have 
upon the death of the trustor." Id. During Darlene Patterson's lifetime, the beneficial rights 
of Ron in the trust estate were potential, illusory, non-vested rights - nothing more. 
Furthermore, under these circumstances, it would be wholly inequitable for the court 
to award Ron an interest in the trust estate other than that which was left to him under the 
Final Amendment. Under general contract law, wCan interpretation that will produce an 
inequitable result will be adopted only where the contract so 
provides that there is no other reasonable interpretation to 
expressly and unequivocally so 
pe given it". Peirce v. Peirce, 
2000 UT 7, Tfl9, 994 P.2d 193. Because a trust is fundamentally a contractual relationship 
between one or more individuals, these same principles woulg apply and should further dilute 
Ron's claims. 
Under the facts of this case, equity demands an interpretation of Paragraph 3.2 
consistent with the foregoing portions of this Memorandum During the time when Ron was 
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living with his elderly mother, Ron secretly used his mother's credit cards to purchase four-
wheelers for his business without any permission to do so. Ron made these purchases 
through the internet and, when discovered, made no attempt to repay the amounts that he had 
stolen. During approximately February of 2006, Ron stole a $52,936.53 check from his 
mother, forged his mother's signature, cashed the check, and used the funds for his own 
personal benefit without his mother's knowledge or consent. After this wrongdoing was 
discovered, Ron was convicted of the crimes of "Elder Abuse" and ''Exploitation of an 
Elder", and was sentenced to forty five days in the county jail. 
Darlene Patterson, after discovering the criminal conduct of Ron, then prepared and 
executed the Final Amendment. Ron now has the temerity to ask this court to disregard his 
prior conduct, ignore the changes his mother rightfully made to the Family Trust by way of 
the Final Amendment, and interpret the trust language in a manner that favors his own selfish 
financial interests to the detriment of others. Under these facts, Ron's interpretation of the 
Family Trust (Paragraph 3.2 in particular) would produce a completely inequitable and 
unconscionable result in the distribution of his deceased mother's estate. This court should 
not sanction such misconduct by giving credibility to Ron's argument, and awarding him 
funds to which he has no lawful or equitable entitlement. 
E. The facts of this case distinguish it from the Banks' case and the Banks' case should 
not be determinative of the distribution of the Trust Estate, rather, this court should 
order the distribution in accordance with the Final Amendment 
Even if Banks is upheld by this court as good law, there are many factors 
distinguishing the case at issue from the facts of Banks. A notable factor which the Banks' 
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court relied upon in coming to this determination was that tjhe Banks' trust had a separate 
provision indicating that in the case of complete revocation, rthe Trustee shall deliver to the 
Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument of revocation, all of the Trust 
property \ Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65 at fflf 4, 10. The court reasoned that this language, 
being a specific provision of the trust, distinguished a "revocation" from an "amendment or 
modification" and established that a revocation is not the same as an amendment or 
modification in this trust. Id. at ^jll. Also noted by the court was "what the 1999 
amendment did not do". Id. at FN5. Footnote 5 points out the amendment did not change the 
purpose of the trust that Ms. Banks be provided for during her life and for the benefit of her 
family after and did not change specific identifications by name and birthdate of the children 
as her family. Id. Additionally, the court stated, accepting the 1999 amendment would 
render some trust language null and void, and would contravene the stated purpose. Id, 
However, unlike the Banks' trust, the Family Trust or Darlene Patterson, as restated 
by the Trust Restatement, contains no language governing 
nowhere in the Trust Restatement is complete revocation required, explained, or mentioned 
Rather, the Trust Restatement explicitly provides revocation 
and only requires that such be done in writing and signed bv the settlor. Therefore, unlike 
Banks, there is no distinguishing language in the Trust Restatement that would lead a party or 
the court to believe that a complete revocation is necessary 
complete revocation. In fact, 
can be made in whole or in part 
to divest a beneficiary of his or 
her rights in the trust. 
Further, the Banksy court placed emphasis on the fact the purpose of the trust would be 
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nullified if it accepted the 1999 amendment. However, in this case, the Patterson Final 
Amendment completely restated the beneficiaries of the trust and does not require any of the 
Trust Restatement's language to be rendered null and void. The purposes of the trust are still 
fulfilled, and all of its provisions can be followed, even after giving effect to the Final 
Amendment. 
Therefore, the Final Amendment should govern the disposition of the trust estate. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, the Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment and Denying Defendants' Counter Motion for Partial Summary Judgment should be 
reversed and this case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to uphold and 
enforce the Final Amendment. 
DATED this Z 0^ day of April, 2010 
OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
J&mes C. Je 
Attorney for Plaintiff, Petitioner, and 
Appellant 
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trict Court, Salt Lake, Utah, granted summary 
judgment in favor of appellees, decedent's chil-
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dent's sister, seeking enforcement of a trust that 
was purportedly modified by a later amend-
ment. The sister appealed. 
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interests under the terms of the trust itself. 
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[**1191] DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
[*P1] Decedent's children, Kenneth Alan 
Banks, Susan Banks Baker, and Bransford Mi-
chael Banks brought an action against dece-
dent's sister, Nancy Means ("Ms. Means") 
seeking enforcement of a 1992 trust that was 
purportedly modified by a 1999 amendment. 
Under the terms of the 1999 amendment, Ms. 
Means would become the sole beneficiary of 
the trust, while the Banks children would be-
come contingent beneficiaries. The trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the 
Banks children. Ms. Means appealed, arguing 
that the trial court erred by (1) granting the 
Banks children's motion for summary judg-
ment, (2) denying Ms. Mean's cross-motion for 
summary judgment, and (3) admitting the 
[***2] deposition testimony of attorney Joseph 
L. Piatt. We affirm the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment and hold that the 1999 
amendment did not effect a revocation of the 
trust as required by the trust language. There-
fore, the terms of the original trust document 
govern the disposition of the trust estate and the 
remaining issues are moot. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] On April 15, 1992, the decedent, 
Betty A. Banks ("Ms. Banks"), executed a 
document entitled the "Betty A. Banks Family 
Protection Trust," which was prepared by her 
attorney, Joseph L. Piatt ("Mr. Piatt"). As re-
quired by the terms of the trust, Ms. Banks, as 
settlor, transferred certain property into the 
trust and served as trustee until her death on 
August 24, 1999. 
[*P3] The trust provides that upon the 
death of Ms. Banks, the Banks children were to 
share equally in the proceeds of the trust estate 
and serve as joint trustees. Article I of the trust, 
"PURPOSES AND BIRTH DATES," declares 
"This Trust is established for the primary bene-
fit of the Undersigned during the Undersigned's 
lifetime, for the Undersigned's family thereaf-
ter." The document then names Ms. Banks' 
family as Kenneth Alan Banks, Susan Banks 
Baker, [***3] and Bransford Michael Banks. 
Article IV, "DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH 
OF THE UNbERSIGNED," designates the 
Banks children as joint beneficiaries of the trust 
estate upon Ms. Banks' death. Article VI, 
"TRUSTEE PROVISIONS," names the Banks 
children as joint successor trustees. 
[*P4] Tht trust agreement provides that 
the trust is revocable, and that Ms. Banks, as 
settlor, can amend certain portions of the trust, 
subject to the provisions of the trust language. 
Article III provides: 
AMENDMENT, REVOCATION AND 
ADDITIONS TO TRUST 
3.1 Rights of the Undersigned. As long as 
the Undersigned is alive, the Undersigned re-
serves the right to amend, modify or revoke this 
Trust in whole or in part, including the princi-
pal, and the present or past undisbursed income 
from such principal. Such revocation or 
amendment of this Trust may be in whole or in 
part by written instrument. Amendment, modi-
fication or revocation of this instrument shall 
be effective only when such change is delivered 
in writing to tfre then acting Trustee. On the 
revocation of tlfis instrument in its entirety, the 
Trustee shall deliver to the Undersigned, as the 
Undersigned may direct in the instrument of 
revocation, all of the [***4] Trust property. 
3.2 Interest^ of the Beneficiaries. The inter-
ests of the beheficiaries are presently vested 
interests subject to divestment which shall con-
tinue until this Trust is revoked or terminated 
other than by death. As long as this Trust sub-
sists, the Trust properties and all the rights and 
privileges hereunder shall be controlled and 
exercised by the Trustee named herein in their 
fiduciary capacity. 
[*P5] In August 1999, Ms. Banks exe-
cuted an amendment to the trust. The amend-
ment consists <^f three replacement pages in-
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serted into the trust document. It does not 
change article I of the trust, which states that 
the trust's purpose is to benefit Ms. Banks dur-
ing her lifetime and her family thereafter, and 
names the Banks children as her family. The 
amendment does, however, change the benefi-
ciaries and the successor trustees. The amend-
ment changes article IV, "DISPOSITION ON 
THE DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED," 
[** 1192] to allocate 100% of the trust estate to 
Ms. Banks' older sister, Ms. Means, on the 
death of Ms. Banks, with the Banks children 
listed as alternate beneficiaries should Ms. 
Means predecease Ms. Banks. In addition, arti-
cle VI of the amendment, "TRUSTEE 
PROVISIONS," changes [***5] the successor 
trustee to Ms. Means, with the Banks children 
to serve as joint successor trustees if Ms. 
Means predeceases Ms. Banks. 
[*P6] After Ms. Banks died in August, 
1999, the parties disputed whether the 1999 
amendment or the original trust agreement 
governed the disposition of the trust. On Octo-
ber 14, 1999, the Banks children filed a com-
plaint against Ms. Means seeking, among other 
things, a finding that they were the rightful 
trustees and beneficiaries of the trust, and were 
therefore entitled to the trust proceeds. Ms. 
Means counterclaimed, asserting that the 1999 
amendment governed the disposition of the 
trust and that she was the sole beneficiary. Af-
ter a series of motions and cross-motions, the 
trial court granted the Banks children's motion 
for summary judgment, and this appeal fol-
lowed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P7] [HN1] Summary judgment is appro-
priate where there are no genuine issues of ma-
terial fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 
56(c); Gerbich v. Numed, Inc., 1999 UT 37, 
P10, 977 P.2d 1205. When reviewing the trial 
court's ruling in a motion for summary judg-
ment, we consider all facts and [***6] infer-
ences to be drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the nonmoving party. Peterson v. 
Sunrider Corp., 2002 UT 43, P13, 446 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 40 . We review the trial court's grant 
of summary judgment for correctness, accord-
ing no deference to that court's legal conclu-
sions. Oxendine v. Overturf, 1999 UT 4, P7, 
973 P.2d 417; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah 1994). In addition, we may affirm a grant 
of summary judgment on any ground available 
to the trial court, even if it was not relied upon 
below. Bailey v. Boyles, 2002 UT 58, P10, _ 
P.3d _ ; Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 
231, 235 (Utah 1993). 
ANALYSIS 
[EDITOR'S NOTE: TEXT WITHIN 
THESE SYMBOLS [0><0] IS 
OVERSTRUCK IN THE SOURCE.] 
[*P8] Ms. Means argues that the trial court 
erred when it (1) granted the Banks children's 
motion for summary judgment, (2) denied Ms. 
Means' motion for summary judgment, and (3) 
determined that the attorney-client privilege did 
not protect Mr. Piatt's deposition statements. ' 
When the trial court granted summary judg-
ment to the Banks children, it found that 
the[0>ir<0] children's [***7| interest in the 
trust was vested subject to divestiture only 
through a revocation of the trust, that the trust 
was never revoked, and that the Banks children 
were therefore the sole beneficiaries of the trust 
and entitled to receive disbursement of the trust 
corpus as set forth in the original trust docu-
ment. 
1 These statements were relevant to the 
Banks children's claim of undue influ-
ence or lack of capacity to amend the 
trust; because of our disposition of the 
other questions on appeal, we do not 
reach this issue. 
I. THE TERMS OF THE ORIGINAL TRUST 
AGREEMENT 
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[*P9] It is well settled [HN2] that "[a] 
trust is a form of ownership in which the legal 
title to property is vested in a trustee, who has 
equitable duties to hold and manage it for the 
benefit of the beneficiaries." Continental Bank 
& Trust Co. v. Country Club Mobile Estates, 
Ltd., 632 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1981)(citmg Re-
statement (Second) of Trusts § 2 (1959)). "Once 
the settlor has created the trust he is no longer 
the owner [***8] of the trust property and has 
only such ability to deal with it as is expressly 
reserved to him in the trust instrument." Id. (cit-
ing Boone v. Davis, 64 Miss. 133, 8 So. 202 
(Miss. 1886)). Thus, a settlor has the power to 
modify or revoke a trust only if and to the ex-
tent that such power is explicitly reserved by 
the terms of the trust. Continental Bank, 632 
P.2d at 872; see also Kline v. Utah Dep't. of 
Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989)(citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 
330-331 (1959)); accord Clayton v. Behle, 565 
P.2d 1132, 1133 (Utah 1977). Furthermore, 
"the creation of a trust involves the transfer of 
[** 1193] property interests in the trust subject-
matter to the beneficiaries. These interests can-
not be taken from [the beneficiaries] except in 
accordance with a provision of the trust instru-
ment." George G. Bogert & George T. Bogert, 
Trusts & Trustees § 998 (2d ed. rev. 1983). 
Thus, our analysis begins with an examination 
of the original trust language to see what pow-
ers Ms. Banks reserved for herself as the trustee 
and what beneficial interests she created.2 
2 Ms. Banks was the settlor of the trust, 
the "Undersigned" in the trust document, 
and the trustee of the trust once it was 
created. 
[***9]yl Revocation 
[*P10] Article III, entitled 
"AMENDMENT, REVOCATION AND 
ADDITIONS TO TRUST," clearly reserves the 
settlor's right to amend, modify or revoke the 
trust. Section 3.1 states "Rights of the Under-
signed. . . . The Undersigned reserves the right 
to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole 
or in part " The trust specifies that "revoca-
tion or amendment of this Trust may be in 
whole or in part by written instrument. 
Amendment, modification or revocation of this 
instrument shall be effective only when such 
change is delivered in writing to the then acting 
Trustee." However, the trust indicates that in 
the case of complete revocation, "the Trustee 
shall deliver t^ the Undersigned, as the Under-
signed may direct in the instrument of revoca-
tion, all of the Trust property." Thus, the trust 
specifies that for Ms. Banks to completely re-
voke the trust, all the property must be trans-
ferred back to Ms. Banks, after which she could 
presumably create a new trust or dispose of the 
property as she saw fit. 
[*P11] It is clear from the trust language 
that Ms. Banks reserved for herself the power 
to amend, modify, or revoke the trust in whole 
or in part. Any such changes [***10] were to 
be specified in writing and delivered to her, but 
in the case of a complete revocation, all the 
property in the trust was also to be delivered to 
Ms. Banks. Revocation is therefore a specific 
provision of the trust language and is not the 
same as an amendment or modification. 
B. Beneficiary Interests 
[*P12] Npxt, we examine the trust agree-
ment to see wjhat interests Ms. Banks created 
for the trust beneficiaries. Section 3.2 reads, 
"Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of 
the beneficiaries are presently vested interests 
subject to divestment which shall continue until 
this Trust is revoked or terminated other than 
by death." By the plain language of the trust, 
the beneficiaries have "vested interests" 3 that 
continue until the interests are "revoked or ter-
minated." Here, Ms. Banks reserved the power 
to revoke, modify, or amend the trust in whole 
or in part in section 3.1, but limited that power 
in section 3.2 With regard to the beneficiaries. 
Thus, a complete revocation was required to 
divest the beneficiaries of their vested interests. 
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3 A "vested" interest is something "that 
has become a completed, consummated 
right for present or future enjoyment; not 
contingent; unconditional; absolute. . . . 
An interest may be vested, even where it 
does not carry a right to immediate pos-
session, if it does confer a fixed right of 
taking possession in the future." Black's 
Law Dictionary 1557 (7th ed. 1999). 
[***11] [*P13] Ms. Means relies on In re 
Estate of Groesbeck, 935 P.2d 1255 (Utah 
1997) for the proposition that the language in 
section 3.2 merely proves that the trust is not 
illusory and does not restrict Ms. Banks' rights 
to divest the Banks children of their vested in-
terests. Her reliance is misplaced. In Groesbeck 
we held that a revocable trust can be created, 
without being deemed illusory, as long as title 
to the property passes to the trustee and vested 
interests are created in the beneficiaries, even if 
these interests are subject to divestiture. Id. at 
1257-58 (citing Horn v. First Sec. Bank of 
Utah N.A, 548 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1976)). 
That is, a reservation of the power to revoke 
does not make a trust invalid. Id. at 1257 . We 
further observed that [HN3] vested beneficiary 
interests are "subject to being divested by the 
exercise of the reserved power to amend or re-
voke the indenture in trust." Id. at 1258. Thus, 
we concluded that the trust was valid, even 
though the Groesbecks had reserved the right to 
revoke the trust and created vested beneficiary 
interests that were subject [** 1194] to divesti-
ture via the specific provisions [***12] of the 
trust itself. 4 Id. at 1258. Groesbeck, therefore, 
does not require us to disregard the require-
ments of the trust language. 
4 The Groesbeck trust language was 
remarkably similar to the trust language 
at issue here: "The interest of the benefi-
ciaries is a present interest which shall 
continue until this Trust is revoked or 
terminated other than by death." Id. at 
1258. In that case, however, we were not 
called upon to determine whether a revo-
cation had taken place that would have 
divested the beneficiaries of their inter-
ests. Id. 
[*P14] Ms. Banks reserved the right to 
amend, modify, or revoke the trust, specified 
how such changes were to be accomplished, 
and created vested beneficiary interests that 
could be divested only though a complete revo-
cation of the trust. Our next step, therefore, is 
to look to the 1999 amendment to see whether 
it complied with the terms of the trust. 
II. THE 1999 AMENDMENT 
[*P15] The 1999 amendment contains two 
primary changes. First, it changes [***13] arti-
cle IV, "DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH OF 
THE UNDERSIGNED," to allocate 100% of 
the trust estate to Ms. Means on the death of 
Ms. Banks. Second, article VI, "TRUSTEE 
PROVISIONS," changes Ms. Banks' successor 
trustee from the Banks children to Ms. Means, 
unless Ms. Means predeceases Ms. Banks. 
Thus, the 1999 amendment sought to change 
the beneficiary status of the Banks children, 
thereby divesting them of their vested interests 
in the trust. 5 As discussed earlier, the Banks 
children had vested interests in the trust which 
could only be divested according to the terms 
of the original trust document. Therefore, the 
1999 amendment falls within the purview of 
article III, section 3.2 of the trust, which pro-
vides that beneficiary interests are only subject 
to divestiture via a revocation of the trust, and 
section 3.1, which requires that upon revoca-
tion the trust property must be delivered to Ms. 
Banks. 
5 Also notable is what the 1999 
amendment did not do. It did not change 
the language in article I, stating that the 
purpose of the trust was for Ms. Banks 
and her family thereafter, or the specific 
identifications by name and birthdate of 
the Banks children as her family. Accept-
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ing Ms. Means' interpretation of the 1999 
amendment would thus render some lan-
guage null and void, and contravene the 
stated purpose of the Betty A. Banks 
Family Protection Trust. 
[***14] [*P16] Neither of these require-
ments were met. Ms. Banks did not divest the 
Banks children of their vested interests in the 
trust because she did not completely revoke the 
trust in the 1999 amendment. In other words, 
the 1999 amendment did not effect a revocation 
of the trust that would have properly divested 
the Banks children of their vested interests un-
der the terms of the trust itself As we have 
previously stated, [HN4] "even a revocable 
trust clothes beneficiaries . . . with a legally en-
forceable right to insist that the terms of the 
trust be adhered to." Continental Bank & Trust 
Co. v. Country Club Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632 
P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1981). 
CONCLUSION 
[*P17] We affirm the district court's grant 
of summary judgment to the Banks children 
and find that the Betty A. Banks Family Protec-
tion Trust dated April 15, 1992, governs the 
disposition of the estate of Betty A. Banks. 
[*P18] Associate Chief Justice Durrant, 
Justice Howe, Justice Russon, and Justice Wil-
kins concur in Chief Justice Durham's opinion. 
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OPINION BY: DURHAM 
OPINION 
[**591] DURHAM, Chief Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
[*P1] Decedent's spouse, Marian Flake 
(Mrs. Flake), brought an action against the Al-
mon J. Flake Family Trust, seeking enforce-
ment of the trust dated September 22, 1987 (the 
1987 Trust Agreement) and making numerous 
claims regarding her rights as a beneficiary. 
The 1987 Trust Agreement was purportedly 
modified or replaced by a subsequent trust 
document entitled Restatement of the Almon J. 
Flake Family Trust dated October 30, 1998 (the 
1998 Restatement). The 1998 Restatement pur-
ported to change significantly many of Mrs. 
Flake's benefits as outlined in the 1987 Trust 
Agreement. Prior [***2] to the filing of any 
action, the parties met to discuss a possible set-
tlement. Joel Flake, as trustee (the trustee) filed 
a motion before trial to enforce the settlement 
agreement that he claimed was reached on 
April 14, 199^ (the 1999 Settlement Agree-
ment). 
[*P2] Th£ trial court addressed the issues 
in two phases. In the first phase, the court con-
sidered whether the parties had reached an en-
forceable settlement agreement before the ac-
tion was filed. The court held that the parties 
had reached a valid settlement agreement on 
several issues, but that there was no mutual re-
lease of claims. The second phase considered 
Mrs. Flake's claims of undue influence relating 
to the 1998 Restatement and the formation of 
JALCOM, L.L.C., a family limited liability 
company. The trustee filed a motion to dismiss, 
arguing that Mrs. Flake stated she had no evi-
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dence to offer and would rely solely on the 
documents at issue. The trial court granted the 
trustee's motion to dismiss in part. The court 
concluded that the 1998 Restatement did not 
fully supercede the 1987 Trust Agreement, spe-
cifically holding that under the 1987 Trust 
Agreement Mrs. Flake was entitled to monthly 
support from the trust. The [***3] court also 
determined that Mrs. Flake was entitled to re-
ceive the decedent's social security and retire-
ment funds as outlined in the 1987 Trust 
Agreement. 
[*P3] Mrs. Flake appealed, arguing that 
the enforcement of an unexecuted agreement, 
[**592] the 1999 Settlement Agreement, con-
stitutes reversible error. She also contends that 
she held certain rights under the trust which can 
only be relinquished by express waiver. The 
trustee filed a cross-appeal arguing, among 
several issues, that the 1998 Restatement did in 
fact supercede the 1987 Trust Agreement. The 
trustee, therefore, contends that the Trust is en-
titled to a reimbursement of the support pay-
ments previously paid to Mrs. Flake. We affirm 
the trial court's granting of the trustee's motion 
to dismiss, but reverse the finding that the 1998 
Restatement did not effect a revocation of the 
trust. We find that the 1998 Restatement fully 
replaced and superceded the original 1987 
Trust Agreement. Therefore, the terms of the 
1998 Restatement and subsequent 1999 Settle-
ment Agreement govern the disposition of the 
trust estate. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P4] Almon J. Flake (Mr. Flake) and his 
first wife, Lois Flake, had five children. Mr. 
[***4] Flake's first wife subsequently passed 
away. On September 22, 1987, Mr. Flake exe-
cuted the 1987 Trust Agreement by which he 
created the "Almon J. Flake Family Trust." 
Shortly thereafter, on October 5, 1987, Mr. 
Flake married Marian R. Flake. Article II of the 
1987 Trust Agreement states that "this trust is 
specifically designed for the use and benefit of 
the Undersigned Almon J. Flake, and spouse, 
for the lifetime of the Undersigned, then for the 
use and benefit of the Undersigned's children, 
except as contained herein" (emphasis added). 
The 1987 Trust Agreement made "Special Pro-
visions" for Mrs. Flake. Article VII of the 1987 
Trust Agreement provides as follows: 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
Upon the death of the Undersigned the 
Trust shall care for the needs of MARIAN R. 
FLAKE including her living arrangements in 
the home of the Undersigned or other reason-
able living quarters which may include a unit in 
the Flake duplex, at her discretion. 
B. The furnishings of the Flake home shall 
be used by Marian until her death as needed. 
C. Marian shall also enjoy Almon's social secu-
rity and all existing retirement funds. 
F. Upon the death of Almon and Marian, all 
the remainder [***5] of this trust estate shall 
be distributed to the Flake children, share and 
share alike, per stirpes. THESE SPECIAL 
PROVISIONS SHALL TAKE PRECEDENCE 
OVER ANY AND ALL OTHERS OF THIS 
TRUST AGREEMENT. 
[*P5] The 1987 Trust Agreement also 
stated that the trust was revocable, and that Mr. 
Flake as settlor could amend certain portions of 
the trust, subject to the provisions of the trust 
language. Article XIII of the 1987 Trust Agree-
ment: 
Revocation and Amendment 
A. As long as the Undersigned is alive, he 
reserves the right, without the consent or ap-
proval of any other, to amend, modify, revoke, 
or remove from this Trust the property that he 
has contributed, in whole or in part, including 
the principal and the present or past undis-
Page 7 
2003UT17,*;71P.3d589,**; 
472 Utah Adv. Rep. 18; 2003 Utah LEXIS 36, *** 
bursed income from such principal. (Emphasis 
added). 
[*P6] On October 30, 1998, Mr. Flake 
executed a document entitled the "Restatement 
of the Almon J. Flake Family Trust" (the 1998 
Restatement), which states that "Almon J. 
Flake hereby amends and restates in full the 
Almon J. Flake Family Trust dated September 
22, 1987." (emphasis added). In her brief, Mrs. 
Flake points out that Mr. Flake executed the 
1998 Restatement during his final [***6] ill-
ness and within two weeks of his death. She 
also suggests that Mr. Flakefs children facili-
tated the changes he made, significantly reduc-
ing the extent of her interest in the 1987 Trust 
Agreement. However, we note that while Mrs. 
Flake originally asserted a claim of undue in-
fluence in this case, during the second phase of 
trial, she declined to pursue her claim. We are 
therefore precluded from considering anything 
that might be relevant to a claim of undue in-
fluence. Article IX of the 1998 Restatement 
makes the following provisions for Mrs. Flake: 
[**593] Disposition at my Death 
C. Vehicles, If Marian R. Flake survives me 
she shall be distributed the Cadillac. 
D. Marian R. Flake, If Marian R. Flake 
survives me, the main part of my home (located 
at 604 East 540 North in Centerville) shall be 
held in a separate trust as a life estate for her 
benefit. The trust shall pay the following costs 
associated with the property: property insur-
ance, property taxes, electricity, heating fuel, 
water, and other city utilities. Marian R. Flake 
shall pay all other costs associated with the 
property including telephone charges and main-
tenance and upkeep costs. However, the Trus-
tee shall have [***7] discretion to pay such 
part or all of the maintenance costs of the home 
that the Trustee feels is appropriate. 
[*P7] After Mr. Flake died on November 
15, 1998, the parties disputed whether the 1987 
Trust Agreement or the 1998 Restatement gov-
erned the disposition of the trust. The trustee's 
position was that the 1998 Restatement had en-
tirely replaced the 1987 Trust Agreement. Mrs. 
Flake, however, contended that she was entitled 
to certain rights under the original trust agree-
ment which could only be relinquished through 
express waiver. The parties met on April 14, 
1999 in order to resolve their dispute and to 
discuss a possible settlement agreement. Mrs. 
Flake later filed a claim seeking enforcement of 
the original 1987 Trust Agreement. Pending the 
result of the litigation, Mrs. Flake filed a lis 
pendens on property subject to the trust, and 
argued that the recording of the lis pendens was 
done in order to give constructive notice that 
the property was subject to litigation. The trus-
tee contends that Mrs. Flake improperly filed 
the lien and failed to provide notice within 
thirty days after recordation as required under 
Utah Code Ann. sections 38-12-102 [***8] 
and 103. Appellee also argues that Mrs. Flake 
failed to release the lien within twenty days as 
required under Utah Code Ann. section 38-9-4. 
After a series of motions and cross-motions, the 
trial court granted the trustee's motion to dis-
miss and ruled on the pending issue of the lis 
pendens. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P8] [ffiil] The validity of the trust is an 
issue of law, which we review for correctness. 
Groesbech v. Groesbeck (In re Estate of 
Groesbeck), 935 P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1997). 
The grant of a motion to dismiss is likewise a 
matter of law, which the appellate court re-
views for correctness. Thimmes v. Utah State 
Univ., 2001 UTApp 93, P4, 22 P.3d257, 258. 
ANALYSIS 
[*P9] The determinative questions on ap-
peal are as follows: (1) whether the trial court 
erred in concluding that the 1998 Restatement 
did not fully supercede the 1987 Trust Agree-
ment; (2) whetjher the trial court erred when it 
found that section 75-3-912 of the Utah Uni-
form Probate Code is not applicable to nonpro-
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bate transfers, such as trust administration in 
decedent's estates, and therefore does not apply 
to the 1999 Agreement; (3) [***9] whether 
the trial court erred in failing to find that Mrs. 
Flake was estopped to make claims beyond the 
scope of the 1999 Settlement Agreement; (4) 
whether the trial court erred in failing to award 
attorneys' fees and costs relating to the lis 
pendens; and (5) whether the court should di-
rect removal of the trustee. We reverse the rul-
ing of the trial court as to the first issue, and 
affirm regarding the remaining issues. 
[*P10] In granting the trustee's motion to 
dismiss, the trial court found that the 1998 Re-
statement did not fully replace the 1987 Trust 
Agreement, and that the documents must be 
read together to determine the governing terms 
of the trust. We disagree, and hold that the 
1987 Trust Agreement was entirely superceded 
by the 1998 Restatement. We further conclude 
that Mrs. Flake and the trustee reached an en-
forceable oral settlement agreement at a meet-
ing held on April 14, 1999. However, the 1999 
Settlement Agreement did not resolve all the 
issues between the parties, and thus did not in-
clude a release of claims nor did it preclude 
Mrs. Flake from asserting other claims against 
the trust to the extent they (1) are provided for 
in the 1998 Restatement and (2) were not 
[*** 10] discussed and agreed upon at the April 
14, 1999 settlement meeting. 
[**594] I. THE TERMS OF THE 1987 
TRUST AGREEMENT 
[*P11] [HN2] A trust is an arrangement 
for the ownership of property. The nature of the 
arrangement is such that the legal title of the 
property is held by the trustee, but the benefit 
and enjoyment of the property resides with the 
beneficiaries. It is well settled that 
[a] t rust . . . is a fiduciary relationship with re-
spect to property, subjecting the person by 
whom the title to the property is held [the trus-
tee] to equitable duties to deal with the property 
for the benefit of another person [the benefici-
ary], which arises as a result of a manifestation 
[by the settlor, or trustor] of an intention to cre-
ate it. 
In re Estate of West, 948 P.2d 351, 353 (Utah 
1997) (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 
2 (1959)). There must be an intent by the settlor 
to confer a beneficial interest in the property in 
some other person. To create an inter vivos 
trust, 
[a] settlor must have an intent to create a pres-
ently enforceable trust, . . . the trust property 
must be clearly specified and set aside, . . . and 
the essential terms of the trust [*** 11] must be 
clear enough for the court to enforce the equi-
table duties that are the sine qua non of a trust 
relationship. 
Sundquist v. Sundquist, 639 P.2d 181, 183-84 
(Utah 1981) (citations omitted). 
[*P12] [HN3] "A trust is a form of owner-
ship in which the legal title to property is 
vested in a trustee, who has equitable duties to 
hold and manage it for the benefit of benefici-
aries." Confl Bank & Trust Co. v. Country 
Club Mobile Estates, Ltd, 632 P.2d 869, 872 
(Utah 1981) (citing Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts § 2 (1959)). The trustee has exclusive 
control of the trust property, subject only to the 
limitations imposed by law or the trust instru-
ment, and "once the settlor has created the trust 
he is no longer the owner of the trust property 
and has only such ability to deal with it as is 
expressly reserved to him in the trust instru-
ment." Id. (citation omitted). A trust must have 
an identifiable beneficiary who is capable of 
enforcing the equitable duties of the trustee. 
The transfer of property interests to the benefi-
ciaries "cannot be taken from them except in 
accordance with a provision of the trust instru-
ment . . . ." George G. Bogert & [***12] 
George T. Bogert, Trusts & Trustees § 998 (2d 
ed. rev. 1983). 
A. Revocation 
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[*P13] [HN4] Absent fraud or mistake, a 
settlor "has the power to modify a trust only if 
and to the extent that such a power was re-
served by the terms of the trust." Kline v. Utah 
Dep't of Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989); see also Restatement (Second) of Trusts 
§ 331. The same rule applies to a settlor's 
power to revoke a trust. Restatement (second) 
of Trusts § 331. Ordinarily, if a power to mod-
ify is subject to no restrictions, then a reserved 
power to amend or modify includes the power 
to revoke. Id. cmt. h. However, the settlor can-
not modify the trust if, by the terms of the trust, 
he did not reserve a power of modification. Id. 
Likewise, "if the settlor reserves a power to 
modify the trust only in a particular manner or 
under particular circumstances, he can modify 
the trust only in that manner or under those cir-
cumstances." Id. cmt. d. However, as is the case 
with the 1987 Trust Agreement, if the settlor 
does not specify the method of modification, 
then "the power may be exercised by any 
method which sufficiently manifests his inten-
tion to modify [***13] the trust." Id. cmt. c. In 
interpreting the terms of a trust, the proper fo-
cus of inquiry is the settlor's intent. Leggroan 
v. lion's Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 120 Utah 93, 
99, 232 P.2d 746, 749 (1951). 
[*P14] In Article XIII of the 1987 Trust 
Agreement, Mr. Flake expressly reserved both 
the power to modify and the power to revoke 
the trust created in 1987. The terms of the 1987 
Trust Agreement state that the "Undersigned" 
reserves the right "to amend, modify, [or] re-
voke" the Trust, and thus it is clear that the 
settlor, Mr. Flake, reserved the right to amend, 
modify, or revoke. 
Revocation and Amendment 
A. As long as the Undersigned is alive, he 
reserves the right, without the consent or ap-
proval of any other, to amend, modify, revoke, 
or remove from this Trust the [**595] prop-
erty that he has contributed, in whole or in part, 
including the principal and the present or past 
undisbursed income from such principal. 
The 1998 Restatement clearly states that it 
amends the 1987 Trust Agreement. 
[*P15] We agree with the trial court's con-
clusion that the 1998 Restatement, absent an 
explicit revocation, is construed only as a 
modification of the 1987 Trust [***14] 
Agreement. However, we find that although the 
1998 Restatement amended, or modified, the 
1987 Trust Agreement and did not revoke it in 
its entirety, the terms and contents of the 1998 
Restatement did fiilly supercede all of the op-
erative provisions of the original 1987 Trust 
Agreement. 
B. Beneficiary Interests 
[*P16] This court recently held in Banks 
v. Means, 2002 UT 65 P14, 52 P.3d 1190, that 
[HNS] a trust that specified revocation of a 
vested beneficiary interest through divestiture 
could only divest those beneficiary interests 
through a complete revocation of the trust. 
"Mrs. Banks reserved the power to revoke, 
modify, or amend the trust in whole or in part," 
and "limited that power in [a subsequent sec-
tion] with regard to the beneficiaries." Banks, 
2002 UT 65 at P12. "[A] complete revocation 
[or termination] was required to divest the 
beneficiaries of their vested interest." Id. The 
appellant in Banks relied on Groesbeck, 935 
P. 2d 1255, arguing that the limiting language 
merely proved that the trust was not illusory 
and did not restrict the grantor's right to divest 
the beneficiaries of their vested interests. 
[***15] The court in Groesbeck held that a 
reservation of the power to revoke does not 
make a trust invalid. Id. at 1257. However, in 
Banks, this court noted that Mrs. Banks re-
served the right to amend, modify, or revoke 
the trust, specified how such changes were to 
be accomplished, and created vested benefici-
ary interests that could be divested only 
through a complete revocation or termination 
of the trust. Banks, 2002 UT 65 at PI4.' 
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1 The trustee argues that to hold that a 
vested interest cannot be revoked or that 
the vested beneficiary assets cannot be 
modified is to nullify thousands of out-
standing trust agreements. However, we 
do not hold that a vested beneficiary in-
terest can never be revoked, but only that 
the revocation is subject to the terms of 
the individual trust agreement. Here, the 
trust agreement specifically states that 
the vested beneficiary interests can only 
be divested or revoked through a com-
plete revocation or termination of the 
Trust. 
[*P17] As [***16] in Banks, Mr. Flake 
reserved the right "to amend, modify, [or] re-
voke" the trust and later stated that the vested 
beneficiary interests shall continue until revo-
cation or termination of the Trust other than by 
death. Here, Article XIV of the 1987 Trust 
Agreement states as follows: 
Vested Interest of Beneficiaries 
The interest of the beneficiaries is a present 
vested interest which shall continue until the 
Trust is revoked or terminated other than by 
death. 
The 1987 Trust Agreement language can be 
distinguished from the language used in Banks. 
The limiting language in Banks was subject to a 
beneficial interest that was to be revoked or 
terminated through a complete divestiture of 
that beneficial interest. The relevant language 
from the trust in Banks is as follows: 
Article III 
AMENDMENT, REVOCATION AND 
ADDITIONS TO THE TRUST 
3.2 Interests of the Beneficiaries. The inter-
ests of the beneficiaries are presently vested 
interests subject to divestment which shall con-
tinue until this Trust is revoked or terminated 
other than by death. (Emphasis added). 
Banks, 2002 UT 65 at P4. This language at 
issue lacks any reference [***17] to a com-
plete divestiture. The beneficial interest of Mrs. 
Flake was merely amended, and not completely 
divested as was the case in Banks. The disposi-
tive issue in the present case is whether there 
was a complete divestiture of a beneficial inter-
est as in Banks, or whether there was simply a 
change in the quality, or scope, of the benefi-
cial interest. We held in Banks that [HN6] 
revocation was required when terminating a 
vested beneficial interest. 2002 UT 65 at PI4. 
[**596] Here, we find that there is no require-
ment of revocation where the beneficial interest 
is simply modified or amended but not termi-
nated. Therefore, Mrs. Flake's beneficial inter-
est, as amended, was completely outlined in the 
1998 Restatement, inasmuch as the 1998 Re-
statement contained all of the operative provi-
sions of the Almon J. Flake Family Trust. The 
purpose and primary effect of Article XIV in 
the 1987 Trust Agreement is to save the Trust 
from the doctrine of merger and to prove that 
the Trust is not illusory.2 
2 In Groesbeck, we held that [HN7] a 
revocable trust can be created, without 
being deemed illusory, as long as title to 
the property passes to the trustee and 
vested interests are created in the benefi-
ciaries, even if these interests are subject 
to divestiture. 935 P.2d at 1257-58 (cit-
ing Horn v. First Sec. Bank of Utah, 
NA., 548 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1976)). 
The relative Trust language in In re Es-
tate of Groesbeck specified that "the in-
terest of the beneficiaries is a present in-
terest which shall continue until this 
Trust is revoked or terminated other than 
by death." 935 P.2d at 1258. The reser-
vation of a power to amend, modify, or 
revoke does not make a trust invalid or 
incomplete. See Restatement (Second) of 
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Trusts § 331, cmt. j . As in In re Estate of 
Groesbeck, the vested beneficiary inter-
ests are subject to divestiture through op-
eration of the specific provisions of the 
trust, namely the reserved power to 
amend, modify, or revoke. 
[***18] II. THE 1998 RESTATEMENT 
[*P18] We next examine whether the 1998 
Restatement complied with the terms of the 
original trust and either (1) effected a revoca-
tion of the 1987 Trust Agreement or (2) was 
solely a modification as an amendment to the 
1987 Trust Agreement. 
[*P19] The question concerns the effect 
and disposition of a "restated11 trust agreement. 
The trial court held that absent an express revo-
cation, the 1998 Restatement did not fully re-
place the 1987 Trust Agreement, and that the 
documents therefore must be read together to 
determine the governing terms of the trust. We 
disagree, and hold that the 1998 Restatement 
did, in fact, fully supercede the 1987 Trust 
Agreement. 
[*P20] The meaning of the term "restate" 
as it applies to an inter vivos trust document 
has not been established in Utah. We therefore 
look to other areas of trust law and the law of 
other states for guidance. In the law of business 
trusts, the meaning of a "restated" trust has 
been defined by statute in several states. These 
statutes address the meaning of a restated trust 
as it applies to various forms of corporate gov-
ernance. For example, in Nevada "a certificate 
of trust may be restated [***19] by integrating 
into a single instrument all the provisions of the 
original certificate [or trust instrument], and all 
amendments to the certificate, which are then 
in effect or are to be made by the restatement." 
(Emphasis added). Nev. Rev. Stat. 88A.220(2) 
(2002); see also Del Code Ann. 12 § 3810 
(c)(1) (2002); S.D. Codified Laws §§ 47-14A-
45 (2002). Thus, state legislatures in some 
states have codified the meaning of a restated 
business trust, providing that a trust may be re-
stated by integrating into a single instrument all 
of the operative provisions of the trust.3 
3 We do not intend to imply that a trust 
may only be restated if it has been ex-
pressly authorized by statute; we merely 
look to these various statutes to clarify 
the meaning of the terms "restated" and 
"restatement" in the 1998 Restatement 
Agreement. 
[*P21] I^ i the Utah Revised Limited Li-
ability Company Act (the Act), the Utah legis-
lature [***20] addressed, in another context, 
the meaning of the term "restatement." Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-2c-409. The Act states that 
[HN8] "[a] company may integrate into a single 
document all of the provisions of its articles of 
organization #nd amendments thereto, and it 
may . . . further amend its articles of organiza-
tion, by adopting restated or amended and re-
stated articles of organization." Id. The Act fur-
ther clarifies that [HN9] a restated document 
that not only restates and integrates the opera-
tive provisions but that also amends the opera-
tive provisions shall so state with the appropri-
ate language. Id. § 48-20-409(2), (3). "If the 
restated articles only restate and integrate, and 
do not further amend the provisions of the arti-
cles of organization as previously amended or 
supplemented, and there is no discrepancy be-
tween those provisions and the provisions of 
the restated articles, they must so state." Id. § 
48-2c-409(4)(b). 
[*P22] In this case, the 1998 Restatement 
was titled a "Restatement" and declared that 
[**597] it "amended and restated in full" (em-
phasis added) the 1987 Trust Agreement. Al-
though it did not detail the provisions of the 
trust that [***21] were specifically amended, 
as a restatement it merged all of the operative 
provisions of the 1987 Trust Agreement to-
gether with amendments in a single instrument, 
and therefore superceded the 1987 Trust 
Agreement. The clear and unambiguous lan-
guage of the 1998 Restatement demonstrated 
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that it was intended to supplant the terms of the 
1987 Trust Agreement with amended and re-
stated terms. The 1998 Restatement unambigu-
ously references the "Almon J. Flake Family 
Trust dated September 22, 1987" as "amended 
and restated in full," and therefore reflects the 
settlor's intent to supplant the 1987 Trust 
Agreement. See Restatement (Second) OF 
Trusts § 331, cmt. c (stating that if the settlor 
reserves a power to modify or revoke the trust 
without specifying the method of modification, 
the power can be exercised in any manner 
which manifests the intent of the settlor to 
modify). In particular, the 1987 Trust Agree-
ment provisions that provide for the "needs of 
MARIAN R. FLAKE" and which state that 
"Marian shall also enjoy Almon's Social Secu-
rity and all existing retirement funds" were su-
perceded due to their omission from the 1998 
Restatement. Mrs. Flake is entitled only to what 
was provided [***22] for in the operative pro-
visions of the 1998 Restatement. 
III. THE 1999 SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
[*P23] On April 14, 1999, prior to filing 
any claims, the parties met to discuss the possi-
bility of a settlement agreement. The 1999 Set-
tlement Agreement confirmed the distribution 
of the Cadillac to Mrs. Flake, as outlined in the 
1998 Restatement. It was also agreed that Mrs. 
Flake would be the beneficiary of the life estate 
as outlined in the 1998 Restatement. The trust 
agreed to pay certain specified debts, and Mrs. 
Flake agreed to immediately close the accounts 
giving rise to the debts. Provisions concerning 
the disposition of additional assets were also 
outlined in the 1999 Settlement Agreement, 
including a provision releasing the trust from 
any other claim that Mrs. Flake may have been 
able to make under the 1987 Trust Agreement. 
Since family settlement agreements are "favor-
ites of the law," it is the general policy to en-
courage these types of agreements. In re Estate 
of Grimm, 784 P. 2d 1238, 1243 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
1990) ("it is said that the law looks with favor 
upon an agreement of compromise among 
members [***23] of a family . . . . " (quotations 
and citations omitted)). 
A. Oral Agreements 
[*P24] Mrs. Flake contends that the 1999 
Settlement Agreement, as an oral agreement 
with testamentary effect, is unenforceable and 
is subject to section 75-3-912 of the Utah Code, 
which provides as follows: 
[HN10] Subject to the rights of creditors 
and taxing authorities, competent successors 
may agree among themselves to alter the inter-
ests, shares, or amount to which they are enti-
tled under the will of the decedent, or under the 
laws of intestacy, in any way that they provide 
in a written contract executed by all who are 
affected by its provisions. The personal repre-
sentative shall abide by the terms of the agree-
ment, subject to his obligation to administer the 
estate for the benefit of creditors, to pay taxes 
and costs of administration, and to carry out the 
responsibilities of his office for the benefit of 
any successors of the decedent who are not par-
ties. Personal representatives of decedents' es-
tates are not required to see to the performance 
of trusts if the trustee thereof is another person 
who is willing to accept the trust. Accordingly, 
trustees of a testamentary trust are successors 
[***24] for the purposes of this section. Noth-
ing contained in this section relieves trustees of 
any duties owed to beneficiaries of trusts. 
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-912 (emphasis 
added). Mrs. Flake argues that the legislative 
history, official text, and comments, indicate 
that the Utah Probate Code was designed to 
establish uniform rules to govern all testamen-
tary documents, including inter vivos trusts, 
and thus section 75-3-912 should apply to trusts 
as well as to wills. 
[*P25] [**598] [HN11] When faced with 
a question of statutory construction, and in at-
tempting to determine legislative intent, this 
court first looks to the plain language of the 
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statute. State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, PI2, 52 
P.3d 1276; Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, Inc., 
935 P.2d 518, 520 (Utah 1997); Savage Indus, 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 811 P.2d 664, 671 
(Utah 1991). In construing a statute, we assume 
that "each term in the statute was used advis-
edly; thus the statutory words are read literally, 
unless such a reading is unreasonably confused 
or inoperable." Id. at 670. "Only if we find 
some ambiguity [in the statute's plain [***25] 
language] need we look further," Schurtz v. 
BMW of N. Am., 814 P.2d 1108, 1112 (Utah 
1991), and only then "need we seek guidance 
from the legislative history and relevant policy 
considerations." World Peace Movement of 
Am. v. Newspaper Agency Corp., 879 P.2d 253, 
259 (Utah 1994). 
[*P26] We turn to the specific language of 
the statute, which states that "competent suc-
cessors may agree among themselves to alter 
the interests, shares, or amount to which they 
are entitled under the will of the decedent, or 
under the laws of intestacy, in any way that 
they provide in a written contract executed by 
all who are affected by its provisions." Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-3-912 (emphasis added). Thus, 
according to the plain language of the statute of 
the Utah Probate Code, the requirement of a 
written contract to alter beneficiary interests 
applies only to interests created by will or by 
the laws of intestacy. Mrs. Flake suggests that 
the statute was poorly drafted and that the 
drafters intended, but failed, to make the neces-
sary revisions to include agreements affecting 
interests created by trusts. She may be correct, 
but there [***26] is no evidence thereof in the 
statute. Its plain terms limit the requirement of 
a written contract in altering beneficiary inter-
ests to a will or the laws of intestacy. [HN12] 
We will not look beyond the language to divine 
legislative intent; the language is clear and un-
ambiguous. Stephens, 935 P.2d at 522 (citing 
Brinkerhojf v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 
(Utah 1989)). [HN13] A written agreement is 
not required to alter interests created by an inter 
vivos trust. 
[*P27] The issue of whether an oral con-
tract or agreement exists presents questions of 
both law and fact. "Whether a contract has been 
formed is ultimately a conclusion of law, but 
that ordinarily depends on the resolution of 
subsidiary issues of fact." Nunley v. Westates 
Casing Serv., Inc., 1999 UT 100P17, 989 P.2d 
1077, 1083 (citing O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 
1289, 1290-91 (Utah 1981)). While we do not 
defer to the trial court's legal conclusions in 
reviewing them for correctness, we do defer to 
its factual findings, and will not set them aside 
unless they are clearly erroneous. See Reliance 
Ins. Co. v. Utah Dep't of Transp., 858 P.2d 
1363, 1366 (Utah 1993). [***27] A trial 
court's finding of fact is not clearly erroneous 
unless it is against the clear weight of the evi-
dence or we reach a definite and clear conclu-
sion that a mistake has been made. See Dep't of 
Human Serv. v. Irizarry, 945 P.2d 676, 682 
(Utah 1997). 
[*P28] The April 14, 1999 meeting re-
sulted in an enforceable oral agreement that 
was later memorialized by a writing, the 1999 
Settlement Agreement. [HN14] The terms and 
conditions of an oral agreement must be suffi-
ciently definite to allow it to be enforced. See 
Brown's Shoe Fit Co. v. Olch, 955 P.2d 357, 
363 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). In determining 
whether the parties created an enforceable con-
tract, a court should consider all preliminary 
negotiations, offers, and counteroffers and in-
terpret the various expressions of the parties for 
the purpose of deciding whether the parties 
reached agreement on complete and definite 
terms. See 1 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Con-
tracts § 2.1, at 101 (rev. ed. 1993). Based on 
the actions of the parties prior to and after the 
April 14, 1999 settlement meeting, we con-
clude that the trial court correctly ruled that the 
parties entered into an enforceable settlement 
[***28] agreement. The parties were each ac-
companied by legal representatives at the meet-
ing. The parties agreed to essential terms re-
garding the life estate, distribution of the Cadil-
lac, payment of outstanding creditors, owner-
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ship in the life insurance policies and funeral 
plan, disposition of the tax proceeds, use and 
condition of a barn, as well as additional items 
of personal property. [HN15] "An agreement 
cannot be enforced if its terms are indefinite or 
demonstrate [**599] that there was no intent 
to contract." Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 
928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) (citing Val-
carce v. Bitters, 12 UT 2d 61, 63, 362 P.2d 
427, 428 (Utah 1961)); Perillo, supra § 4.3 at 
569. Here, the agreed terms were specific and 
definite, and the facts found by the trial court 
demonstrate an intent by the parties to comply 
with the terms of the 1999 Settlement Agree-
ment. 
B. Waiver 
[*P29] Mrs. Flake contends that the 1999 
Settlement Agreement was an unexecuted 
agreement and as such is unenforceable. As we 
stated in the foregoing section, the 1999 Set-
tlement Agreement was a valid and enforceable 
oral settlement agreement. Mrs. Flake further 
contends that [***29] the 1987 Trust Agree-
ment and the 1998 Restatement granted certain 
rights that could only be relinquished through 
express waiver. [HN16] "Waiver is an inten-
tional relinquishment of a known right. 'It must 
be distinctly made, although it may be express 
or implied.'" Interwest Const, v. Palmer, 886 
P.2d 92, 98 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (citing Webb 
v. R.O.A. Gen., Inc., 773 P.2d 834, 839 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1989)). With respect to waiver, this 
court has often used the following formulation: 
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment 
of a known right. To constitute a waiver, there 
must be an existing right, benefit, or advantage, 
a knowledge of its existence, and an intention 
to relinquish it. [The relinquishment] must be 
distinctly made, although it may be express or 
implied. 
Soter's, Inc. v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass'n, 857 P.2d 935 (Utah 1993) (citing Phoe-
nix Inc. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 
308, 311-12 (1936)). 
[*P30] Thus, we have previously stated 
that a "waiver is an intentional relinquishment 
of a known right." Interwest, 886 P.2d at 98. 
To constitute a waiver, there must be an exist-
ing [***30] right, benefit or advantage, a 
knowledge of its existence, and an intention to 
relinquish it. Mrs. Flake argues that the waiver 
'"must be distinctly made, although it may be 
express or implied.'" Hunter v. Hunter, 669 
P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983) (quoting Am. Sav. 
Loan Ass'n v. Bloomquist, 21 Utah 2d 289, 292, 
445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968)). While it is true that a 
waiver, or the relinquishment of a known right, 
must be distinctly made, it still may be express 
or implied. Mrs. Flake relies on language in 
Hunter, 669 P.2d at 432, which sought to 
elaborate restrictively on what specific facts 
might be necessary to support a finding of in-
tent. Hunter stated that "to constitute waiver, 
one's actions or conduct must be distinctly 
made, must evince in some unequivocal man-
ner an intent to waive, and must be inconsistent 
with any other intent." Id. The language in 
Hunter, stating the need for an unequivocal in-
tent to waive a known right, was later ad-
dressed by this court. In Soter's, 857 P.2d at 
942, this court reiterated that the legal standard 
of Phoenix is the correct standard required to 
establish waiver. "A waiver [***31] is the in-
tentional relinquishment of a known right. To 
constitute waiver, there must be an existing 
right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its 
existence, and an intention to relinquish it." 
Soter's, 857 P.2d at 942 (citing Phoenix, 61 
P.2d at 311-12). Soter's further clarified that 
the intent to relinquish a right must be distinct, 
and this determination is made by looking at 
the totality of the circumstances. Soter's, 857 
P. 2d at 942. The court noted that in Utah, a dis-
tinct intent to waive may only be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 942, n.6. 
[*P31] [HN17] "Waiver of a contractual 
right occurs when a party to a contract inten-
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tionally acts in a manner inconsistent with its 
contractual rights, and, as a result, prejudice 
accrues to the opposing party or parties to the 
contract." Interwest Const., 886 P.2d at 98; see 
also Cooper v. Forresters Underwriters, Inc., 
2 Utah 2d 373, 376-77, 275 P.2d 675, 677 
(1954) (holding defendant did not waive the 
right to enforce a contract because defendant's 
actions were not inconsistent with terms of con-
tract nor did defendant [***32] induce belief 
that it did not intend to enforce terms of con-
tract). Here, the evidence shows that the actions 
of Mrs. Flake were intended to relinquish 
known rights. She agreed to assign ownership 
to the trust of the life insurance policy as well 
as the funeral plan, and acted accordingly. She 
agreed to close the outstanding credit accounts 
in compliance [**600] with the Trust's agree-
ment to pay those outstanding debts, and again 
acted accordingly. Mrs. Flake agreed to and 
received the distribution of the Cadillac. She 
agreed to the terms of the life estate as outlined 
in the 1998 Restatement. When looking to the 
totality of the circumstances, Mrs. Flake's ac-
tions were consistent with the terms of the 1999 
Settlement Agreement, and thus her actions sat-
isfy the elements of waiver. 
IV. LIS PENDENS 
[*P32] The trustee argues on cross-appeal 
that the trial court erred in failing to award fees 
and costs resulting from Mrs. Flake's failure to 
remove a lis pendens from certain trust prop-
erty. Under Utah Code Ann. sections 38-9-4 
and 38-12-102, 103, appellee argues that Mrs. 
Flake filed a lien and failed to provide notice 
within thirty days after recordation as required 
[***33] under Utah Code Ann. § 38-12-102. 
Appellee argues that this subjects Mrs. Flake to 
liability of "$ 1,000 or for treble actual dam-
ages," whichever is greater, and for reasonable 
attorney fees and costs. Utah Code Ann. section 
38-12-103(l)(a) states that [HN18] "[a] person 
who fails to meet the notice requirements" is 
"precluded from receiving an award of costs 
and attorney's fees from the person against 
whom a notice of lien has been filed." How-
ever, Utah C$de Ann. section 38-12-103(l)(b) 
provides that [HN19] "subsection (l)(a), a per-
son's failure to meet the notice requirements, 
"does not create a right to costs and attorneys' 
fees." 
[*P33] Mrs. Flake argued that the lis 
pendens was recorded to give constructive no-
tice that the property was the subject of litiga-
tion. The trial court found that based on Mrs. 
Flake's withdrawal of her claims of undue in-
fluence all lis pendens filed on property in this 
case should be released. The trial court consid-
ered the trustee's argument and declined to 
award the statutory penalty for failing to give 
notice. Utah Code Ann. section 38-12-103(2) 
[HN20] provides [***34] for penalties to the 
lien claimant for noncompliance with the notice 
requirements or for a willful refusal to release 
the lien. After the trial court's finding that all lis 
pendens should be released, Mrs. Flake filed a 
Motion for Stay Pending Appeal and Further 
Order of the Court. The trial court issued its 
final Order Dissolving Lis Pendens on July 11, 
2001. During the pendency of the litigation, the 
lis pendens did not create any actual damages 
to the litigant^. The lis pendens did not cloud 
title because, other than an attempt to refinance, 
there was no attempt to transfer or convey the 
underlying property. Our review of the record 
does not indicate that the trial court's finding 
was clearly erroneous. We agree with the trial 
court that there was no willful refusal to release 
the notice of lien, and therefore that Mrs. Flake 
should not have been ordered to pay damages. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P34] Fpr the foregoing reasons, we af-
firm the trial cjourt's ruling granting the motion 
to dismiss, but reverse as to the enforceability 
of the original 1987 Trust Agreement. We find 
that the 1998 Restatement and the 1999 Settle-
ment Agreement govern the disposition of the 
estate of [***^5] Almon J. Flake. Accordingly, 
Mrs. Flake is Entitled to the following distribu-
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tions: (i) the life estate as outlined in the 1998 
Restatement; (ii) the distribution of the Cadil-
lac; (iii) the payment of the commercial debts 
as outlined in the 1999 Settlement Agreement; 
(iv) the right to the funeral plan maintained by 
the trust; and (v) the right to the upper level of 
the barn as a storage facility. Mrs. Flake is not 
entitled to monthly support from the trust, nor 
is she entitled to receive the decedent's social 
security, according to the 1998 restatement, 4 
and retirement funds as outlined in the 1987 
Trust Agreement. 
4 We are at a loss to understand this 
particular provision, inasmuch as social 
security benefits are determined by the 
Social Security Administration and are 
not subject to allocation by trust docu-
ments. 
[*P35] The trustee contends that the trust 
is entitled to repayment of the support pay-
ments paid through the time of trial and post-
trial. In light of our decision, this case is re-
manded for [***36] a determination of the 
amount of payments, if any, that Mrs. Flake 
must repay to the trust. See Capital Transit 
[**601] Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 93 U.S. 
App. D.C. 194, 213 F.2d 176, 195 (B.C. Cir. 
1954) (citing Cox v. Dixie Power Co., 81 Utah 
94, 16 P.2d 916 (Utah 1932)). [HN21] 'The 
trial court has power to order restitution in an 
independent suit, or upon a motion filed in the 
original proceeding^]" id. (citation omitted), 
and we believe that the trial court should under-
take the disposition of the trustee's claims here, 
as was observed in Capital Transit Co., 
The disposition of a claim for restitution may 
well involve issues of fact and law, conflicting 
equities, and problems of legal and administra-
tive policy. These can best be dealt with and 
disposed of initially by the [trial court].... 
213 F.2d 176 at 196. We agree also with the 
comment that, 
In view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in 
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Florida, cit. supra 
295 US. 301, 79 L. Ed. 1451, 55 S. Ct. 713 
(1934) that restitution upon the reversal of a 
judgment 'is not of mere right. It is ex gratia, 
resting in the exercise of a sound discretion . . . 
Ml 
[***37] Id. at 196 (citations omitted). Thus, it 
is appropriate for the trial court to consider this 
claim in the first instance. 
[*P36] Associate Chief Justice Durrant, 
Justice Russon, Justice Wilkins, and Judge 
Greenwood concur in Chief Justice Durham's 
opinion. 
[*P37] Having recused himself, Justice 
Howe does not participate herein; Court of Ap-
peals Judge Pamela T. Greenwood sat. 
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why something is or is not a present trust. Ask-
ing whether something is a "trust" or a "mere 
agency" is at best question begging. So is the 
suggestion in many opinions that, in order to 
uphold a disposition, a court must find a "pre-
sent" or "vested" interest in one or more bene-
ficiaries other than the settlor; in fact these 
statements are untrue unless they mean, simply, 
"presently existing" interests. And assertions 
that a settlor must relinquish "dominion and 
control" over the property are merely erroneous 
dicta. These statements confuse the issue, and 
maybe the reader, ignoring the reality that these 
very courts regularly and properly find valid 
trusts where settlors have retained complete 
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OPINION BY: PARRISH 
OPINION 
[**751] PARRISH, Justice: 
INTRODUCTION 
[*P1] Shortly before she passed away, 
Leona Hoggan ("Leona") amended a trust that 
she had created some fifteen years earlier. The 
amendment provided that, upon Leona's death, 
her son John Hoggan (a.k.a. "Jack") would be 
forgiven a loan Leona made to him, rather than 
receiving a one-third interest in the trust prop-
erty. Jack asserts that the language of the trust 
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document did not authorize Leona to effect 
such an amendment. We disagree. Under our 
previous interpretations of very similar trust 
language in Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, 52 
P.3d 1190, and Flake v. Flake (In re Estate of 
Flake), 2003 UT 17, 71 P.3d 589, Leona re-
tained the power to modify Jack's interest. 
BACKGROUND 
[*P2] [***2] Leona executed the original 
trust document in 1987. Under the terms of the 
trust, the trust property was to be used for 
Leona's benefit during her lifetime. Upon her 
death, the trust property was to be distributed 
equally among her three children—Jack, Bonnie 
Weber ("Bonnie"), and William Hoggan ("Wil-
liam"). Article XI of the trust, entitled "Revoca-
tion and Amendment," provides: "As long as 
the Undersigned is alive, she reserves the 
right[] to amend, modify, revoke, or remove 
from this Trust any and all property that she has 
contributed, in whole or in part, including the 
principal, and the present or past undisbursed 
income from such principal." This section also 
contains the following sentence: "The interest 
of the beneficiaries is a present interest which 
shall continue until this Trust is revoked or 
terminated other than by death." 
[*P3] In 2002, Leona signed an amend-
ment to the trust that modified the allocation of 
the trust property upon her death. Under the 
amended distribution scheme, William was to 
receive an automobile, while the remainder of 
the trust property was to be either divided be-
tween William and Bonnie or transferred to the 
survivor of the two. As his only share of the 
[***3] trust property, Jack was to be forgiven 
any remaining indebtedness he owed to Leona 
at the time of her death. Leona passed away 
two months after executing the amendment. 
[*P4] Later that same year, Jack filed suit 
against William and Bonnie individually and 
against William in his capacity as trustee. The 
lawsuit sought to invalidate the amendment un-
der various theories. Specifically, Jack asserted 
that the amendment was the result of undue in-
fluence on the part of William and that Leona 
suffered from diminished capacity. Jack also 
sought to invalidate the amendment and reform 
the trust documents under the theory that the 
amendment violated the terms of the trust. Jack 
subsequently filed a motion for partial sum-
mary judgment under the latter theory. William 
and Bonnie then filed cross-motions for partial 
summary judgment, arguing that the second 
amendment was valid or, in the alternative, that 
the terms of the trust should be reformed to re-
flect Leona's intent. 
[*P5] In a memorandum decision, the dis-
trict court ruled that the amendment was valid 
and that William and Bonnie were therefore 
entitled to partial summary judgment. William 
and Bonnie then submitted to the district court 
proposed findings [***4] of fact and conclu-
sions of law. Jack objected on the basis that the 
proposed factual findings and legal conclusions 
exceeded the scope of the issues addressed in 
the district court's memorandum decision. The 
district court overruled Jack's objections and 
entered an order consistent with William and 
Bonnie's proposed findings and conclusions. 
[*P6] The parties stipulated that Jack's 
claims of undue influence and reduced capacity 
would be dismissed with prejudice so that the 
partial summary judgment would become final 
and appealable. Jack now appeals the partial 
summary judgment. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[*P7] [Hlkl] "On summary judgment, we 
review the [district] court's legal conclusions 
for correctness." Quaid v. U.S. Healthcare, 
Inc., 2007 UT27, P 8, 158 P.3d525. So long as 
a court confines its analysis to the language of 
the trust instrument and does not resort to ex-
trinsic evidence of intent, the interpretation of a 
trust is an issue of law. [**752] See Kimball v. 
Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985) ("A 
contract's interpretation may be either a ques-
tion of law, determined by the words of the 
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agreement, or a question of fact, determined by 
extrinsic evidence of intent."). Because we re-
strict our review in this [***5] case to the lan-
guage of the trust instrument, we cede no def-
erence to the district court. 
ANALYSIS 
[*P8] Jack has raised two challenges to the 
summary judgment entered by the district 
court. First, he argues that the district court 
erred in concluding that the 2002 amendment 
was valid. Second, he asserts that the court 
erred when it entered findings of fact and con-
clusions of law that exceeded the findings and 
conclusions articulated in its initial memoran-
dum decision. 
I. VALIDITY OF THE 2002 AMENDMENT 
[*P9] [HN2] "Absent fraud or mistake, a 
settlor 'has the power to modify a trust only if 
and to the extent that such a power was re-
served by the terms of the trust.'" Flake v. 
Flake (In re Estate of Flake), 2003 UT 17, P 
13, 71 P.3d589 (quoting Kline v. Utah Dep't of 
Health, 776 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)); 
accord Banks v. Means, 2002 UT 65, P 9, 52 
P. 3d 1190; Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 
331 (1959). We accordingly begin by analyzing 
the terms of the trust to determine whether 
Leona reserved the right to amend the trust 
document. Because we find that she did, we 
then examine the scope of her authority to 
amend the trust and whether she exceeded any 
limitations placed upon that power. 
[*P10] Leona retained [***6] a broad 
grant of authority to amend the trust. Article XI 
of the trust instrument provides: "As long as the 
Undersigned is alive, she reserves the right[] to 
amend, modify, revoke, or remove from this 
Trust any and all property that she has contrib-
uted, in whole or in part, including the princi-
pal, and the present or past undisbursed income 
from such principal." Under a literal reading of 
the trust language, the object of the phrase "to 
amend, modify, [and] revoke" is the trust prop-
erty, rather than the trust instrument. This read-
ing is nonsensical, however, because one does 
not typically amend, modify, or revoke prop-
erty, but rather, written legal documents. In in-
terpreting nearly identical trust language in 
Flake, 2003 UT 17, P 14, 71 P3d 589, ' we es-
chewed this rather odd literal reading and inter-
preted the language to mean that the settlor had 
reserved the right to amend, modify, or revoke 
the trust. Consistent with this precedent, we 
hold that Leona retained the right to amend the 
trust instrument. 
1 The analogous Flake trust language 
read: 
As long as the Under-
signed is alive, he reserves 
the right, without the consent 
or approval of any other, to 
amend, modify, revoke, or 
remove from this Trust 
[***7] the property that he 
has contributed, in whole or 
in part, including the princi-
pal and the present or past 
undisbursed income from 
such principal. 
2003 UT17,P 14, 71 P. 3d 589. 
[*P11] Her power to amend the trust, 
however, was circumscribed. Article XI of the 
trust also states, "The interest of the beneficiar-
ies is a present interest which shall continue 
until this Trust is revoked or terminated other 
than by death." 2 In Banks, we [**753] held 
that very similar trustlanguage 3 required "a 
complete revocation . . . to divest the benefici-
aries of their vested interests." 2002 UT 65, P 
12, 52 P. 3d 1190. In accordance with this in-
terpretation of the trust language, we invali-
dated an amendment to the Banks trust that 
completely divested named beneficiaries of 
their interests. Id. PP 15-16. Therefore, under 
the very similar language of the Hoggan trust, 
2007UT78,*;169P.3d750,**; 
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Leona could not amend the trust to completely 
divest one of the beneficiaries of his or her in-
terest without first revoking the trust. Jack re-
lies on Banks in arguing that the amendment 
violated the terms of the trust. 
2 Language asserting that beneficiaries 
have a "present interest" or a "presently 
vested interest" in a trust has apparently 
become common within trusts drafted in 
[***8] Utah. We suspect that drafters in-
clude such language with the intent of 
warding off potential challenges to the 
trust on grounds that it is illusory. See 
Banks, 2002 UT 65, PP 12-13, 52 P.3d 
1190. Unfortunately, such phrases have 
been the focus of recent litigation and 
have the potential to produce results not 
within the contemplation of the drafters 
of trusts or their clients. Indeed, the po-
tential for confusion is great because in 
many living trusts, like the one at issue 
here, the beneficiaries have no immediate 
right of possession or enjoyment of the 
trust property. In such instances, the in-
sertion of language proclaiming that the 
beneficiaries have a "present interest" 
simply contradicts the operative terms of 
the trust. See Black's Law Dictionary 816 
(7th ed. 1999) (defining a present interest 
as "[a] property interest in which the 
privilege of possession or enjoyment is 
present and not merely future; an interest 
entitling the holder to immediate posses-
sion"). Similarly, trusts in which the 
settlor retains the right to amend or re-
voke the instrument do not convey "pres-
ently vested rights" to beneficiaries be-
cause their interests are contingent upon 
the settlor not amending or revoking the 
[***9] trust. See id. at 1557 (defining the 
term "vested" as a "consummated right 
for present or future enjoyment; not con-
tingent; unconditional; absolute"). 
The impetus for including such 
phrases within trust agreements appears 
to originate, unfortunately, from our 
holding that a trust is invalid unless the 
beneficiary's interest vests during the 
settlor's lifetime. Alexander v. Zion's Sav. 
Bank & Trust Co., 2 Utah 2d 317, 273 
P.2d 173, 174 (Utah 1954), affd on re-
h'g, 4 Utah 2d 90, 287 P.2d 665 (Utah 
1955). But see Restatement (Second) of 
Trusts §\59 cmt. c (1959) ("A provision 
in the tehns of the trust under which in-
terests of the beneficiaries do not vest un-
til a future time is not invalid unless such 
interests | may not vest within the period 
of the rule against perpetuities . . . ."). In 
an apparent effort to uphold prior prece-
dent while at the same time avoiding the 
invalidation of countless trusts intended 
to serve as substitutes for wills, we later 
said that such trusts created vested inter-
ests that were subject to divestment. 
Horn v. \First Sec. Bank of Utah, N.A., 
548 P.2d 1265, 1267 (Utah 1976). Al-
though the term "vested interest subject 
to divestment" is more of an oxymoron 
than a meaningful legal term, over 
[***10] the decades this phrase has been 
used by this court to uphold trusts in 
which the beneficiaries' interests were 
not vested under the traditional meaning 
of the term. See Banks, 2002 UT 65, P 
13, 52 P. 3d 1190; Groesbeck v. Groes-
beck (hi re Estate of Groesbeck), 935 
P.2d 1255, 1257-58 (Utah 1997). 
We hereby disavow the use of this 
phrase and the antiquated and now 
widely discredited rule articulated in 
Alexander that gave rise to it. [HN3] We 
agree with the analysis of the Restate-
ment (Third) of Trusts, which advocates 
the abandonment of such confusing and 
disingenuous terminology in favor of an 
open recognition that there is no re-
quirement that a beneficiary's interest be 
either present or vested: 
2007 UT 78, *; 169 P.3d 750, **; 
588 Utah Adv. Rep. 24; 2007 Utah LEXIS 183, *** 
Page 6 
Issues are obscured and 
litigation invited by confus-
ing or unsound dicta often 
found in opinions that at-
tempt to explain why some-
thing is or is not a present 
trust. Asking whether some-
thing is a "trust" or a "mere 
agency" is at best question 
begging. So is the suggestion 
in many opinions that, in or-
der to uphold a disposition, a 
court must find a "present" 
or "vested" interest in one or 
more beneficiaries other than 
the settlor; in fact these 
statements are untrue unless 
they mean, simply, "pres-
ently existing" [***11] in-
terests. And assertions that a 
settlor must relinquish "do-
minion and control" over the 
property are merely errone-
ous dicta. 
These statements con-
fuse the issue, and maybe 
the reader, ignoring the real-
ity that these very courts 
regularly and properly find 
valid trusts where settlors 
have retained complete con-
trol, and where the other 
beneficiaries usually, if 
drafting is competent, have 
only future interests that are 
not only defeasible (by revo-
cation or amendment) but 
also "contingent" upon sur-
viving the settlor and maybe 
other events as well 
Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 25 re-
porter's notes, cmt. b (2003). 
3 The analogous Banks trust language 
read: "The interests of the beneficiaries 
are presently vested interests subject to 
divestment which shall continue until this 
Trust is revoked or terminated other than 
by death." 2002 UT 65, P 4, 52 P.3d 
1190. 
[*P12] Jack's reliance is misplaced in light 
of our subsequent decision in Flake. We clari-
fied in Flake that such trust language invali-
dates only amendments that effect a complete 
divestment of an interest in the trust. In inter-
preting trust language very similar to that in 
Banks and nearly identical to the language 
found in the Hoggan trust,4 we [***12] held: 
The beneficial interest of Mrs. 
Flake was merely amended, and 
not completely divested as was the 
case in Banks. The dispositive is-
sue in the present case is whether 
there was a complete divestiture of 
a beneficial interest as in Banks, or 
whether there was simply a change 
in the quality, or scope, of the 
beneficial interest. We held in 
Banks that revocation was required 
when terminating a vested benefi-
cial interest. Here, we find that 
there is no requirement of revoca-
tion where the beneficial interest is 
simply modified or amended but 
not terminated. 
Flake, 2003 UT 17, P 17, 71 P.3d 589 (citation 
omitted). 
4 The analogous Flake trust language 
read: "The interest of the beneficiaries is 
a present vested interest which shall con-
tinue until the Trust is revoked or termi-
nated other than by death." 2003 UT 17, 
P 17, 71 P. 3d 589. 
[**754] [*P13] Under the clear precedent 
of Banks and Flake, if the 2002 amendment 
completely divested Jack of any interest in the 
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trust, the amendment would violate a condition 
placed upon the power to amend because Leona 
failed to revoke the trust first. If the amendment 
merely changed the quality or scope of Jack's 
beneficial interest, however, it would be valid. 
The amendment changed Jack's interest 
[***13] in the trust from an equal share in the 
trust property to forgiveness of any remaining 
indebtedness to Leona at the time of her death. 
Jack does not contest that he still owed his debt 
to Leona at the time of her death and that the 
forgiveness of this legal obligation to pay the 
debt is a benefit conferred upon him under the 
amendment. Because Jack's interest in the trust 
was not completely divested but only modified, 
the amendment does not violate the terms of 
the trust and is therefore valid. 
[*P14] Jack argues that we should over-
rule Flake because the holding in that case 
would allow settlors to effectively eliminate a 
beneficiary's interest in a trust by merely modi-
fying that interest to a negligible amount. We 
decline such an invitation. First, Jack does not 
assert that the benefit he received from the trust 
was nominal. Therefore, his argument applies 
only to hypothetical future cases and would not 
be dispositive in this case. Second, the potential 
outcome that Jack finds objectionable is under 
the control of the drafters of trust instruments. 
If a settlor deems such an outcome to be unpal-
atable, it can easily be avoided through careful 
drafting. 
II. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF 
THE DISTRICT [***14] COURT 
[*P15] Jack also argues that the district 
court erred in adopting findings of fact and 
conclusions of law that were not articulated in 
its original memorandum decision. He primar-
ily asserts th$t the additional findings of fact 
relating to Leona's state of mind and her intent 
in including certain provisions of the trust were 
improper and that we should therefore refuse to 
consider these additional findings. We need not 
address the merits of this argument because the 
findings to which Jack objects are unnecessary 
to our holding. The only facts necessary to our 
holding are the terms of the trust and the undis-
puted existence of Leona's outstanding loan to 
Jack. The additional findings and conclusions 
to which Jack objects are simply irrelevant. 
CONCLUSION 
[*P16] Because the 2002 amendment 
merely modified Jack's interest in Leona's trust, 
the amendment is valid, and we therefore af-
firm the summary judgment entered by the dis-
trict court. 
[*P17] Chief Justice Durham, Justice Dur-
rant, Justice Nehring, and Judge Ludlow concur 
in Justice Parrish's opinion. 
[*P18] Having disqualified himself, Asso-
ciate Chief Ju$tice Wilkins does not participate 
herein; District Judge Eric A. Ludlow sat. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT 
Ron Patterson, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Judy Ann Henry and Randy D. 
Patterson, as Trustees of the 
Darlene Patterson Family 
Protection Trust; Estate of 
Darlene Patterson, et a I. 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
COUNTER MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 070700586 
Honorable Judge Allphin 
The Court held a hearing on September 30, 2009 on several motions 
and has ruled on the following Motions: 
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment and Defendants' 
counter motion for partial summary judgment. 
Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment sought declaratory 
relief, asking the Court to hold that a certain "Final Amendment" executed by 
the Parties' mother on May 30, 2006 is void as a matter of law due to its 
Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion For Partial Summary Ju 
VO30503565 pages: 3 
complete divestment of the plaintiff's vested interest in the trust's property 
without a revocation of the original Family Trust, as is required by the Family 
Trust's terms. Defendants' counter motion for partial summary judgment 
sought a declaration that the Final Amendment is valid. The parties reserved 
any issues regarding whether "undue influence" affected the execution of 
any of the respective trust documents. 
Having read the pleadings, heard the argument of counsel, and being 
apprised in the premises, the Court hereby orders the following: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted. 
2. Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is denied. 
The Final Amendment is invalid and the assets of the estate shall be 
distributed without regard to any provision contained in the Final 
Amendment. 
Provided, however, that this Order is without prejudice to the Parties' 
ability to raise the issue of whether undue influence affected the execution of 
any of the respective trust documents. 
IT JS HEREBY, ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the /o day of 
_ 2 0 0 9 . 
BY THE COURT: 
I  I 
HONORABLE MIC 
DISTRICT COUR 
Approved as to Form: 
^ n e w s e a ^ 
Craig T. Peterson 
Attorney for Defendants 
James C. Jenkins 
Attorney for Defendant 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
postage pre-paid to the following: 
Cathcart & Peterson, LLC 
80 North Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 840io 
James C. Jenkins 
Olson & Hoggan, P.£. 
130.South Main St., Suite 200 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
on this O r d day of December 2009. 
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SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RON PATTERSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUDY ANN HENRY and RANDY D. 
PATTERSON, as trustees of the Darlene 
Patterson Family Protection Trust; ESTATE 
OF DARLENE PATTERSON; JUDY ANN 
HENRY; RANDY D. PATTERSON; GARY 
E. PATTERSON; REX A. PATTERSON; 
VICKY D. ROMERO; RICKY A. 
PATTERSON; and/or JOHN DOES 1-10 and 
JANE DOES 1-10, 
Defendants. 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S AND 
DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTIONS FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 070700586 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
This matter is before the Court on the plaintiffs and the defendants' cross motions for 
partial summary judgment. The Court has reviewed the moving and responding papers, along 
with their supporting documentation. The Court also held a hearing on the matters on September 
30, 2009. Having considered all of the arguments, being fully advised in the premises, and for 
the reasons set forth herein, the Court GRANTS the plaintiffs motion for partial summary 
judgment, and DENIES the defendants' counter motion for partial summary judgment. 
VD30342154
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070700586 PATTERSON.DARLENE 
BACKGROUND 
The following are the undisputed material facts relevant to the parties' cross motions for 
summary judgment: 
On July 30, 1999, Darlene Patterson and Rex E. Patterson executed, and thus, created 
The Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust (herein, the "Family Trust") See Family Trust. 
The stated purpose of the Family Trust is "for the primary benefit of the Undersigned during the 
Undersigned's lifetime, [and] for the Undersigned's family thereafter." Id. at Art. I, § 1.1. 
Moreover, the Family Trust provides that, "[t]he interests of the beneficiaries are presently 
vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or 
terminated other than by death." Id. at Art. Ill, § 3.2.2 Further, the Family Trust states that upon 
the death of Darlene Patterson and Rex. E. Patterson and, "[ajfter all the surviving children of the 
Undersigned attain age 25, the Trustee shall divide the remaining principal and income of the 
Trust Estate into as many equal shares as there are children of the Undersigned then living[.]" Id. 
at Art. V, § 5.2. However, the Family Trust also provides that, "[a]s long as the Undersigned is 
alive, the Undersigned reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in 
part, including the principal, and the present or past undisbursed income from such principal," Id. 
at Art. Ill, §3.1. 
On May 31, 2000, Darlene Patterson executed an amendment to the Family Trust (herein, 
the "First Amendment"), which provided Plaintiff Ron Patterson additional property upon the 
distribution of the trust's property. See First Amendment, | L 
1
 The Court notes that the parties have agreed and stipulated that the parties' cross motions for partial summary 
judgment shall be submitted and considered without respect to the parties' respective dispute of facts over the issue 
of "undue influence" in the execution of the amendments and restatement to the Family Trust by Darlene Patterson 
prior to her death. 
Notably, the Family Trusts lists Plaintiff Ron Patterson among the trust's beneficiaries with a presently vested 
interest subject to divestment. See Family Trust, Art. I, § 1.2. 
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Subsequently, on March 12, 2001, Darlene Patterson executed a restatement of the 
Family Trust (herein, the "Restatement"), which, among other things, provided Plaintiff Ron 
Patterson with an additional specific devise and reduced the beneficiary interests of Defendants 
Gary E. Patterson, Judy Ann Henry, and Rex A. Patterson. See Restatement, Art. IX. 
Additionally, the Restatement included similar provisions regarding the Family Trust's 
revocability and the presently vested interests of the trust's beneficiaries. Id. at Art. II & V, § B. 
Thereafter, on May 30, 2006, Darlene Patterson executed another amendment to the 
Family Trust (herein, the "Final Amendment"), which effectively removed Plaintiff Ron 
Patterson as a beneficiary of the trust, stating: 
"I have intentionally not provided anything for my son Ronald S. 
Patterson (or his descendants) since I have already properly provided for 
this son during his lifetime as I felt was appropriate" 
Final Amendment, TfC. 
Darlene Patterson died on April 30, 2007. 
On October 25, 2007, the plaintiff initiated this action, which pertains primarily to the 
parties' dispute over the distribution of the Family Trust's property and the propriety of the 
trust's amendments and restatement executed by Darlene Patterson prior to her death. 
On April 6, 2009, the plaintiff filed the instant motion for partial summary judgment, 
requesting a declaratory order that the Final Amendment to the Family Trust be invalidated due 
to its complete divestment of the plaintiffs vested interest in the trust's property without a 
revocation of the Family Trust, as is required by the Family Trust's terms. The defendants 
opposed the plaintiffs motion and filed the instant counter motion, for partial summary judgment 
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on May 5, 2009, requesting the Court disregard prior Utah appellate case law based on the 
equities of this matter. 
Following complete briefing of the parties' cross motions for partial summary judgment 
and the same being submitted for decision on July 29, 2009, the Court held a hearing on the 
matters on September 30, 2009, and took the matters under advisement.4 Accordingly, the Court 
finds that the parties' cross motions for partial summary judgment are now ripe for 
determination. 
ANALYSIS 
Summary judgment is appropriate only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Further, "[o]n a motion for summary judgment a trial court 
should not weigh disputed evidence, and its sole inquiry should be whether material issues of 
fact exist" to determine if judgment may be rendered as a matter of law. Draper City v. Estate of 
Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1100 (Utah 1995). 
3
 The Court notes that on May 29, 2009, the plaintiff filed a motion to strike portions of the Affidavit of Randy 
Patterson, which the defendants submitted in support of their counter motion for partial summary judgment. The 
plaintiff argued that certain paragraphs within the affidavit are not based on Randy Patterson's personal knowledge 
and have no foundation, and regardless, are irrelevant to the issues before the Court. The defendants subsequently 
amended the affidavit on July 1, 2009, removing many of the disputed statements. On July 29, 2009, the plaintiff 
submitted his motion to strike for decision. In reviewing the Supplemental and Corrected Affidavit of Randy 
Patterson, and given the parties' stipulation to limit the issues pertaining to their cross motions for partial summary 
judgment and the relevant Utah appellate case law on such issues, the Court agrees with the plaintiff that the 
information within the affidavit is largely irrelevant to the Court's analysis. However, the Court finds that the 
plaintiffs motion to strike is rendered moot by the Court's ruling on the plaintiffs motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
4
 The Court notes that also pending at the September 30, 2009 hearing were the plaintiffs motion to strike pleadings 
and enter default judgment regarding the defendants' failure to provide discovery, and the defendants' motion for 
Rule 56(f) relief. However, at the hearing, the plaintiffs counsel agreed to provide the defendants with an additional 
ten (10) days to provide the requested discovery, which timely occurred on October 9, 2009. Further, the defendants' 
counsel indicated at the hearing that given the parties stipulation to the limitation of issues with regard to the parties' 
cross motions for partial summary judgment, the defendants' motion for Rule 56(f) relief is unnecessary and moot. 
Accordingly, the Court finds that both the plaintiffs motion to strike pleadings and the defendants' motion for Rule 
56(f) relief are moot. 
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In the instant matter, the Court is asked to determine the validity of the Family Trust's 
Final Amendment, which by its terms completely divested the plaintiffs beneficiary interest in 
the Family Trust without revoking the same, as is required by the Family Trust's terms. "So long 
as a court confines its analysis to the language of the trust instrument and does not resort to 
extrinsic evidence of intent, the inteipretation of a trust is an issu$ of law." Hoggan v. Hoggan, 
169 P.3d 750, 751 (Utah 2007).5 
"It is well settled that a trust is a form of ownership in which the legal title to property is 
vested in a trustee, who has equitable duties to hold and manage it for the benefit of the 
beneficiaries." Banks, 52 P.3d at 1192 (Internal quotations omitted). "Once the settler has created 
the trust he is no longer the owner of the trust property and has onlly such ability to deal with it as 
is expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument." Id. (Emphasis added). "Thus, a settlor has 
the power to modify or revoke a trust only if and to the extent that such power is explicitly 
reserved by the terms of the trust." Id.; see also Flake, 71 P.3d at 594 (''Likewise, if the settlor 
reserves a power to modify the trust only in a particular manner or under particular 
circumstances, he can modify the trust only in that manner or under those circumstances.") 
(Internal quotations omitted); Hoggan, 169 P.3d 750, 752 (Utah 2007) ("Absent fraud or 
mistake, a settlor has the power to modify a trust only if and to the extent that such a power was 
reserved by the terms of the trust.") (Internal quotations omitted). Accordingly, "[t]he transfer of 
property interests to the beneficiaries cannot be taken from them except in accordance with a 
provision of the trust instrument[.]" Flake, 71 P.3d at 594. 
5
 The Court notes that the defendants' inclusion of additional facts pertaining to parlene Patterson's intent and the 
equity of a finding that the Final Amendment is invalid are largely irrelevant to fjhe Court's analysis of the issues 
under existing Utah appellate case law and the Court's interpretation of the Family Trust's plain language. See 
Banks v. Means, 52 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2002); see also Flake v. Flake, 71 P.3d 589 (Utah 2003); Hoggan, 169 P.3d 
750. While the defendants have requested the Court disregard this case law as b^d precedent, the Court declines 
such request. This Court is bound to follow the precedent of the Utah appellate courts and the defendants' attempt to 
change this precedent is more appropriate on appeal. 
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In the instant matter, the parties acknowledge that the Utah Supreme Court has 
interpreted trust language, identical in relevant part, to that of the Family Trust's modification 
and revocation requirements regarding the trust's beneficiaries' presently vested interest in the 
trust's property. In Banks v. Means, the Utah Supreme Court held that an attempted amendment 
that completely divested a beneficiary's vested interest in a trust's property was invalid due to 
the settlor's failure to make the amendment in accordance with the trust's terms. 52 P.3d 1190. 
The Banks Court stated that, "[b]y the plain language of the trust, the beneficiaries have Vested 
interests' that continue until the interests are 'revoked or terminated."' Id. at 1193. However, the 
Banks Court also found that "[the settlor] reserved the power to revoke, modify, or amend the 
trust in whole or in part ..., but limited that power ... with regard to the beneficiaries." Id. 'Thus, 
a complete revocation [of the trust] was required to divest the beneficiaries of their vested 
interests." Id. In reaching this decision, the Banks Court emphasized that, "as we have previously 
stated, 'even a revocable trust clothes beneficiaries ... with a legally enforceable right to insist 
that the terms of the trust be adhered to." Id. at 1194 (quoting Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Country Club Mobile Estates, Ltd., 632 P.2d 869, 872 (Utah 1981)). 
Here, just as in Banks, the Family Trust, as amended by the First Amendment and the 
Restatement, permitted Darlene Patterson to modify and/or revoke the trust, but limited this 
power by stating that "the interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested interests subject to 
divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death." 
Family Trust, Art III, § 3.2; see also Restatement, Art. V, § B ("The interest of the beneficiaries 
is a present interest which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated.").6 With 
6
 The Court notes that in Hoggan v. Hoggan, the Utah Supreme Court criticized the use of terms such as "vested 
interest subject to divestment" within trusts due to the confusion and unintended consequences that may occur from 
the use of such language. 169 P.3d at 753 fh.2. However, the Hoggan Court explicitly upheld its prior precedent of 
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respect to the Final Amendment to the Family Trust, Darlene Patterson attempted to completely 
divest the plaintiff of his beneficiary interest in the trust's property, to wit: 
"I have intentionally not provided anything for my son Ronald S. 
Patterson (or his descendants) since I have already properly provided for 
this son during his lifetime as I felt was appropriate!-" 
Final Amendment, f C. However, the Final Amendment clearly did not revoke the Family Trust 
or the Restatement, as is required by the documents' plain language to effectuate a complete 
divestment. Consequently, and in accord with the Utah Supreme Court's precedent in Banks, 52 
P,3d 1190, Flake, 71 P.3d 589, and Hoggan, 169 P.3d 750, the Court must find that the Final 
Amendment is invalid based upon Darlene Patterson's failure to comply with the Family Trust's 
and the Restatement's terms for completely divesting a beneficiary's vested interest in the trust's 
property. The Court must, therefore, GRANT the plaintiffs motion for partial summary 
judgment, and DENY the defendants' counter motion for partial summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the plaintiffs motion for partial summary 
judgment, and DENIES the defendants' counter motion for partial summary judgment. 
Consistent herewith, the Court finds that the plaintiffs motion to strike portions of the Affidavit 
of Randy Patterson is moot. The Court directs the plaintiff to prepare and submit an order that is 
consistent with and reflects this Ruling. *6Z**-&£&® 
Patched: /A & ~Q f ^ „ , ^ £ ^ ^ 
'STATE 
DISTRICT (£OlJRT JUD$£ J H i ^r i^y 
MICHAEL A. ALLPHIN^ 4 £ \ UTAH / $ ' ' / 
^UNMSiS** 
Banks, 52 P.3d 1190, and Flake, 71 P.3d 589, asserting that "[i]f a settlor deems such an outcome to he unpalatable. 
it can easily be avoided through careful drafting." Id. at 754. 
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SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON 
CASE NUMBER 061903836 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-5-111.1(4A) - ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF DISABLD 
OR ELDER ADLT 2nd Degree Felony (amended) to 3rd Degree Felony 
Offense Date: January 19, 2006 
Plea: February 22, 2007 Guilty 
Disposition: February 22, 2007 Guilty 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
MICHAEL DIREDA 
PARTIES 
Defendant - RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON 
Offense tracking number: 14800775 
Date of Birth: June 03, 1957 
Law Enforcement Agency: OGDEN CITY POLICE 
Prosecuting Agency: WEBER COUNTY 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
PAPER BOND TOTALS Posted: 
Forfeited: 
Exonerated: 
Balance: 
0.75 
0.75 
0.00 
0.00 
10,000.00 
0.00 
10,000.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 0.75 
Amount Paid: 0.75 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
Printed: 04/22/10 15:58:56 Page 1 
CASE NUMBER 061903836 State Felony 
NONMONETARY BOND DETAIL - TYPE: Surety 
Posted By: BEEHIVE BAIL BONDS 
Posted: 10,000.00 
Forfeited: 0.00 
Exonerated: 10,000.00 
Balance: 0.00 
CASE NOTE 
APP PROBATION 
PROCEEDINGS 
10000.00 
10,000.00 
09-27-06 Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN assigned. 
09-27-06 Warrant ordered on: September 27, 2006 Warrant Num: 981083438 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 10000.00 
09-27-06 Warrant issued on: September 27, 2006 Warrant Num: 981083438 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 10000.00 
Judge: ROGER S DUTSON 
Issue reason: Based on Affidavit and Order for Warrant of 
Arrest 
09-27-06 Note: Michael Murphy enters his appearance of counsel. 
09-27-06 Note: Undertaking of bail by Beehive Bail Bonds $10,000.00 to 
WCJ 9-22-2006. 
09-27-06 Bond Account created Total Due: 
09-27-06 Bond Posted Non-Monetary Bond: 
09-27-06 Case filed 
09-27-06 Filed: From an Information 
09-27-06 Filed: Information 
09-28-06 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on October 19, 2006 at 09:00 AM in 
3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
09-28-06 Warrant recalled on: September 28, 2006 Warrant num: 981083438 
Recall reason: Based on Court order 
09-28-06 Filed: NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR MICHAEL MURPHY FOR DEF 
09-28-06 Filed: Motion AND REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
10-02-06 Filed: AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR MURPHY FOR DEFENDANT 
10-02-06 Filed: AMENDED MOTION AND FOR DISCOVERY REQUEST 
10-19-06 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on November 30, 2006 at 09:00 AM 
in 3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
10-19-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s MURPHY, MICHAEL D 
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CASE NUMBER 061903836 State Felony 
Video 
Tape Number: PRB101906 Tape Count: 10:15-10:17 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
rage j uio 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant,. 
The Information is read. 
Advised of charges and penalties. 
Defendant is present with private counsel, Michael Murphy. 
Preliminary hearing is requested and set for 11/30/Q6. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 11/30/2006 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
11-30-06 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on December 28, 2006 at 09:00 AM 
in 3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
11-30-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D 
Video 
Tape Number: PRB113006 Tape Count: 10:18-10:1^ 
HEARING 
This is time set for preliminary hearing. Defendant is present and 
is represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel. 
The defendant waives his preliminary hearing, and the Court 
accepts the waiver. The Court arraigns the defendant on the 
information and holds him for trial. 
ARRAIGNMENT 
A copy of the information is given to the defendant-
Advised of rights and penalties. 
The information is read. 
Defendant enters a plea of not guilty to the charge. Court sets a 
pre-trial on 12/28/06 @ 9:00 a.m. 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 12/28/2006 
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Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
11-30-06 Charge 1 Plea is Not Guilty 
12-28-06 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on February 01, 2007 at 09:00 AM 
in 3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
12-28-06 JURY TRIAL scheduled on February 27, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd 
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
12-28-06 JURY TRIAL scheduled on February 28, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd 
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
12-28-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D 
Video 
Tape Number: PRB122806 Tape Count: 9:45-9:46 
HEARING 
This is time set for pre-trial conference. Defendant is present 
and is represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel. 
Jury trial is requested and set for 2/27 and 2/28/07 @ 9:00 a.m. 
Pre-trial is requested and set for 2/1/07. 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 02/01/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 02/27/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
JURY TRIAL. 
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CASE NUMBER 061903836 State Felony 
Date: 02/28/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
02-01-07 DISPOSITIOIN scheduled on February 22, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd 
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
02-01-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: HEWARD, GARY R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D 
Video 
Tape Number: PRB020107 Tape Count: 9:16-9:17 
HEARING 
This is time set for pre-trial conference. Defendant is present 
and is represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel. 
Mr. Murphy makes a motoin to strike the trial date and continue 
this case for the defendant to enter a plea of guilty. Court grants 
the request. 
DISPOSITIOIN is scheduled. 
Date: 02/22/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
02-01-07 JURY TRIAL Cancelled. 
02-22-07 Filed order: Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea 
and Certificate of Counsel and Order 
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Signed February 22, 2007 
02-22-07 APP SENTENCING scheduled on April 05, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd 
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
02-22-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for DISPOSITION 
Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D 
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Video 
Tape Number: PRB022207 Tape Count: 9:41-9:46 
HEARING 
This is time set for disposition. Defendant is present and is 
represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel. 
State makes a motion to amend the charge to Attempted Exploitation 
of Disabled or Elder Adult, a third degree felony, 
motion. 
The Court relies on the Statement of Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel to supplement a Rule 11 
colloquy. Plea agreement executed in open court. 
Court grants the 
Defendant enters a plea of guilty to the amended charge of 
Attempted Exploitation of Disabled or Elder Adult, a class third 
degree felony. 
Pre-sentence is requested with sentencing continued to 4/5/07. 
APP SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 04/05/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
07 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty 
07 Charge 1 amended to 3rd Degree Felony 
07 Minute Entry - Minutes for APP SENTENCING 
Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D 
Video 
Tape Number: PRB040507 Tape Count: 10:16-10:34 
HEARING 
This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present and is 
represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel. Court proceeds with 
sentencing. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF 
DISABLD OR ELDER ADLT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
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the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF 
DISABLD OR ELDER ADLT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 45 day(s) 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Defendant to serve 45 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
The defendant shall enter into an agreement with the Utah State 
Department of Adult Probation & Parole and comply strictly with its 
terms and conditions. 
02-22 
02-22 
04-05 
The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections and to 
the court whenever required. 
The defendant shall violate no law, either federal, state or 
municipal. 
The defendant shall not consume alcohol or illegal drugs. 
The defendant shall submit to random search, seizure, and chemical 
testing. 
The defendant shall not frequent establishments where alcohol is 
the chief menu item nor associate with persons usinig alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
The defendant shall provide a DNA sample, to be obtained by Adult 
Probation and Parole, and pay all costs. 
The defendant shall serve 45 days in the Weber County Jail with 
credit for time served granted. 
The defendant shall report to the Weber County Jail on 4/9/07 @ 
8:00 a.m. and may be released to the Kiesel facility for 
employment. 
The defendant shall not have a power of attorney while on 
probation. 
The defendant shall complete any treatment deemed necessary under 
the direction of Adult Probation and Parole. 
The defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of $52,935.00 on 
behalf of the victim, Darlene Patterson, payable through Adult 
Probation and Parole. 
04-05-07 Bond Exonerated -10>000.00 
04-09-07 Judgment #1 Entered $ 52935.00 
Creditor: DARLENE PATTERSON 
Debtor: RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON 
52,935.00 Restitution 
52,935.00 Judgment Grand Total 
04-09-07 Filed judgment: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
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Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Signed April 05, 2007 
10-18-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.75 
10-18-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.75 
Note: 1.00 cash tendered. 0.25 change given. 
03-16-09 APP MOTION TO TERMINATE scheduled on March 26, 2009 at 09:00 AM 
in 2nd Floor Southwest with Judge DIREDA. 
03-16-09 Judge MICHAEL DIREDA assigned. 
03-2 6-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for APP MOTION TO TERMINATE 
Judge: MICHAEL DIREDA 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: TREE, TERAL L 
Defendant not present 
Video 
Tape Number: 2D032609 Tape Count: 12:23-12:27 
HEARING 
This is time set for a motion to terminate formal probation with 
Adult Probation & Parole. The Court denies the motion until all 
restitution has been paid in full. 
02-10-10 APP MOTION TO TERMINATE scheduled on February 25, 2010 at 09:00 
AM in 2nd Floor Southwest with Judge DIREDA. 
02-25-10 Minute Entry - Minutes for APP MOTION TO TERMINATE 
Judge: MICHAEL DIREDA 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: WILLOUGHBY, BENJAMIN B 
Defendant not present 
Audio 
Tape Number: 2D022510 Tape Count: 9:13-9:16 
HEARING 
This is time set for a motion to terminate formal probation with 
Adult Probation & Parole. Defendant is not present. 
The Court grants the motion for unsuccessful termination and 
reduces the fines, fees and restitution to a civil judgment and 
transfers them to the Office of State Debt Collection. 
02-25-10 Filed order: Progress Violation Report (Approved Unsuccessful 
Termination) 
Judge MICHAEL DIREDA 
Signed February 25, 2010 
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OLSON & HOGGAN, P.C. 
13 0 South Main, Suite 200 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84323-0525 
Telephone (435) 752-1551 
Attorneys for Randy Patterson, Trustee of The 
Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust 
^sfiluBi 
RECEIVED JUN 3 0 2009 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS 
RON PATTERSON, 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ] 
RANDY D. PATTERSON, as Trustee of the ; 
Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust, ) 
ESTATE OF DARLENE PATTERSON, et ) 
al., ] 
Defendants. ] 
) SUPPLEMENTAL 
) ANp CORRECTED 
) AFFIDAVIT OF RANDY 
) PATTERSON 
! Civil No. 070700586 
I Judge: Michael J. Alphin 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Cache ) 
RANDY PATTERSON, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as 
follows: 
1. I am a Defendant in the above captioned matter, I am a child of Darlene 
Patterson, and I am a brother of Plaintiff, Ron Patterson. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the following except where otherwise stated, 
and I am competent to testify. 
Patterson v. Henry, et al 
Civil No. 070700586 
Affidavit of Randy Patterson 
Page 1 of 4 
VD29160920 pages: 12 
3. I am aware that on July 30, 1999, Darlene Patterson created the Darlene 
Patterson Family Protection Trust (the "Family Trust"). The Family Trust was prepared 
by Darlene's attorney, David Ray Carver. 
4. Before and after our mother's death, Plaintiff admitted to me that during 
the time when Plaintiff was living next to Darlene Patterson, Plaintiff unlawfully used 
Darlene's credit card without authorization to make personal purchases including four-
wheelers for his business. Plaintiff acknowledged that he made many of these purchases 
online through Ebay and PayPal. Plaintiff also acknowledged that when Darlene 
discovered that these transactions had taken place, she objected and notified PayPal that 
Plaintiff had no authority to use her credit card. 
5. In or about February of 2006, Darlene Patterson received a check from the 
State of California in the amount of $52,936.53 payable to Darlene for a project involving 
real property which Darlene owned in California, Plaintiff, however, stole the check, 
forged Darlene's signature, cashed the check, and used the check funds for his personal 
benefit without Darlene's knowledge or permission. Plaintiff has admitted these facts to 
me before and after our mother's death. Eventually, Plaintiffs conduct was discovered, 
and Plaintiff was prosecuted for the felony crime of "Elder Abuse" or "Exploitation of an 
Elder", which after negotiations was reduced to a felony attempt charge of the same 
crime. Darlene was the complaining witness. In connection with his conviction, Plaintiff 
was ordered to pay restitution to Darlene in the amount of $52,935.00, and was sentenced 
to jail and probation. Plaintiff has acknowledged these facts to me. (See also the 
attached Exhibit "A"). 
6. Soon after Darlene discovered Plaintiffs wrongdoing discussed in 
Paragraph 5 above, she asked Mr. Carver to prepare another amendment to the Darlene 
Patterson Family Protection Trust (the "Final Amendment"), which she executed on May 
30, 2006. I was present when Darlene asked Mr. Carver to prepare the Final Amendment 
and when she executed it on May 30, 2006. 
7. I have read the foregoing Supplemental Affidavit, know the contents thereof 
and state the same to be true. 
Patterson v. Henry, et al. 
Civil No. 070700586 
Affidavit of Randy Patterson 
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DATED this X7 day of June, 2009. 
Randy Patterson 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1^\ day of June, 2009. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
m JAMES C. JENKINS k
*
x
 My Commission # 575633 
My Commission Expires 
Sept. 12,2012 
STATE OF UTAH 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this "Zf\ day of June, 2009,1 mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing SUPPLEMENTAL AND CORRECTED AFFIDAVIT OF 
RANDY PATTERSON, postage prepaid in Logan, Utah, to the following: 
L. Miles LeBaron 
Tyler J. Jensen 
LEBARON & JENSEN, P.C. 
476 West Heritage Park Blvd., Suite 200 
Layton, Utah 84041 
Craig T. Peterson 
CATHCART & PETERSON, LLC 
80 North Main Street 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
Attorney for Individual Defendants 
Patterson v. Henry, et al 
Civil No. 070700586 
Affidavit of Randy Patterson 
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JJCJ/Pleadings/Patterson Estate/Supplemental Affidavit of Randy Patterson, doc 
Patterson v. Henry, et al. 
Civil No. 070700586 
Affidavit of Randy Patterson 
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EXHIBIT _ A 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON 
CASE NUMBER 061903836 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 76-5-111.1(4A) - ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF DISABLD 
OR ELDER ADLT 2nd Degree Felony (amended) to 3rd Degree Felony 
Offense Date: January 19, 2006 
Plea: February 22, 2007 Guilty 
Disposition: February 22, 2007 Guilty 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
MICHAEL DIREDA 
PARTIES 
Defendant - RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON 
Plaintiff - STATE OF UTAH 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON 
Offense tracking number: 14800775 
Date of Birth: June 03, 1957 
Law Enforcement Agency: OGDEN CITY POLICE 
Prosecuting Agency: WEBER COUNTY 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due: 
Amount Paid: 
Credit: 
Balance: 
PAPER BOND TOTALS Posted: 
Forfeited: 
Exonerated: 
Balance: 
0.75 
0.75 
0.00 
0.00 
10,000.00 
0.00 
10,000.00 
0.00 
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE 
Amount Due: 0.75 
Amount Paid: 0.75 
Amount Credit: 0.00 
Balance: 0.00 
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NONMONETARY BOND DETAIL -
Posted By: 
Posted: 
Forfeited: 
Exonerated: 
Balance: 
TYPE: Surety 
BEEHIVE BAIL BONDS 
10,000.00 
0.00 
10,000.00 
0.00 
CASE NOTE 
APP PROBATION 
PROCEEDINGS 
09-27-06 
10000.00 
September 27, 
2006 Warrant Num: 981083438 
2006 Warrant Num: 981083438 
10000.00 
S DUTSON 
Based on Affidavit and Order for Warrant of 
09-27-06 Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN assigned. 
09-27-06 Warrant ordered on: September 27/ 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 
Warrant issued on: 
Bail Allowed 
Bail amount: 
Judge: ROGER 
Issue reason: 
Arrest 
6 Note: Michael Murphy enters his appearance of counsel. 
6 Note: Undertaking of bail by Beehive Bail Bonds $10,000.00 to 
WCJ 9-22-2006. 
6 Bond Account created Total Due: 10000.00 
6 Bond Posted Non-Monetary Bond: 10,000.00 
6 Case filed 
6 Filed: From an Information 
6 Filed: Information 
6 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on October 19, 2006 at 09:00 .AM in 
3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
09-28-06 Warrant recalled on: September 28, 2006 Warrant num: 981083438 
Recall reason: Based on Court order 
09-28-06 Filed: NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR MICHAEL MURPHY FOR DEF 
09-28-06 Filed: Motion AND REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
10-02-0 6 Filed: AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEARANCE FOR MURPHY FOR DEFENDANT 
10-02-06 Filed: AMENDED MOTION AND FOR DISCOVERY REQUEST 
10-19-06 PRELIMINARY HEARING scheduled on November 30, 2006 at 09:00 AM 
in 3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
10-19-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for Initial Appearance 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D 
09-
09-
09-
09-
09-
09-
09-
09-
27-0 
27-0 
27-0 
27-0 
27-0 
27-0 
27-0 
28-0 
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Video 
Tape Number: PRB101906 Tape Count: 10:15-10:17 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
A copy of the Information is given to the defendant. 
The Information is read. 
Advised of charges and penalties. 
Defendant is present with private counsel, Michael Murphy. 
Preliminary hearing is requested and set for 11/30/06. 
PRELIMINARY HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 11/30/2006 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
11-30-06 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on December 28, 2006 at 09:00 AM 
in 3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
11-30-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRELIMINARY HEARING 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: NEIDER, CAMILLE L 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D 
Video 
Tape Number: PRB113006 Tape Count: 10:18-10:19 
HEARING 
This is time set for preliminary hearing. Defendant is present and 
is represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel. 
The defendant waives his preliminary hearing, and the Court 
accepts the waiver. The Court arraigns the defendant on the 
information and holds him for trial. 
ARRAIGNMENT 
A copy of the information is given to the defendant. 
Advised of rights and penalties. 
The information is read. 
Defendant enters a plea of not guilty to the charge. Court sets a 
pre-trial on 12/28/06 @ 9:00 a.m. 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 12/28/2006 
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Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84 401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
11-30-06 Charge 1 Plea is Not Guilty 
12-28-06 PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE scheduled on February 01, 2007 at 09:00 AM 
in 3rd Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
12-28-06 JURY TRIAL scheduled on February 27, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd 
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
12-28-06 JURY TRIAL scheduled on February 28, 
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
12-28-06 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D 
2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd 
Video 
Tape Number: PRB122806 Tape Count: 9:45-9:46 
HEARING 
This is time set for pre-trial conference. Defendant is present 
and is represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel. 
Jury trial is requested and set for 2/27 and 2/28/07 @ 9:00 a.m. 
Pre-trial is requested and set for 2/1/07. 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE is scheduled. 
Date: 02/01/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
JURY TRIAL. 
Date: 02/27/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
JURY TRIAL. 
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Date: 02/28/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R. BALDWIN 
02-01-07 DISPOSITIOIN scheduled on February 22, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd 
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
02-01-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: HEWARD, GARY R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D 
Video 
Tape Number: PRB020107 Tape Count: 9:16-$:17 
HEARING 
This is time set for pre-trial conference. Defendant is present 
and is represented by Michael Murphy, private Counsel. 
Mr. Murphy makes a motoin to strike the trial date and continue 
this case for the defendant to enter a plea of guilty. Court grants 
the request. 
DISPOSITIOIN is scheduled. 
Date: 02/22/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
02-01-07 JURY TRIAL Cancelled. 
02-22-07 Filed order: Statement of Defendant in Support of Guilty Plea 
and Certificate of Counsel and Order 
Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Signed February 22, 2007 
02-22-07 APP SENTENCING scheduled on April 05, 2007 at 09:00 AM in 3rd 
Floor Southwest with Judge BALDWIN. 
02-22-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for DISPOSITION 
Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D 
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Video 
Tape Number: PRB022207 Tape Count: 9:41-9^46 
HEARING 
This is time set for disposition. Defendant is present and is 
represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel. 
State makes a motion to amend the charge to Attempted Exploitation 
of Disabled or Elder Adult, a third degree felorjy. Court grants the 
motion. 
The Court relies on the Statement of Defendant in Support of 
Guilty Plea and Certificate of Counsel to supplement a Rule 11 
colloquy. Plea agreement executed in open court. 
Defendant enters a plea of guilty to the amended charge of 
Attempted Exploitation of Disabled or Elder Adult, a class third 
degree felony. 
Pre-sentence is requested with sentencing continued to 4/5/07. 
APP SENTENCING is scheduled. 
Date: 04/05/2007 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: 3rd Floor Southwest 
Second District Court 
2525 Grant Avenue 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Before Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
02-22-07 Charge 1 Disposition is Guilty 
02-22-07 Charge 1 amended to 3rd Degree Felony 
04-05-07 Minute Entry - Minutes for APP SENTENCING 
Judge: PARLEY R BALDWIN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: DECARIA, MARK R 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): MURPHY, MICHAEL D 
Video 
Tape Number: PRB040507 Tape Count: 10:16-10:34 
HEARING 
This is time set for sentencing. Defendant is present and is 
represented by Michael Murphy, private counsel. Court proceeds with 
sentencing. 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF 
DISABLD OR ELDER ADLT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
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the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED EXPLOITATION OF 
DISABLD OR ELDER ADLT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 45 day(s) 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation and Parole. 
Defendant to serve 45 day(s) jail. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
The defendant shall enter into an agreement, witfh the Utah State 
Department of Adult Probation & Parole and comply strictly with its 
terms and conditions. 
The defendant shall report to the Department of Corrections and to 
the court whenever required. 
The defendant shall violate no law, either federal, state or 
municipal. 
The defendant shall not consume alcohol or illegal drugs. 
The defendant shall submit to random search, seizure, and chemical 
testing. 
The defendant shall not frequent establishments where alcohol is 
the chief menu item nor associate with persons using alcohol or 
illegal drugs. 
The defendant shall provide a DNA sample, to be obtained by Adult 
Probation and Parole, and pay all costs. 
The defendant shall serve 45 days in the Weber County Jail with 
credit for time served granted. 
The defendant shall report to the Weber County Jail on 4/9/07 @ 
8:00 a.m. and may be released to the Kiesel facility for 
employment. 
The defendant shall not have a power of attorney while on 
probation. 
The defendant shall complete any treatment deemed necessary under 
the direction of Adult Probation and Parole. 
The defendant shall pay restitution in the amount of $52,935.00 on 
behalf of the victim, Darlene Patterson, payable through Adult 
Probation and Parole. 
04-05-07 Bond Exonerated -10,000.00 
04-09-07 Judgment #1 Entered $ 52935.00 
Creditor: DARLENE PATTERSON 
Debtor: RONALD STEVEN PATTERSON 
52,935.00 Restitution 
52,935.00 Judgment Grand Total 
04-09-07 Filed judgment: Sentence, Judgment, Commitment 
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Judge PARLEY R BALDWIN 
Signed April 05, 2007 
10-18-07 Fee Account created Total Due: 0.75 
10-18-07 COPY FEE Payment Received: 0.75 
Note: 1.00 cash tendered. 0.25 change given. 
03-16-09 APP MOTION TO TERMINATE scheduled on March 26, 2009 at 09:00 AM 
in 2nd Floor Southwest with Judge DIREDA. 
03-16-09 Judge MICHAEL DIREDA assigned. 
03-2 6-09 Minute Entry - Minutes for APP MOTION TO TERMINATE 
Judge: MICHAEL DIREDA 
PRESENT 
Clerk: debbieg 
Prosecutor: TREE, TERAL L 
Defendant not present 
Video 
Tape Number: 2D032609 Tape Count: 12:23-12i27 
HEARING 
This is time set for a motion to terminate formal probation with 
Adult Probation & Parole. The Court denies the motion until all 
restitution has been paid in full. 
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THE 
DARLENE PATTERSON 
FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST 
This Agreement is made and entered into this 30th day of July, 1999, by and 
between Darlene Patterson, (hereinafter referred to as the "Undersigned"), of West Point, 
Davis County, State of Utah, and Darlene Patterson and Rex E. Patterson, (hereinafter 
referred to as "Trustees"). 
The name of this trust shall be The Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust. 
Darlene Patterson hereby transfers and delivers to the Trustees (or their successor 
Trustees) the property listed in the attached Schedule "A" (which is incorporated herein), 
and the Trustees agree to hold said property and any other property which may be 
transferred to this trust by either inter vivos or testamentary transfer; and all said property 
shall be part of the trust and shall be held, administered and distributed by the Trustees 
according to the terms and conditions stated herein. 
ARTICLE I 
PURPOSES AND BIRTH DATES 
1.1 Puipose of the Trust. This Trust is established for the primary benefit of 
the Undersigned during the Undersigned's lifetime, for the Undersigned's family 
thereafter. 
1.2 Family and Birth Dates. The Family of the Undersigned consists of, 
among others, the following: 
Spouse of the Undersigned: 
Rex E. Patterson 
Children of the Undersigned: 
Gary E. Patterson, January 16, 1944 
Judy Ann Henry, born December 20,1946 
Rex A. Patterson, born January 14, 1947 
Vicky D. Romero, born December 31,1950 
Ronald S. Patterson, June 3, 1957 
Ricky A. Patterson, bom April 28, 1958 
Randy D. Patterson, bom December 19, 1964 
The dates of birth above referred to may be relied upon by the Trustees for all purposes. 
13 Community Property. If the Undersigned transfers property to this Trust 
which constitutes community property pursuant to the laws of any community property 
state having jurisdiction over such property, such property shall retain its character as 
community property while held hereunder until the earlier of the death of the 
Undersigned or the Undersigned's spouse. If the Undersigned removes such property 
from this Trust, such property shall continue to retain its character as community 
property. In addition, as to all community property which is transferred to this Trust, this 
Trust shall: 
(a) Remain revocable in whole or in part during the joint lives of the 
Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse, 
(b) All said property that is transferred to this Trust shall remain 
community property and any withdrawals therefrom shall be community property of the 
Undersigned's spouse, 
(c) During the joint lives of the Undersigned and the Undersigned's 
spouse, the Trustees of this Trust shall have powers no more extensive than those 
possessed by the Undersigned or the Undersigned's spouse under the statutory provisions 
setting forth the rights and powers with regards to any community personal and real 
property generally; and 
(d) As to community property, this Trust shall be subject to 
amendment or alteration during the joint lives of the Undersigned and the Undersigned's 
spouse upon their joint consent. 
ARTICLE II 
DISPOSITION DURING THE LIFE OF THE 
UNDERSIGNED OR INCAPACITY 
2.1 Income and Principal. During the lifetime of the Undersigned, such or all 
of the principal of the Trust Estate and any income which such principal shall generate 
shall be paid or delivered to such persons and in such manner from time to time as the 
Undersigned shall direct in writing or, in the absence of such direction, the Trustees shall 
pay or apply for the benefit of the Undersigned, such amounts to such persons as in the 
sole and absolute discretion of the Trustees is deemed necessary and proper for the health, 
support, maintenance and welfare of the Undersigned, in accordance with the 
2 
Undersigned's accustomed manner of living at the date of this instrument. The Trustees 
shall exercise in a liberal manner the power to invade principal included in this paragraph 
2.1, and the rights of the remainderman in the Trust shall be considered of secondary 
| importance. 
2.2 Guardianship. During physical or mental incapacitation, the Undersigned 
herein appoints the successor Trustees to succeed his or her place as a successor Trustee, 
guardian, or other legal capacity, whether appointed orally or in writing, and to supervise 
all matters in which the Undersigned had a right to act if the Undersigned had not become 
incapacitated. 
ARTICLE III 
AMENDMENT, REVOCATION AND ADDITIONS TO TRUST 
3.1 Rights of the Undersigned. As long as the Undersigned is alive, the 
Undersigned reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in part, 
including the principal, and the present or past undisbursed income from such principal. 
Such revocation or amendment of this Trust may be in whole or in part by written 
instrument. Amendment, modification or revocation of this instrument shall be effective 
only when such change is delivered in writing to the then acting Trustee or Trustees. On 
the revocation of this instrument in its entirety, the Trustees shall deliver to the 
Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument of revocation, all of the 
Trust property. 
3.2 Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beneficiaries are 
presently vested interests subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is 
revoked or terminated other than by death. As long as this Trust subsists, the Trust 
properties and all the rights and privileges hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by 
the Trustees named herein in their fiduciary capacity. 
3.3 Additions to Trust. It is understood that the Undersigned or any other 
person may grant, and the Trustees may receive as part of this Trust, additional real and 
personal property by assignment, transfer, deed, or otheif conveyance, or by any other 
means, testamentary or inter vivos, for inclusion in the Trust herein created. Any such 
property so received by the Trustees shall become part of the Marital Trust or Family 
Trust (hereafter described) to which said property is appointed and into which it is 
transferred and shall become subject to the terms of this Trust Agreement. If such 
property is not specifically appointed to either the Marital Trust or the Family Trust in 
particular, it shall be held, administered and distributed according to the terms of this 
entire Trust instrument. 
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3.4 After-Acquired Property. It is specifically the intention of the 
Undersigned that all real and personal properties now owned by the Undersigned, except 
for joint tenancy property, may be added to this Trust; provided further that all future real 
and personal properties acquired by the Undersigned may become a part of this Trust at 
the time acquired by the Undersigned. 
ARTICLE IV 
DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH OF THE UNDERSIGNED 
4.1 Basic Trust Division, Trust Names, and Survivorship. At the death of the 
Undersigned, if the spouse of the Undersigned is then living, the Trustees shall divide the 
Trust Estate into two separate trusts, hereinafter designated as the "Marital Trust" and the 
"Family Trust", respectively, to be held, administered and distributed according to this 
Article VI as hereinafter stated. At the death of the Undersigned, if the spouse of the 
Undersigned has predeceased the Undersigned, then the trustees shall hold, administer 
and distribute the assets of this trust in accordance with Article V. In case of 
simultaneous death between the Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse, whoever has 
the smallest estate shall be presumed to have survived the other in order to effect the 
lowest combined federal and state estate or inheritance taxes. The preceding sentence 
and Section 4.3 shall be interpreted to achieve the lowest possible combined state and 
federal estate taxes for the Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse. 
4.2 Debts and Taxes. All debts, expenses of last illness and funeral expenses, 
attorneys fees, and other costs incurred in the administration of the estate of the 
Undersigned, and all foreign, federal, estate, transfer, inheritance, and succession taxes 
payable by reason of the death of the Undersigned, may in the sole discretion of the 
trustees, be paid out of the Trust assets contributed to the Trust by the Undersigned. The 
Undersigned absolves his or her surviving spouse, if any, from any liability for any of 
said debts or expenses. The Trustees shall have power to determine whether or not any or 
all of the secured debts shall be paid (including debts secured by property passing by joint 
tenancy) and thus exonerate particular properties from debt. Hence, the Trustees may pay 
secured debts, may obtain renewals or extensions of secured debts, may distribute 
property subject to such debts, and may do other acts which the Trustees deem 
appropriate and for the best interest of the Trust and the beneficiaries thereof. The 
Trustees shall have discretion to require that the recipients of any assets included in the 
federal gross estate of the Undersigned pay their proportionate share of any federal, state 
or any taxes. The aforementioned is subject to two exceptions: (i) none of the said 
hereinbefore described debts, expenses or federal, state, foreign estate or other taxes shall 
be borne by the surviving spouse of the Undersigned with respect to any such non probate 
assets or probate assets qualifying for the Marital deduction, but shall be charged to the 
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Family Trust; and (ii) the proceeds received from any life insurance policies on the 
Undersigned's life or from qualified pension or profit sharing plans, and which may or 
may not be included in the gross estate of the Undersigned, shall not be liable for, or paid 
toward the debts, expenses, death taxes, or other charges against the estate of the 
Undersigned, if there are other assets available for such payment. Further, any proceeds 
received from insurance policies or retirement plans because of the death of the 
Undersigned, and which are not included in the federal taxable estate of the Undersigned, 
shall become assets of the Family Trust and not the Marital Trust. The reason for this is 
to keep those assets from being taxed in the estate of the Undersigned. The Trustee is 
given authority to do whatever is necessary to keep those assets out of the federal taxable 
estate of the Undersigned. 
4.3 Initial Corpus of the Marital Trust. If the Undersigned's spouse shall 
survive the Undersigned, the Trustee shall set aside, transfer and pay over to the Marital 
Trust all of the assets of this Trust. Notwithstanding anything contained in this 
paragraph, if a reduction of the property passing to the Marital Trust under this paragraph 
would not result in any increase in the federal estate tax upon the Undersigned's estate 
(after taking into account all credits allowable against such tax), said amount shall be 
reduced by the largest amount which will result in no increase in federal estate tax upon 
the Undersigned's estate, and such amount shall not pass under this paragraph but instead 
shall pass and be governed by the provisions of Article 4.5 of this Trust. In determining 
the amount of any such reduction, the final determination in the federal estate tax 
proceeding in the Undersigned's estate shall control, and there shall be taken into account 
all property passing or which shall have passed to or for the benefit of the Undersigned's 
spouse under this Trust, the Undersigned's Will or otherwise. Such reduction shall be 
deemed a dollar amount reduction, and the property passing as a result thereof under 
Article 4.5 of this Trust shall not participate in increases or decreases during the 
administration of the Undersigned's estate. To the extent possible, assets with respect to 
which the marital reduction is not allowable for purposes of federal estate tax on the 
Undersigned's estate, or with respect to which a credit for foreign death taxes is allowable 
for such purposes, shall be allocated to the property passing to the Trust created under 
Article 4.5 of this Trust. 
4.4 Marital Trust Purposes. The Marital Trust shall be held by the Trustees, 
separately in trust, for the following purposes: 
4.401 Income Distribution. The Trusteed shall pay to the surviving 
spouse of the Undersigned, commencing as of the date of the Undersigned's death, all of 
the income from the Trust in monthly or other convenient installments, but in no event 
less frequently than in quarter-annual installments. 
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4.402 Principal Distribution. Whenever the Trustees determine that the 
funds available to the surviving spouse of the Undersigned from all sources, including the 
income from the Marital Trust, are not sufficient for proper care, maintenance, support 
and travel, including but not limited to the needs arising from illness, accident or 
misfortune of the surviving spouse of the Undersigned, and funds required to permit the 
purchase of residences, the Trustees at any time and from time to time may, in their sole 
discretion, pay or distribute to the surviving spouse of the Undersigned so much of the 
principal of the Trust as they shall deem necessary or advisable under the circumstances, 
and the rights of the remaindermen in the Trust shall be considered of secondary 
importance. 
4.403 Distribution on Death of Surviving Spouse. Upon the death of the 
surviving spouse of the Undersigned, the Trustees shall continue to hold and distribute 
the rest, residue and remainder of this Trust as subject to and under the provisions of 
Article V; provided, however, that the Trustees may, in their discretion, first pay from the 
Marital Trust all debts, expenses and death taxes of the Undersigned's spouse. 
4.404 Disclaimer. The surviving spouse of the Undersigned, or his or her 
executor, after the Undersigned's death, may disclaim in writing the surviving spouse's 
interest in the Marital Trust. If the surviving spouse of the Undersigned disclaims part or 
all of the interest given to the Marital Trust as referred to in Article IV, the disclaimed 
properties shall pass to and become part of the Family Trust, and shall be distributed as 
set forth therein. 
4.5 The Initial Corpus and Purposes of the Family Trust. The Family Trust 
shall contain the balance of the Trust Estate remaining after setting aside all property of 
the Trust Estate that is included in the Marital Trust. The Family Trust shall not be 
subject to the payment of the debts and death taxes of the Undersigned. The Family Trust 
shall be held by the Trustees separately in trust for the following purposes: 
4.501 Principal and Income Distribution. During the lifetime of the 
spouse of the Undersigned, the Trustees may distribute, commencing as of the date of the 
Undersigned's death, to said spouse and any children or grandchildren of the 
Undersigned, such part or all of the principal and income of the Family Trust as the 
trustees, in their sole discretion, deem necessary or appropriate for the support and 
maintenance of the surviving spouse and said children and grandchildren in the standard 
of living to which they are accustomed, including reasonable and adequate health, 
medical, mental, hospital, nursing and invalidism expenses. 
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4.502 Primary Consideration of Spouse and Minor Children. In 
exercising the discretions imposed upon the Trustee, the Trustees are directed that 
primary consideration be given to the surviving spouse and the surviving minor children, 
inasmuch as they shall likely be the ones with the greatest needs. 
4.503 Exclusive Special Power of Appointment Exercisable Inter Vivos 
or Testamentarily; Gift Over in Default. Notwithstanding any of the provisions above, 
during the life or at the death of the surviving spouse of the Undersigned, the Trustees 
shall hold, administer or distribute the assets of the Family Trust to or for the benefit of 
any one or more of (i) the Undersigned's issue; (ii) spouses of the Undersigned's deceased 
issue; or (iii) siblings or any issue of the siblings of the Undersigned, as the surviving 
spouse of the Undersigned shall appoint by exercise of this exclusive special power of 
appointment provided herein. Such special power of appointment shall be exercised 
either inter vivos by a written direction delivered to the Trustees of this Trust or by a Will 
made after the death of the Undersigned, which specifically refers to the power herein 
given. Any appointment by the spouse of the Undersigned may be of such estates and 
interest and upon such terms, trusts, conditions, powers ^nd limitations as the surviving 
spouse shall determine. 
Any appointment may exclude any one or more of the beneficiaries of any 
enumerated class. If, or to the extent that, the spouse of the Undersigned does not 
exercise this testamentary special power of appointment, at the death of the spouse of the 
Undersigned, said assets of the Family Trust shall pass as directed in Article V. 
However, this special power shall not apply to any trust property which the holder of the 
power at any time gifted to the Undersigned which would be included in the estate of the 
holder for federal estate tax purposes if the holder were tp leave such power under IRC 
Section 2038. 
ARTICLE V 
DISPOSITION ON THE DEATH OF THE UM)ERSIGNED 
AND THE UNDERSIGNED'S SPOUSE 
All Trust principal with all accumulated income thereof, directed to be disposed 
of under the provisions of Article V shall, upon the death of the Undersigned and the 
Undersigned's spouse, be held in trust for the benefit of the then living children of the 
Undersigned, and the then living issue of any deceased children of the Undersigned, and 
shall be disposed of as follows: 
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5.1 Support and Education. All remaining Trust assets (principal and income) 
shall be held, administered and distributed as follows: Until the youngest living child of 
the Undersigned is age 25, the Trustees, in their sole discretion, shall distribute such 
funds from income or principal of the Trust Estate, as they deem necessary for the 
support, maintenance and education of the Undersigned's children, and grandchildren (if 
the Trustees deem the grandchildren to be in need); such payments need not be equal in 
amounts. The Trustees shall take into account the needs, ages, assets and other available 
sources of income and support of the Undersigned's children. The Undersigned further 
particularly directs the Trustees that in exercising their discretion hereunder, they should 
make reasonable allowance for the degree of educational expenses at undergraduate 
college and post-graduate college level that have been expended for various of their 
children and that should thereafter be expended for various others of their children, in 
order to treat their children with some degree of fairness with respect to the receipt of 
educational funds from them. The Trustees shall determine the amount to be distributed, 
the beneficiary to whom distributions are to be made, and the time and manner of 
distributions made under this Section, and shall distribute the amounts according to the 
various needs of the beneficiaries, even if such distribution is unequal. Any such 
payment is to be charged against the Trust Estate as a whole, rather than against the 
ultimate distributive share of the beneficiary to whom payment is made. If amounts are 
not disbursed under this provision after the youngest living child has reached age 25; then 
the remainder shall be distributed according to Section 5.2. 
5.2 Distribution. After all the surviving children of the Undersigned attain age 
25, the Trustee shall divide the remaining principal and income of the Trust Estate into as 
many equal shares as there are children of the Undersigned then living, and children of 
the Undersigned then deceased with issue then living; provided, further, that each of said 
equal shares shall either be distributed or held and administered, and later distributed by 
the Trustees as separate trust, as follow: 
5.201 Living Children. One share shall be set aside for the benefit of each 
of the Undersigned's children who may then be living and distributed or held in trust as 
follows: 
Each of the Trusts mentioned above for a separate child of Undersigned 
shall be held as a life estate and in trust for the life of the respective child of the 
Undersigned. The Trustees during the life of each Trust beneficiary (who is a child of the 
Undersigned) shall invest the income, add it to principal, and shall be granted a power of 
invasion over the principal and income of the Trust and may exercise that power of 
invasion, in the Trustee's sole and uncontrolled discretion, for the support, education, 
medical care and maintenance of the respective Trust beneficiary during his lifetime. The 
beneficiary is given no power of invasion over the Trust. 
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At such time as a Trust beneficiary (a child of the Undersigned) dies, or if 
said child dies prior to the Undersigned, then his or her share shall continue to be held in 
Trust for the benefit of his children (grandchildren of the Undersigned) until the youngest 
of said children reach the age of 25. Until the youngest of said children reach the age of 
25, the Trustee shall continue to hold the assets of the trust estate and may invade the 
income and principal of the Trust for the support, maintenance, medical care and 
education for the beneficiaries of the Trust as the trustee in the trustee's sole and 
uncontrolled discretion deems best. At such time as th^ youngest living child of a 
deceased child of the Undersigned reaches the age of 25, then that Trust shall terminate 
and be paid out in equal shares by right of representation to the issue of each child of the 
Undersigned for whose benefit the trust is set up. By way of example, upon the death of 
Gary E. Patterson, his Trust shall continue to be held for the benefit of his issue, if he 
then has any. At such time as the youngest child of GaiV E. Patterson reaches the age of 
25, the Trust shall terminate and the Trustee shall pay the Trust assets out to the issue of 
Gary E. Patterson by right of representation. In the event a child of the Undersigned dies 
without having issue surviving, then in that event their respective share shall be 
transferred in equal shares to the other Trusts established for the children of the 
Undersigned pursuant to this paragraph, to be held, administered and distributed in 
accordance with said Trust terms. 
For each Trust which is otherwise to be established under this Trust 
instrument and to which any of the Undersigned's generation-skipping exemption is 
allocated, unless the Trust thereby has a generation-skipping inclusion ratio of zero, the 
Trustee shall instead establish two separate Trusts so that each separate Trust has a 
generation-skipping inclusion ratio of either zero (the Exempt Trust) or one (the 
Nonexempt Trust). This is to be accomplished by allocating to the Nonexempt Trust the 
minimum amount of property necessary to establish that Trust with an inclusion ration of 
one, while leaving the Exempt Trust with an inclusion r^tio of zero. 
5.3 Alternative Distribution. If all of the aboVe distributions fail, then the 
Trustee shall distribute the property of this Trust equally to those persons who would 
constitute heirs at law of the Undersigned, in the proportions provided by the law of 
descent and distribution of the state whose laws govern this Trust. 
ARTICLE VI 
TRUSTEE AND EXECUTOR ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS 
6.1 In General. The personal representative of the estate of the Undersigned 
and the Trustees of this Trust shall have as complete power and discretion with respect to 
administration and management of the Undersigned's estate and this Trust, as the 
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Undersigned had over the Undersigned's property while living; such power and discretion 
shall include, by way of illustration and not of limitation, and in addition to any inherent, 
implied or statutory power not inconsistent with the other provision of this Trust, and the 
Undersigned's Will, the power thereinafter enumerated in this Article. The word 
"Trustees" hereinafter shall refer to the Trustees of this Trust, and the personal 
representative of the Undersigned's estate and "Trust Estate" shall refer to the Trust Estate 
of the Trust and the estate outside of this Trust of the Undersigned. 
6.2 Investments. The Trustees may purchase or otherwise acquire and retain, 
whether originally a part of any Trust Estate hereunder or subsequently acquired, any and 
all stocks, bonds, notes and other such securities or any variety of real or personal 
property, including stocks or interests in investment trusts, mutual funds and common 
trust funds (including common trust funds maintained by the Trustees) as the Trustees 
may deem advisable, whether or not such investments be of a character permissible for 
investments by fiduciaries. Investments need not be diversified and may be made or 
retained with a view toward possible increase in value, notwithstanding the amount or 
absence of income therefrom. 
6.3 Types of Transactions. The Trustees may sell, exchange, lease, pledge, 
mortgage, transfer, convert, or otherwise dispose of or grant options with respect to any 
and all properties at any time forming a part of the Trust Estate, in such manner, at such 
time or times, for such purposes, for such prices and upon such terms, credits and 
conditions as the Trustees may deem advisable. Any lease or contract made by the 
Trustees may extend beyond the period fixed by statute for leases or contracts made by 
fiduciaries and may extend beyond the duration of any trust hereunder. 
6.4 Borrowing. The Trustees may borrow money from any source, including 
the Trustees, for the benefit of the Trust Estate created hereunder, and as security for any 
such loan, may mortgage or pledge any property in any Trust Estate created hereunder. 
6.5 Management. The Trustees may vote in person or by general or limited 
proxy with respect to any shares of stock or other securities held by the Trustees, may 
become a party to or deposit securities or other property under or accept securities issued 
under any voting trust agreement (whether or not extending beyond the duration of any 
trust hereunder) any may rescind, terminate or amend any such voting trust agreement, 
make consents, directly or through a committee or agent, to any recapitalization, 
reorganization, consolidation, merger, dissolution or liquidation of any corporation, 
partnership or association in which any Trust created hereunder may have an interest, and 
may make any payments, assignments, or subscriptions and take any other steps which 
the Trustees may deem necessary or proper to enable the Trust created hereunder to 
obtain the benefits of any such transaction. 
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6.6 Insurance. The Trustees may effect and keep in force life, fire, rent, title, 
liability or casualty insurance or any other insurance of any nature in any form and in any 
amount, including without limitation, insurance on or with respect to any dwelling and 
the contents thereof in which any beneficiaries reside and any automobile which any 
beneficiary uses, whether or not such dwelling, contents or automobile are part of the 
Trust Estate. 
6.7 Principal and Income. The Trustees may determine what is principal or 
income of any trust and apportion and allocate in their discretion its receipts, taxes and 
other expenses and charges between the two. A separate income account need not be 
maintained. Any income not distributed in accordance with the provisions hereof shall 
become principal. 
6.8 Alternative Valuation Date and Tax Choices. The Trustees, in selecting 
the valuation date for purposes of Federal estate and state death taxes, may select a date 
which results in the lowest tax burden on the Undersigned's estate, considering the effect 
of the Federal estate tax and all state death taxes, and also income tax of the property 
included in the Undersigned's estate and the same shall be binding upon all such 
beneficiaries, without further adjustment to any share or portion due a beneficiary. 
Trustees may also choose between taking certain deductions, or both. The Trustees shall 
not restore to principal from income the amount by which the Federal estate taxes are 
increased by the estate's loss of any such deductions. 
6.9 Settlement of Claims. The Trustees shall have power to renew, assign, 
alter, extend, compromise, release, with or without consideration, or submit to arbitration, 
obligations or claims held by or asserted against the Tru$t Estate. 
6.10 Income and Gift Taxes. The Trustees shall have power to join with the 
surviving spouse in federal and state income tax returns for any period prior to the first of 
the Undersigned's death; and also for federal gift tax purposes, to consent to the splitting 
of gifts made by the Undersigned to third persons so that such gifts may be treated for the 
purpose of computing gift tax or refunds, including deficiencies, interest and penalties as 
they result from so doing, even though not attributable to the Undersigned's own income 
or property, and even to determine that all sums so payable shall be paid out of the 
Undersigned's Trust Estate, without giving or obtaining any consideration therefor. 
6.11 Trustee Transactions with Other Family Trusts or Estates. The Trustees 
may enter into any transactions authorized by this Article with any other decedent's estate 
or any inter vivos or testamentary trust in which the Undersigned or issue or any of them 
has beneficial interest, even though any fiduciary of such other estate or trust is also a 
fiduciary under this Trust or the Undersigned's Will. The Trustees may enter into any 
transaction authorized by this Article with the Trustees or legal representatives of any 
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other trust or estate in which any beneficiary hereunder has a beneficial interest even 
though such Trustee or legal representative is also a Trustee hereunder. Without limiting 
the generality of the foregoing, the Trustees may advance funds to, purchase assets from, 
or sell assets to the personal representatives of the estate of the Undersigned and may pay, 
with or without arrangements for reimbursement, any sums necessary for the settlement 
of the estate of the Undersigned subject to Section 4.3. 
6.12 Reserves for Amortization, Obsolescence, Depreciation and Depletion. 
The Trustees may charge to operating expense all current costs of amortization, 
obsolescence, depreciation and depletion of any properties of the Trust and provide 
adequate reserves for such amortization, obsolescence, depreciation and depletion. 
6.13 Agents. The Trustees may hold investments in the name of a nominee and 
may employ custodians of any Trust property, brokers, agents and attorneys. 
6.14 Distribution in Kind. The Trustees may make any distribution or 
payments in kind, or cause any shares to be composed of cash, property or undivided 
fractional interests in property different in kind from any other share and determine the 
value of such shares. The Trustees may acquire assets for distribution in kind to the 
beneficiaries hereunder. Such assets may include property, real and personal, stocks, 
bonds, notes and other securities, life insurance contracts and annuities. 
6.15 Trustees Expenses. The Trustees may pay from either income or principal 
of the Trust the expenses of administering the same. The Trustees shall have a lien on the 
Trust Estate from either principal or income or from both, all advances made for the 
benefit or protection of the Trust Estate or its properties and all expenses, loss and 
liabilities not resulting form the negligence or other default of the Trustees incurred in 
connection with the administration of the Estate. 
6.16 Payments to Minors or Disabled Beneficiaries. If, in the Trustees 
discretion, any beneficiary (whether under or over age 25) is incapable of making proper 
disposition of any sum of income or principal that is payable or appointed to said 
beneficiary under the terms of this Trust Agreement, the Trustees may apply said sum to 
or on behalf of the beneficiary by one or more of the following methods: (i) by payment 
on behalf of the beneficiary to any one with whom the beneficiary resides; (ii) by 
payments in discharge of the beneficiary's bills or debts, including bills for premiums on 
insurance policies; or (iii) by paying an allowance to the beneficiary directly. The 
foregoing payments shall be made without regard to other resources of the beneficiary, 
and without the intervention of any guardian or like fiduciary; provided, however, that the 
Trustees shall endeavor to apply the funds for the benefit of the beneficiary, that the funds 
will not be used by any adult person, or any other person for a purpose other than the 
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direct benefit of the beneficiary, and particularly so that said funds will not be diverted 
from the purpose of support and education of the beneficiary. 
6.17 Trustees May Rely on Will. In ascertaining whether there has been an 
amendment of this Trust by the Last Will and Testament of the Undersigned or whether 
there has been an exercise of any powers which have b^en granted to any of the 
beneficiaries herein and which may be exercised by an>| such beneficiary's Last Will and 
Testament, the Trustees shall be protected in relying upon an instrument admitted to 
probate in any jurisdiction as the Last Will and Testament of the Undersigned or as the 
Last Will and Testament of any beneficiary who has such power. Unless the Trustees 
have actual notice of the admission to probate of such a Will within six (6) months after 
the death of the Undersigned or any such beneficiary, it | will be conclusively presumed 
that no such Will has been admitted to probate, and no Such Will exists, and that the 
Undersigned or beneficiary, as the case may be, died intestate and the Trust Estate shall 
be administered accordingly, whether or not such Will is thereafter found to exist. 
6.18 Commingling. The Trustees may commingle the funds and assets of any 
Trust Estate hereunder with any other Trust Estate created hereunder so long as proper 
records are kept of the assets allocable to any such trust. The Trustees shall not be 
required to physically divide any of the investments or any other property unless 
necessary or deemed advisable for the purpose of distribution, but may keep the same or 
any part hereof in one or more funds in which the separate and distinct trust or shares or 
fraction shall have undivided interests. 
6.19 Parties Dealing With the Trustees. No purchaser, and no issuer of any 
stock, bond or other person dealing with the Trustees hereunder with respect to any 
properties hereunder as a purchaser, lessee, party to a contract or lease, or in any other 
capacity whatsoever, shall be under any obligation whatsoever to see to the disbursing of 
monies paid to the Trustees or to the due execution of this Trust in any particular, but 
such person shall be absolutely free in dealing with the Trustees on the same basis as 
though the Trustees were the absolute owners of said property, without any conditions, 
restrictions or qualifications whatsoever. 
6.20 Trustees Liability. No successor Trustee shall be held liable for any 
mistakes, negligence or willful misconduct of any preceding Trustee. Without limiting 
the generality of the foregoing, no Trustee shall be held liable for failing to make detailed 
examinations of the actions or accounts of any preceding Trustee unless such improper 
actions of the preceding Trustee are brought to the attention of the successor Trustee. An 
honest, non-negligent error of judgment shall never be c^use of liability of any Trustee. 
The heirs of the Undersigned while serving as Trustees ^hall be liable only for willful 
fraud. Other Trustees shall be liable for their acts and oifiissions in accordance with the 
laws of the State of Utah. 
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6.21 Limitations on Power of Individual Trustees. Notwithstanding specific 
provisions in this instrument to the contrary, and individual serving as a Trustee shall 
have no voice or power in the determination of distributions of principal (including trust 
terminations) or accumulations of income for said individual Trustees, or to or for any 
person to whom said individual Trustees owes a legal obligation of support, nor shall said 
individual fiduciary have any voice or power in any other determination which would 
cause Trust principal to be includible in such individual's estate for tax purposes or which 
would cause Trust income to be taxed to such individual, but such deteiminations shall be 
made in the sole discretion and at the direction of any Co-Trustee or successor Trustees. 
Even though any successor Trustees are not then serving full time, they shall serve as a 
Trustee for this limited purpose. 
6.22 Miscellaneous Trustee Provisions. In order to carry out the provisions of 
the Trusts created by this instrument, the Trustee shall have the following powers, in 
addition to those now or hereafter conferred by law, such powers to be exercised in good 
faith and in accordance with the Trustees' fiduciary obligations: 
(a) To lend money to any person, including the probate estate 
of the Undersigned, provided that any such loan shall be adequately secured and shall 
bear a reasonable rate of interest. 
(b) To purchase property at its fair market value as determined 
by the Trustees in the Trustees' discretion, from the probate estate of the Undersigned. 
(c) To borrow money on such terms and conditions as the 
Trustees consider advisable, and to encumber Trust property by mortgage, deed of trust, 
pledge or otherwise for the debt of the Trust or a Co-owner of Trust property. 
(d) To commence or defend, at the expense of the Trust, such 
litigation with respect to the Trust or any property of the Trust Estate as the Trustees 
consider advisable, and to compromise or otherwise adjust any claims or litigation against 
or in favor of the Trust. 
(e) To withhold from distribution in the Trustees' discretion, at 
the time for distribution of any property in this Trust, without payment of interest, all or 
any part of the property, as long as the Trustees, in their discretion, shall determine that 
such property may be subject to conflicting claims, to tax deficiencies, or to liabilities, 
contingent or otherwise, property incurred in the administration of the Estate. 
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(f) To purchase bonds and to pay such premiums in connection 
with the purchase as the Trustees, in their discretion, consider advisable; provided, 
however, that each premium shall be repaid periodically to principal out of the interest on 
the bond in such reasonable manner as the Trustees shall determine and, to the extent 
necessary, our of the proceeds on the sale or other disposition of the bond. 
(g) To purchase bonds at such discount as the Trustees in their 
discretion consider advisable; provided, however, that the discount shall be accumulated 
periodically as interest in such reasonable manner as the Trustees shall determine, and to 
the extent necessary paid out of the proceeds on the sale or other disposition of the bond 
or out of principal. 
(h) To purchase, in the Trustees discretion, at less than par, 
obligations of the United States of America issued before March 4, 1971, that are 
redeemable at par in payment of any federal estate tax liability of the Undersigned, in 
such amounts as the Trustees deem advisable. The Trustees shall exercise the Trustees' 
discretion and purchase such obligations if the Trustees have reason to believe that the 
Undersigned is in substantial danger of death, and may borrow funds and give security 
for that purpose. The Trustees shall resolve any doubt concerning the desirability of 
making the purchase and its amount in favor of making the purchase and in purchasing a 
larger, even though somewhat excessive, amount. The Trustees shall not be liable to the 
Undersigned, any heir of the Undersigned, or any beneficiary of this Trust for Losses 
resulting form purchases made in good faith. The Trustees are directed to redeem any 
such obligations that are part of Trust corpus to the fullest extent possible in payment of 
the federal estate tax liability of the Undersigned. 
6.23 Income accrued or unpaid on trust property when received into the Trust 
shall be treated as any other income. Income accrued or held undistributed by the 
Trustees at the termination of the Trust created herein shall go the next beneficiaries of 
the Trust in proportion to their interest in it. Among successive beneficiaries of this 
Trust, all taxes and other current expenses shall be prorated over the period to which they 
relate on a daily basis. 
6.24 Notwithstanding anything herein to the contrary, during the lifetime of the 
surviving spouse of the Undersigned, said spouse shall have the power to require the 
Trustees to make all or part of the principal of the Marital Trust productive or to convert 
promptly any unproductive part into productive property. This power shall be exercised 
by the surviving spouse of the Undersigned in a written instrument delivered to the 
Trustees. 
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6.25 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary, it is the Undersigned's intention 
to have the Marital Trust qualify for the marital deduction under Section 2056 of the 
Internal Revenue Code and the regulations pertaining to that Section or any 
corresponding or substitute provisions applicable to the Trust estate. In no event shall the 
Trustee take any action or have any power that will impair the marital deduction, and all 
provisions regarding the Marital Trust shall be interpreted to conform to this primary 
objective. 
6.26 For each trust which is otherwise to be established under this Trust 
instrument and to which any of the Undersigned's generation-skipping exemption is 
allocated, unless the trust thereby has a generation-skipping inclusion ratio of zero, the 
Trustee shall instead establish two separate trusts so that each separate trust has a 
generation-skipping inclusion ratio of either zero (the Exempt Trust) or one (the 
Nonexempt Trust). This is to be accomplished by allocating to the Nonexempt Trust the 
minimum amount of property necessary to establish that trust with an inclusion rate of 
one, while leaving the Exempt Trust with an inclusion ration of zero. 
ARTICLE VII 
TRUSTEE PROVISIONS 
7.1 Accounting. With respect to each separate Trust created herein, any 
corporate Trustee shall render at least annually an account of income and principal, 
including a statement of all receipts, disbursements and capital changes, to all 
beneficiaries then eligible to receive income or to the natural or legal guardians of such 
beneficiaries. However, individual Trustees shall render such annual accounting only if 
requested by at least one beneficiary of the Trust, and as need for tax returns. So long as 
the Undersigned serves as a Trustee of this Trust, an counting requested by beneficiaries 
of this Trust shall be limited to a list of assets currently held by the Trustees as part of this 
Trust. Any time a Trustee resigns, is removed or dies in accordance with Sections 6.5 
and 6.10, then the resigning Trustees, the removed Trustees, or the surviving Co-Trustee 
or successor Trustee, in case of death of a single Trustee, shall submit an accounting to all 
the living beneficiaries of the Trust who shall object in writing to said Trustee's 
accounting within sixty (60) days of said accounting shall be deemed approved by the 
beneficiaries. 
7.2 Acting in Other Jurisdictions. If for any reason the Trustee is required or 
deems it advisable to take any actions in any jurisdiction in which it is not permitted 
under the laws of such jurisdiction to qualify as a Trustee, the Trustee may appoint to act 
in such other jurisdiction such person or corporation as the Trustee deems advisable. 
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7.3 Bond. No bond shall be required of the Original Trustees hereunder or of 
any successor Trustees or, if bond is required by law, no surety on such bond shall be 
! required. 
7.4 Compensation. Any individual Trustee shall serve as Trustee without 
compensation; however, a reasonable compensation shall be paid if the individual Trustee 
so requests by a writing attached to this Trust, and when a copy of such request is 
delivered to the then existing income beneficiaries. Any corporate Trustee shall be 
entitled to a reasonable fee for its services commensurate with fees charged by the 
Trustees for similar services. Any corporate Trustee may charge a reasonable fee for 
transfers to a successor Trustee and for any final distribution of any share of the Trust 
Estate based upon the work involved in such transfer or final distribution. 
7.5 Resignation. Any Trustee may resign by giving thirty (30) days written 
notice to all of the then current, adult, competent beneficiaries of any Trust created 
hereunder. 
7.6 Trustees. The following will act as original Trustees, and as replacement 
Trustees in the following order of succession: 
(a) Darlene Patterson and Rex E. Patterson, jointly as original Co-
Trustees. If either shall fail or cease to serve, then the survivor shall serve alone. 
(b) Judy Ann Henry, Vicky D. Romero, to serve jointly. If either shall 
fail or cease to serve, then the other shall serve with the next listed Trustee, so that there 
are always two individuals serving jointly. 
(c) Rex A. Patterson 
(d) Trustee or Trustees as the majority of the beneficiaries remaining 
choose, with the parent or legal guardian voting for minor beneficiaries. There must 
always be at least two Trustees serving jointly. 
In the discretion of the Trustees, additional Trustees may be added in the 
succession above indicated if more than one trustee is desired. If an institutional trustee 
is appointed Trustee, then no successor Trustee to said institution need be appointed. 
An exception to the above has to do with the Trusts which are established 
as lifetime trusts for the benefit of the children of the Undersigned. At such time as both 
the Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse have died, and at such time as each child 
of the Undersigned who is a Trust beneficiary attains age 40, then the Trustee of the Trust 
established for each such child shall be the child who is the beneficiary of each respective 
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Trust ifsa.id child elects to be Trustee. By way of example, on the death of the 
Undersigned and the Undersigned's spouse, the Trustee for the benefit of the Trust to be 
established for Gary E. Patterson shall be Gary E. Patterson, if he elects and if he is at 
least age 40 or when he becomes age 40. If any of the above children cease to serve as 
trustee, then a successor trustee shall be appointed as described above except that each 
said child may require trustees on said child's trust once said child is age 40. 
7.7 Dissent Among Trustees. A majority of the Trustees, whether individual 
or corporate, shall have the power to make any decisions, undertake any action, or 
execute any documents affecting the Trust created herein. In the event of a difference of 
opinion among the Trustees, the decision of the majority of them shall prevail, but the 
dissenting or non-assenting Trustee shall not be responsible for any action taken by the 
majority pursuant to such decision. After the death of the Undersigned, if only two (2) 
individual Trustees are in office, they must act unanimously. If an individual and a 
corporate Trustee are in office, the determination of the individual Trustee shall be 
binding. 
7.8 Delegation of Authority. Any Trustee may from time to time delegate to 
one or more of the remaining trustees, any powers, duties or discretions. Every such 
delegation shall be in writing delivered to the delegate or delegates, and shall remain 
effective for the time therein specified or until earlier revocation by a further writing 
similarly delivered. Everyone dealing with the Trustees shall be absolutely protected in 
relying upon the certificate of any Trustee as to who is the acting Trustee or Trustees at 
the time and as to the extent of their authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise. 
7.9 Independence of Court Supervision. In the absence of a breach of trust, no 
Trustee shall ever be required to qualify before, be appointed by, or account to any court 
or obtain the order or approval of any court in the exercise of any power of discretion 
herein given. 
7.10 Removal. While the surviving spouse of the Undersigned is a Trust 
beneficiary under this Trust, said spouse shall have the power to require any existing 
Trustee to resign, whereupon a successor Trustee shall be appointed as appointed by said 
spouse, or if the spouse does not appoint a successor then a successor shall be appointed 
pursuant to paragraph 7.6. 
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ARTICLE Vni 
GENERAL TRUST PROVISIONS 
8.1 Insurance 
8.101 Power of the Undersigned. The Undersigned reserves the right, 
without the consent or approval of the Trustees, to sell, assign or hypothecate any policies 
of life or accident insurance made payable to the Trustees hereunder, to exercise any 
option or privilege granted by such policies, including but without limiting the generality 
of the foregoing, the right to change the beneficiaries of such policies, and to receive all 
payments, dividends, surrender values, benefits or privileges of any kind which may 
accrue on account of such policies during the Undersigned's lifetime. Furthermore, the 
Trustees agree to deliver to the Undersigned any of sucfy policies deposited with the 
Trustees hereunder. 
8.102 Duties of Trustees. The Trustees shall hold any policies of life or 
accident insurance which may be deposited with the Trustees, but without any obligation 
to pay premiums, assessments or other charges upon any of the policies or otherwise to 
preserve them or any of them as binding contracts of insurance. Upon the death of the 
insured, or upon the maturity date of any policy assigned or payable to the Trustees, the 
Trustees shall take such proceedings in their judgment they shall deem necessary to 
collect all proceeds due on the policies and they may, if they so elect, exercise any 
settlement options available under the policies. The Trustees are authorized to 
compromise and adjust claims arising out of such insurance policies, upon such terms and 
conditions as the Trustees shall deem advisable, and, to the extent necessary, may 
maintain or defend any dispute; provided, however, the Trustees shall be under no duty to 
maintain or enter into any litigation unless their expenses, including attorneys fees and 
costs, have been advanced or guaranteed in an amount and in a manner reasonably 
satisfactory to the Trustees. The Trustees may repay any advances out of the principal or 
income of this Trust. The receipt of the Trustees to the iijisurer shall be a full discharge of 
the insurer and the Trustees alone shall thereafter be required to see to the application of 
the proceeds. 
8.2 Spendthrift Clause. The interest of each beneficiary in the income or 
principal of any Trust created hereunder shall be free from the control or interference of 
any creditor of the beneficiary or any spouse of a married beneficiary and shall not be 
subject to attachment or susceptible of anticipation or alienation. Nothing contained in 
this Section shall be construed as restricting in any way the exercise of any power or 
discretion granted hereunder. 
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8.3 Perpetuity Savings Clause. In any event, and anything to the contrary 
herein contained notwithstanding, the Trusts created in this Agreement shall terminate 
upon the day of twenty-one (21) years after the death of the Undersigned and the 
Undersigned's children and grandchildren living at the time this Trust becomes 
irrevocable, in the event these Trusts shall not have previously terminated in accordance 
with the terms hereof. In the event of the termination of these Trusts as provided for in 
this Section, the Trustees shall distribute to the Trust Estate as it shall then be constituted, 
together with any net income, to the beneficiaries then entitled to the income from the 
Trust Estate, in the same proportion in which they are entitled to such income. 
8.4 Governing Law. This Agreement shall be construed as regulated by the 
laws of the State of Utah. 
8.5 Definitions. The following are various terms used in the Trust Agreement 
and the definitions which the Undersigned intends for such terms: 
(a) Children. "Children" means the lineal descendants in the first 
degree of the Undersigned or of such other persons specifically named or indicated by the 
text or context. "Child" means a single such descendent. The Undersigned intends, for 
all purposes whatsoever, adopted children of the Undersigned or any other person shall 
have exactly the same status as natural bom children; provided, however, adopted 
children shall be treated as natural children only if the adoption occurs before the adopted 
person's 21st birthday. Provided further, however, adopted issue who are also natural 
issue shall take only in one capacity, such capacity being the one which grants to such 
issue the larger share. 
(b) Issue. "Issue" means children and other lineal descendants of the 
Undersigned or of such other persons specifically named or indicated by the text or 
context. 
(c) Child in Being. A child who is born alive shall be treated as a 
child in being during the actual period of gestation for purposes of (i) determining if a 
person (that is, the Undersigned or any other person) died without children or issue 
surviving; and (ii) determining if a person is entitled to share in a distribution of Trust 
principal. All of the rights of such a child shall commence at birth. 
(d) "Spouse", "Surviving Spouse", or "Spouse of the Undersigned", 
shall be deemed to refer to Rex E. Patterson. 
8.6 Invalid Provisions. If any provision of this Trust is held invalid, none of 
the other provisions shall thereby be rendered invalid or inoperative, but such provisions 
shall be given full force and effect as herein provided. 
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8.7 Survivorship. In determining the beneficiaries of the Trust created herein, 
a beneficiary shall be deemed to have survived the Undersigned, or any other person, a 
point in time, or an event, as the case may be, only if such survivorship is for at least 
thirty (30) days. Provided, however the preceding sentence shall not apply in any case 
where its application would cause an otherwise valid provision of this Trust to be void 
because of the rule against perpetuity, the rule limiting suspension of the power of 
alienation, the rule against accumulation, or any similar rules. 
8.8 Age. A person attains a specific age (for example, age 21) at the 
beginning of the day that forms the coordinate birthday commemoration (for example, 
21st birthday). Any person whose birthday falls on February 29 shall be deemed to have 
a birthday on February 28 for all purposes of this Trust. 
8.9 Number and Gender. The singular shall be interpreted as the plural and 
vice-versa, if such treatment is necessary to interpret this Trust in accordance with the 
manifest intention of the Undersigned. Likewise, if either the feminine, masculine or 
neuter gender should be one of the other genders, it shall be so treated. 
8.10 Paragraph Headings. The paragraph and other headings used herein are 
merely indices for convenience and shall not be used in the interpretation of this 
instrument. 
8.11 Notification of Attorney. If the Undersigned has a serious illness or 
operation, the Undersigned requests that the Trustees contact their attorney, Mark D. 
Palmer, to obtain instructions in case the Undersigned should die. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Undersigned has executed this Trust Agreement. 
DARLENE PATTERSON, Undersigned 
DARLENE PATTERSON, Co-Trustee 
REXTi PATTERSON; Co-Trustee 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
( ss. 
) 
On the 30th day of July, 1999, personally appeared before me a Notary Public in 
and for said County and State, Darlene Patterson and Rex E. Patterson, known to/toe to 
be the persons whose names are subscribed to thej foregoing Fan>i|y Protection T/ust, and 
acknowledged to me that they executed the same/ 
(SEAL) 
Syracuse, Utah 
£sionExpires:08/29/01 
HQTMPVBUC- S W E of UTAH 
i ™ oonP 200 SO. 320 E   
CLEARFIELD 
COMM ~'r* 
UTB4015 
8-29-: 
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SCHEDULE"A" 
SEPARATE PROPERTY OF THE 
DARLENE PATTERSON 
FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST 
FOR TEN DOLLARS ($10.00), and other good and valuable considerations, the 
Undersigned, as Grantor, hereby transfers, sells, assigns, and conveys the below listed 
property with all right, title, interest and obligations pertaining thereto, to the Trustees, 
subject to the terms and conditions of The Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust, 
dated the 30th day of July, 1999. 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION 
1. Any and all personal property now 
owned or hereafter acquired by the 
Undersigned. 
DATE 
PLACED 
INTO TRUST 
GRANTOR'S 
INITIALS 
3. 
DARLENE PATTERSON 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
) 
( ss. 
) 
On the 30th day of July, 1999, personally appeared before rne/Darlene Pattersor 
whose name is subscribed to the foregoing_Schedu^p "A/, and acknowledged to me thp 
she executed the same. 
(SEAL) $&&&. NOTARYPUBUC'STXTEolUTAh 
# $M$- % 320 E. 200 SO. 
ft M E )S} CLEARFIELD, UT 84015 
COMM. EXP. 6-29-2001 \v> 
IC 
yracuse, Utah 
sion Ekpires:08/29/01 
We hereby certify that we have read the foregoing Trust and that it correctly states 
the terms and conditions under which the Trust estate is to be held, managed, and 
disposed of by the Trustees. We approve the declaration of Trust in all particulars and 
request the Trustees to execute it. 
We further state that any properties transferred to this Trust which constitute 
community property pursuant to the laws of any community property state having 
jurisdiction over such property, then such property shall retain its character as community 
property while held in said Trust until the earlier of the date of the death of the person 
who created this Trust, or said person's spouse. In addition, if any property is removed 
from this Trust such property shall continue to maintain its character as either community 
or separate property depending upon what kind of property it is. 
DARLENE PATTERSON 
fly £Ai^gY*h 
REXE. PATTERSON 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
) 
( ss. 
) 
On the 30th day of July, 1999, personally aipeare&before m^Darlene Patterson 
and Rex E. Patterson, known to me to be the persqgs >yKp execffieype foregoing 
instrument. 
(SEAL) 
MyQ 
C 
acus^ Utah 
fonExpires:08/29/01 
/ £ « ? > . MARK D PALMER 
(#$&$& NOTARY PUBUC* STATE of UTAH 
gPm8} 320 E. 200 SO. 
^.&^,,0 CLEARFIELD, UT e4015 
'
<:
^&AP' COMM. EXP. 8-29-2001 
TabG 
FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE 
DARLENE PATTERSON 
FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST 
This First Amendment to the Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust is made and 
entered into this 31st day of May, 2000, by and between Darlene Patterson, the Undersigned 
and Darlene Patterson, Trustee. 
Darlene Patterson, pursuant to the authority granted in the Darlene Patterson Family 
Protection Trust, does hereby amend said Trust as follows: 
1. Article V, of the original Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust is hereby 
amended to add a Section 5.202 to read as follows: 
5.202 Specific Distribution. Notwithstanding the other provisions 
of this Article V, regarding equal shares to children, the Trustees shall distribute to Ronald 
S. Patterson the five acre portion of the property in Davis Cfounty identified as Serial #14-
040-0067. Such portion shall be five acres only (from this 14.34 acre parcel), and shall be 
the approximately five acres located in closest proximity to the North side of Ronald S. 
Patterson's home. This is a specific devise and shall not alter or otherwise diminish the share 
of the balance of the Trust Estate to be distributed to Ronald S. Patterson. 
2. Except as specifically herein amended, I hereby ratify and confirm the Darlene 
Patterson Family Protection Trust dated the 30th day of July, 1999. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Undersigned and Trustees have executed this First 
Amendment to the Darlene Patterson Family Protection Trust the day and year first above 
written. 
UNDERSIGNED: 
DARLENE PATTERSON 
TRUSTEE: 
DARLENE PATTERSON 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF DAVIS 
( ss. 
) 
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged befon 
Undersigned whose identity is known to me or gfevgi on 
this 31st day of May, 2000. ~ ' 
' Darlene Patterson, the 
oLsatisfactory evidence, 
(SEAL) 
Residing at: Syracuse, Utah 
ffLy Commission Expires: 08/29/01 
MARK D PALMER 
mmPWUC»STATE ctifTAH 
320 E 200 SO, 
CLEARFIELD, UT 64015 
COMMEXP. 8-29-2001 
EXHIBIT H 
RESTATEMENT OF 
THE DARLENE PATTERSON FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST 
I, the Trustor, Darlene Patterson, hereby amend and restate in full The Darlene Patterson 
Family Protection Trust dated July 30, 1999 and signed by me as Trustor and Trustee This 
Restatement shall be effective as of the date of its execution. 
ARTICLE I 
TRANSFER INTO TRUST 
A Transfer of Property For valuable consideration, I, the Trustor, Darlene Patterson, of 
West Point, Utah, hereby transfer and deliver to the Trustee and the successor Trustees the 
property listed in the Property List (Schedule A), annexed hereto ahd incorporated herein by 
reference. The Trustee is to hold the property, and any other property which the Trustee may at 
any time hereafter hold or acquire, for the uses and purposes and upon the terms and conditions 
set forth herein. All of such property is referred to collectively as the "Trust Estate." 
B. Present and Future Property. It is specifically my intention that all real and personal 
properties now owned and later acquired by me are to automatically be a part of this Trust I, or 
any other person, may grant to the Trust additional real and personal property However, the 
Trustee may decline to accept such property by sending written notice of nonacceptance to such 
grantor by first class mail addressed to the last known address of sucji grantor or delivered to 
such grantor in person. 
ARTICLE II 
REVOCATION AND AMENDMENT 
I reserve the right to amend or revoke this Trust in whole or in part. Such amendment or 
revocation shall be by written instrument and shall be effective upon the signing thereof by me 
without notice to any successor Trustee. At my death this Trust shall be an irrevocable trust and 
will be administered and distributed as set forth herein While this Trust remains revocable, I 
reserve the right to make such use of the funds and properties of the Trust as I may deem prudent 
Such use shall be deemed to have been made with the consent and approval of the Trustee 
ARTICLE III 
LOCATION OF DOCUMENTS 
This Trust has been prepared in duplicate, each copy of which has been executed as an 
original. One of these executed originals is in my possession. I have deposited the other original 
for safekeeping with my attorney, David Ray Carver, at his office in Kaysville, Utah. Either of 
these copies may be used as an original without the other. If only one copy of this Trust 
Agreement can be found then it shall be considered as the original and the missing copy will be 
presumed inadvertently lost. 
ARTICLE IV 
ATTORNEY NOTIFICATION 
If I have a serious illness or operation, I request that the Trustee call my attorney, David 
Ray Carver, to obtain instructions concerning this Trust If my death makes this prior 
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conversation impossible then the Trustee should call the attorney as soon after my death as is 
possible. 
ARTICLE V 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
A. Certified Copies. To the same effect as if it were the original, any person or institution 
may rely upon a copy certified by a Notary Public to be a true copy of this Agreement and any 
schedules or exhibits attached hereto. 
B. Present Interests. The interest of the beneficiaries is a present interest which shall 
continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated. 
C. Spendthrift Provision. After any of the trusts created herein becomes irrevocable, the 
interests of each beneficiary in income and principal of the trust shall be free from the control or 
interference of any creditor of such beneficiary, the spouse of a married beneficiary, and the 
parent of a child beneficiary, and shall not be subject to attachment or assignment either 
voluntarily or involuntarily. 
D. Rule Against Perpetuities Savings Clause. In any event, this Trust shall terminate not 
later than twenty-one (21) years after the death of the last survivor of the group composed of me 
and those of my descendants living at my death. The property held in trust shall be discharged of 
any trust and shall immediately vest in and be distributed to the persons then entitled to the 
discretionary payments from the income or principal of any particular trust is entitled to receive 
the full income and that any class of persons so entitled is entitled to receive all such property, to 
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be divided among them equally per stirpes. No power of appointment granted hereunder shall be 
so exercised as to violate any applicable Rule Against Perpetuities, accumulations, or any similar 
rule or law. Any attempted exercise of any power which violates such rule or law shall be void, 
notwithstanding any provision of this Trust to the contrary. 
E. Trust Contest. If any beneficiary under this Trust shall, directly or indirectly, contest 
this Trust or any of its respective parts or provisions, any share or interest given to that 
beneficiary shall be revoked and augment proportionately the shares of the beneficiaries that have 
not joined or participated in the contest. 
F. Invalidity. If any provision of this Trust Agreement is unenforceable, the remaining 
provisions shall, nevertheless, be carried into effect. 
G. Gender. In all provisions of this Trust Agreement, the masculine includes the feminine 
and the neuter and vice versa. Where applicable, the singular includes the plural and vice versa. 
H. Natural and Adopted. Whenever used herein, the terms "issue," "child," "children" 
and "descendants" include those natural and adopted. The term descendants means the same as 
the term issue. 
I. Jurisdiction. This Agreement shall be construed and regulated by the laws of the State 
of Utah. 
ARTICLE VI 
TRUSTEE PROVISIONS 
A. Parties Dealing with Trustee Protected No purchaser or issuer of any stock, bond or 
other instrument evidencing a deposit of money or property, or other person dealing with the 
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Trustee with respect to any property hereunder, shall be under any obligation to see to the 
disbursing of money or other property delivered to the Trustee or to the due execution of this 
Trust in any particular. Such persons shall be absolutely free in dealing with the Trustee as 
though the Trustee were the absolute owner of the property. Evefyone dealing with the Trustee 
shall be absolutely protected in relying upon the certificate of any Trustee as to the extent of the 
Trustee's authority by reason of any delegation or otherwise. 
B Insurance. In the event the Trust is named a beneficiary under any policy of insurance, 
the Trustee shall hold the policy, subject to order of the owner of the policy. The Trustee shall 
have no obligation regarding any insurance policy other than the safekeeping of any policy which 
may be delivered to the Trustee. The owner of the policy retains all rights, options and privileges 
with respect to the policy. Upon proof of death of the insured, or upon maturity of the policy 
prior to the death of the insured, the Trustee shall use reasonable efforts to collect all sums 
payable on the policy for which the Trust is designated a beneficiary or owner. All insurance 
proceeds received by the Trustee shall become principal of the Trust Estate, except interest paid 
by the insurer, which shall be classed as income. 
C. Bond. No Trustee named herein need give bond in any jurisdiction. If a fiduciary's 
bond may not be dispensed with, I request that the bond be accepted without surety and in the 
lowest possible amount. 
D Majority Decision. Whenever more than one Trustee is designated to act 
concurrently, a majority of the Trustees shall have the power to make any decision, undertake any 
action, or execute any documents affecting the trusts created herein. In the event of a difference 
of opinion among the Trustees, the decision of the majority of them shall prevail, but a dissenting 
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Trustee shall not be responsible for any action taken by the majority pursuant to such decision If 
only two individual Trustees are in office, they must act unanimously. If an individual and a 
corporate Trustee are in office, the determination of the individual Trustee shall be binding. 
E. Prior Trustee Misfeasance. No successor Trustee shall be liable for any misfeasance of 
any prior Trustee 
F. Resignation. Any Trustee may decline to act or may resign as Trustee of any trust by 
delivering a written resignation to the beneficiaries thereof 
G. Delegation. Any Trustee may, from time to time, delegate to any remaining Trustee 
any powers, duties or discretions. Every such delegation shall be in writing and delivered to the 
delegate or delegates. The delegation shall remain effective for the time specified therein or until 
earlier revoked. Such revocation shall be in writing and delivered to the delegate or delegates. 
H. Trust Expenses. From the income of the trusts or, if that is insufficient, from the 
principal thereof, the Trustee shall pay and discharge all expenses incurred in the administration of 
the trusts. 
I. Compensation. The Trustee shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for services 
rendered by the Trustee or counsel retained by the Trustee, including services in connection with 
the transfer of assets to beneficiaries or a successor Trustee and the appointment of a successor 
Trustee. 
J. Annual Accounting. With respect to each trust created herein, the Trustee shall render 
at least annually an account of income and principal, including a statement of all receipts, 
disbursements and capital changes, to all beneficiaries then eligible to receive income, or to the 
natural or legal guardians of such beneficiaries. 
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ARTICLE VII 
POWERS OF THE TRUSTEE 
The Trustee shall have full power to do everything in administering the trusts that the 
Trustee deems to be for the best interests of the beneficiaries including, but not limited to, the 
following: 
A. Investments. To buy, sell and trade in securities. To maintain and operate accounts 
with brokers. To pledge any securities held in trust as security for loans and advances. To buy, 
sell and trade personal property, real estate, and interests therein, including business interests and 
investments, all without diversification as to kind or amount, without being limited to investments 
authorized by law for the investment of trust funds. To hold or take title to property in the name 
of a nominee. 
B. Sell Property. To sell, exchange, pledge, or otherwise dispose of any real or personal 
property in such manner and upon such terms as the Trustee deems appropriate. 
C. Distributions in Kind. To make distributions as authorized in this Trust Agreement, 
including distributions to the Trustee, in kind or in money or partly in each, even if shares are 
composed differently. For such purposes, the valuation of the Trustee shall be given effect if 
reasonable. 
D. Distributions to a Special Need Beneficiary. The Trustee may, in the sole discretion of 
the Trustee, distribute personal property items to a minor before any age limitations outlined in 
this Trust unless expressly provided otherwise. In addition, if the Trustee, in the sole discretion of 
the Trustee, determines that any beneficiary (whether a minor or of legal age) is incapable of 
making proper disposition of any sum of income or principal that is payable or appointed to the 
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beneficiary, the Trustee may apply the sum on behalf of the beneficiary by any of the following 
methods: 
1 By payments on behalf of the beneficiary to a parent, custodian, guardian, or an 
adult person with whom the beneficiary resides. The Trustee shall not be liable for any 
such payments made. 
2. By payments in discharge of the beneficiary's debts or obligations. 
3. By paying an allowance to the beneficiary directly. 
E. Adjustments between Income and Principal To determine whether and to what extent 
receipts should be deemed income or principal, whether and to what extent expenditures should 
be charged against income or principal, and what other adjustments should be made between 
income and principal. Such determinations shall be within the well-settled rules therefore. 
F Agents. To delegate powers to agents, remunerate them and pay their expenses, 
including accountants, investment counsel, appraisers, legal counsel, and other experts. To 
employ custodians of the trust assets, bookkeepers, clerks and other assistants. 
G. Legal Documents and Claims. To execute contracts, deeds, agreements or any other 
documents which the Trustee deems necessary or desirable. To assign, alter, compromise, 
release, with or without consideration, or submit to arbitration or litigation, obligations or claims 
held by or asserted against the Trustee, my agents, or the trust assets. 
H. Borrow Money. To borrow money for the payment of taxes, debts or expenses, or for 
any other purpose which, in the opinion of the Trustee, will facilitate the administration of any 
trust created herein. To pledge or mortgage property as security for any such loans. To pay 
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0. Trustee as Interested Party. To exercise all the foregoing powers even though the 
Trustee is personally interested in the property that is involved, notwithstanding any rules of law 
relating to divided loyalty or self-dealing. 
ARTICLE VIII 
DISPOSITION DURING MY LIFETIME 
During my lifetime, the Trustee shall hold, manage, and invest the Trust Estate, collect the 
income, and dispose of the net income and principal as follows: 
A. Income and Principal. The Trustee shall pay to me all of the net income of this Trust 
at least semiannually. The Trustee may pay or apply for my use and benefit such amounts of the 
principal as the Trustee deems necessary or advisable. 
B. Competency. I shall continue to be deemed mentally competent unless determined not 
to be competent in writing by two physicians selected by the successor Trustee. The physicians 
shall not be liable for any determination made as to my competency if the determination is made in 
a reasonable manner. 
C. Incapacity. If, in the Trustee's judgment, I am so incapacitated by reason of illness, 
age, or other cause that I am incapable of handling funds for my own use and benefit, or if I am 
unable to give prompt attention to my financial affairs, the Trustee may use so much of the net 
income and principal as the Trustee deems necessary or advisable: 
1. For my comfort, support, maintenance, health and education and any person 
who, in the judgment of the Trustee, is dependent upon me. 
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2. For the discharging of any debt or obligation incurred by me and believed by 
the Trustee to be a valid debt including home rental and mortgage payments, utilities, 
installment obligations, insurance premiums and established charitable contribution 
customs. 
ARTICLE IX 
DISPOSITION AT MY DEATH 
At my death, after payment of currently due debts, expenses and costs of last illness and 
funeral out of the estate, the Trustee shall dispose of the Trust Estate as follows: 
A. Personal Property List. Ail personal properties listed on the attached Personal 
Property List are to be distributed to the named beneficiaries in addition to their respective 
distributive shares of the Trust Estate. 
B. Specific Distributions. The Trustee shall make the following specific distributions: 
1. Gary E. Patterson. Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) shall be set aside for Gary 
E. Patterson, my son. If Gary E. Patterson has predeceased me then this share shall be 
divided among the descendants of Gary E. Patterson by right of representation. 
Distribution of this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and 
C2 below. 
2. Judy Ann Henry. Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) shall be set aside for Judy 
Ann Henry, my daughter. If Judy Ann Henry has predeceased me then this share shall be 
divided among the descendants of Judy Ann Henry by right of representation. Distribution 
of this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and C2 below. 
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3. Rex A. Patterson. Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000) shall be set aside for Rex A 
Patterson, my son. If Rex A. Patterson has predeceased n)te then this share shall be 
divided among the descendants of Rex A. Patterson by rigjit of representation. 
Distribution of this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and 
C2 below. 
4. Vicky D. Romero. All of the California real estate shall be distributed to Vicky 
D. Romero, my daughter. If Vicky D. Romero has predeceased me then this property 
shall be divided among the descendants of Vicky D. Romero by right of representation. 
Distribution of this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and 
C2 below. This distribution is in addition to the share of the Trust Estate to be distributed 
in paragraph C below. 
5. Ronald S. Patterson. The home and five (5) acres of real estate shall be 
distributed to Ronald S. Patterson, my son. The five (5) acres is a portion of the property 
located in Davis County currently identified as Serial No. 14-040-0067. Such portion 
shall be five (5) acres only (from this 14.34 acre parcel) and shall be the approximately five 
(5) acres located in closest proximity to the North side of the current home of Ronald S. 
Patterson. If Ronald S. Patterson has predeceased me then this property shall be divided 
among the descendants of Ronald S. Patterson by right of representation. Distribution of 
this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and C2 below. 
This distribution is in addition to the share of the Trust Estate to be distributed in 
paragraph C below. 
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6. Ricky A. Patterson. Ten Thousand Dollars ($103000) shall be set aside for 
Ricky A. Patterson, my son. If Ricky A. Patterson has predeceased me then this share 
shall be divided among the descendants of Ricky A. Patterson by right of representation. 
Distribution of this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in paragraphs CI and 
C2 below. 
7. Randy D. Patterson. All of the Cache County real estate shall be distributed to 
Randy D. Patterson, my son If Randy D. Patterson has predeceased me then this 
property shall be divided among the descendants of Randy D. Patterson by right of 
representation. Distribution of this share shall be subject to the restrictions provided in 
paragraphs CI and C2 below. This distribution is in addition to the share of the Trust 
Estate to be distributed in paragraph C below. 
C. Division of Trust Estate. Theremainder of the Trust Estate shall be equally divided by 
the Trustee among my following three (3) children: Vicky D. Romero, Ronald S. Patterson, and 
Randy D. Patterson. If one of these three (3) children has predeceased me then the share of the 
Trust Estate for that child shall be divided among the descendants of that child by right of 
representation. 
1. Each beneficiary that has attained (or when the beneficiary does attain) age 
twenty-five (25) years shall have their share distributed to them. 
2. Until a beneficiary has attained age twenty-five (25) years, the share for such 
beneficiary shall be held in a separate trust for the benefit of that beneficiary Each trust 
may be used for the support and education of the beneficiary. Education shall include, but 
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not be limited to, musical education, dancing lessons, grammar school, secondary school, 
college, graduate school, trade school and vocational training school 
D. Disclaimed and Unclaimed Interests. Except as provided otherwise, if any of the 
above beneficiaries are unable or unwilling to take any portion of the Trust Estate then the 
Trustee shall distribute that portion of the property of that beneficiary to his or her descendants by 
right of representation and, if none, then to the other beneficiaries proportionate to each 
beneficiary's interest in the Trust. If there are no remaining beneficiaries then the Trustee shall 
distribute the property to my hving heirs at law in the same priority and distributive order as listed 
in the law of intestate succession of the state of Utah as in force on the date of the signing of this 
Trust Agreement. 
E. Contingent Vesting. If any interest in any part of the Trust Estate would vest in any 
person if he or she were alive upon the occurrence of any contingency, such as the death of an 
individual or the obtaining a specified age, and that person dies under conditions that it would be 
difficult or impossible to determine whether or not he or she was ahve upon the occurrence of the 
contingency, that person shall be deemed to have died prior to the occurrence of the contingency. 
ARTICLE X 
FAMILY MEMBERS AND TRUSTEES 
A. Children. My present living children are: 
Gary E. Patterson 
Judy Ann Henry 
Rex A. Patterson 
Vicky D. Romero 
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Ronald S. Patterson 
Ricky A. Patterson 
Randy D. Patterson 
B. Trustee. The following people will act as Trustee in the following order of succession: 
1. Darlene Patterson. 
2. Ronald S. Patterson (my son) and Randy D Patterson (my son), jointly. If one 
of these Trustees are unwilling or unable to serve then the remaining Trustee shall serve as 
a Co-Trustee with Vicky D. Romero (my daughter), jointly or the survivor. 
3. A Trustee chosen by the majority in interest of the beneficiaries (in proportion 
to each beneficiary's interest in the Trust Estate). A parent or legal guardian shall be 
entitled to vote for minor beneficiaries. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this Restatement on the ) ^ day of 
MtfrrM 20_0j_ as Trustor and Trustee. 
Darlene Patterson 
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State of Utah ) 
/? ' :SS' 
County of sWA/to, ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this /2~ day of 
stf&njrJ} 20_£?/_ by Darlene Patterson. 
OA&CARVER~~1 mA*/&y W A 
„ 116 W. 575 N. I Notary Public / 
.Kaysvilte, Utah 84037 I r> J
 + My Commission Expires I Residing at: 
StS&uSh I M y Commission Expires: 
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Tab I 
AMENDMENT TO 
THE DARLENE PATTERSON FAMILY PROTECTION TRUST 
I, the Trustor, Darlene Patterson, of West Point, Utah, hereby amend The Darlene 
Patterson Family Protection Trust dated July 30, 1999 and signed by me as Trustor and Trustee. 
This amendment shall be effective as of the date of its execution. 
Article IX paragraphs B and C are hereby amended and restated in full as follows: 
B. Specific Distributions. The Trustee shall make the following specific distributions: 
1. Vicky D. Romero. Vicky D. Romero, my daughter, shall be distributed all of 
my real estate located in California in addition to her share of the Trust Estate as provided 
in paragraph C below. If Vicky D. Romero has predeceased me then this share shall be 
divided with the remainder of my Trust Estate as provided in paragraph C below. 
2. Randy D. Patterson. Randy D. Patterson, my son, shall be distributed all of my 
real estate located in Cache County, Utah, in addition to his share of the Trust Estate as 
provided in paragraph C below. If Randy D. Patterson has predeceased me then this share 
shall be divided with the remainder of my Trust Estate as provided in paragraph C below. 
3. Judy Ann Henry. Judy Ann Henry, my daughter, shall be distributed one-half 
of the value of my home (or one-half of the proceed of my home if I sold it) located at 
4056 West 1300 North, West Point, Utah, in addition to her share of the Trust Estate as 
provided in paragraph C below. If Judy Ann Henry has predeceased me then this share 
shall be divided with the remainder of my Trust Estate as provided in paragraph C below. 
4. Gary E. Patterson. The share that will be distributed to Gary E. Patterson shall 
be treated as having received an inheritance advancement in the amount of Twelve 
Thousand Dollars ($12,000). This amount shall be deducted from the share that would 
have been distributed to him pursuant to the provision in Article IX paragraph C below. 
However, should he have predeceased me then any share to be distributed to his 
descendants shall not be charged with this inheritance advancement. 
C. Division of Trust Estate. Subject to the inheritance advancement in paragraph B4 
above, the remainder of the Trust Estate (including any remaining real estate) shall be divided by 
the Trustee among my following children on a per stirpes basis: Gary E. Patterson, Judy Ann 
Henry, Rex A. Patterson, Vicky D. Romero, Ricky A. Patterson, and Randy D. Patterson. I have 
intentionally not provided anything for my son Ronald S. Patterson (or his descendants) since I 
have already properly provided for this son during his lifetime as I felt was appropriate. Any 
share set aside for the descendants of a deceased child shall be divided among the descendants of 
that child by right of representation. 
1. Each beneficiary that has attained (or when the beneficiary does attain) age 
twenty-five (25) years shall have their share distributed to them. 
2. Until a beneficiary has attained age twenty-five (25) years, the share for such 
beneficiary shall be held in a separate trust for the benefit of that beneficiary. Each trust 
may be used for the support and education of the beneficiary. Education shall include, 
but not be limited to, musical education, dancing lessons, grammar school, secondary 
school, college, graduate school, trade school and vocational training school. 
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Article X paragraph B is hereby amended and restated in full as follows: 
B. Trustee. The following people will act as Trustee in the following order 
of succession: 
1. Darlene Patterson. 
2. Judy Ann Henry and Randy D. Patterson (two of my children), jointly or 
the survivor. 
3. A Trustee chosen by the majority in interest of the beneficiaries (in proportion 
to each beneficiary's interest in the Trust Estate). A parent or legal guardian shall be 
entitled to vote for minor beneficiaries. 
This Amendment is attached to the above referenced Trust and by reference incorporated 
therein. All other provisions of the Trust not inconsistent with this Amendment remain in full 
force and effect. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF I have executed this Amendment on the 7?0 day of 
2006 as Trustor and Trustee. 
Darlene Patterson 
3 
State of Utah 
County of &//tAfU> ) 
:ss. 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this _§£?day of 
M/iY 2 0 0 6 by Darlene Patterson. 
Notary Public 
DAVO RAY CARVER 
180 S O * 300 W»et Sto 218 
SaftlatoCftft Utah 84101 
My CotwnlMlon Expires 
JUV3.2008 
State of Utah 
Notary Public / 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
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Can You Amend That Revocable Trust? Utah Estate Planning Lawyers Face a Trap for $he 
Unwary 
by Charles M. Bennett 
Revocable living trusts have become a ubiquitous estate planning tool in Utah. Thousands! of 
Utahns have such trusts, most prepared by Utah lawyers. One of the benefits of revocable living 
trusts is the ability to easily amend them prior to the death of the trustor. Several recent Utah 
Supreme Court decisions, however, require revocation rather than amendment under certain 
circumstances. As such an amendment will likely not be questioned until after the death of the 
trustor - when it is too late to go back and repair anything -attorneys who have prepared revocable 
trusts or who represent those who have such trusts need to carefully review these trusts in light of 
the recent rulings. 
In Banks v. Means, J{ 9-16, 52 P.3d 1190, 452 Utah Adv. Rep. 10, 2002 UT 65 (2002), the Utah 
Supreme Court had to determine whether a trustor was entitled to amend her revocable living 
trust agreement to change the remainder beneficiaries. Shortly before the trustor's death, she 
amended her trust, removed her children as primary beneficiaries upon her death, named her 
sister as the primary beneficiary, and named her children as contingent beneficiaries. Id. at |5. 
Although the circumstances surrounding the amendment were unusual, 1 the court assumed the 
amendment was properly executed. The issue before the Court was whether the trustor had the 
power under the trust agreement to amend the trust and divest the beneficiaries' interest, the 
relevant part of the trust agreement provided: 
3.1 Rights of the Undersigned. As long as the Undersigned is alive, the Undersigned reserves the 
right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in part, including the principal, and ^he 
present or past undisbursed income from such principal. Such revocation or amendment of this 
Trust may be in whole or in part by written instrument. Amendment, modification or revocation of 
this instrument shall be effective only when such change is delivered in writing to the then acting 
Trustee. On the revocation of this instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to the 
Undersigned, as the Undersigned may direct in the instrument of revocation, all of the Tr^ JSt 
property. 
3.2 Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested interests 
subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by 
death. As long as this Trust subsists, the Trust properties and all the rights and privileges 
hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by the Trustee named herein in their fiduciary 
capacity. 
(Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court ruled that the italicized language in the second paragraph 
authorized the trustor to divest the beneficiary's interest only if the trustor revoked the trust in its 
entirety. Banks v. Means at ,'16. "[A J trust that specified revocation of a vested beneficiary interest 
through divestiture could only divest those beneficiary interests through a complete revocation of 
the trust." In re Estate of Flake, J16, 71 P.3d 589, 472 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 2003 UT 17 (2003) 
(interpreting Banks v. Means). Although the trustor in Banks expressly reserved the right "to 
amend, modify or revoke this Trust," the Court ruled that an amendment could not divest a 
beneficiary's interest. Thus, the purported amendment was void. 
The Court's ruling in Banks might be construed to limit the trustor's otherwise plenary reservation 
of the right to amend the Trust to amendments that did not modify the beneficial interests oft a 
beneficiary, such as changing trustees, increasing or decreasing trustee powers, and other 
administrative issues. Any amendment that changed beneficial interests would necessarily divest a 
beneficiary's interest, at least in part. However, as discussed below, in the 2003 Flake decision, the 
Supreme Court approved an amendment to a trust with substantially identical language to that in 
Banks where the amendment reduced, but did not eliminate, the unhappy beneficiary's interest in 
the trust. 
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In Flake, J17, the Supreme Court recognized that the purpose of the vesting language in the 
paragraph entitled "Interests of the Beneficiaries" was to insure that the revocable living trust was 
not deemed to be an illusory trust. Historically, lawyers creating revocable living trusts were 
concerned that the trust could be voided if the trustor had the power to revoke the trust. See e.g. 
MacGregor v. Fox, 114 N.Y.S.2d 286, 280 A.D. 435 (N.Y. App. 1952) (holding trust illusory and 
"void in its entirety"); but see In re Estate of Groesbeck, 935 P.2d 1255, 1257-58 (Utah 1997) 
(holding a revocable trust with either contingent or vested remainder beneficiaries was not 
illusory). Thus, the purpose of the language was not to protect the beneficiary's interest from being 
deleted by an amendment, as seems to be the perception in Banks, but rather to insure that the 
revocable living trust was not deemed illusory. 
The Banks analysis is thus revealed to be seriously flawed. It is illogical to believe that a trustor 
reserves the power "to amend, modify or revoke" only to restrict the right to amend, but not the 
right to revoke. Such a reading truly exalts form over substance Under general contract law, "an 
interpretation that will produce an inequitable result will be adopted only where the contract so 
expressly and unequivocally so provides that there is no other reasonable interpretation to be 
given it." Peirce v. Peirce, |19, 994 P.2d 193, 386 Utah Adv. Rep 38, 2000 UT 7 (2000) (citations 
omitted). Far from requiring an unreasonable interpretation, the Banks trust language supports the 
opposite conclusion. The trustor in Banks did not retain just the power "to amend, modify or 
revoke." Instead, she retained the right "to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in 
part." Indeed, the trust document reiterated that the revocation could be in whole on in part in the 
very next sentence: "Such revocation or amendment of this Trust may be in whole or in part by 
written instrument." The Court should have recognized that an amendment that deletes one 
beneficiary and adds another is a revocation of the Trust "in part" as to the deleted beneficiary's 
rights in the trust. 
The harshness of the holding in Banks, however, is somewhat ameliorated by the Supreme Court's 
2003 Flake decision, 2003 UT 17 at J J16-22. There, the Supreme Court held that the language in 
the Flake trust permitted an amendment partially divesting a beneficiary's interest in the Trust. 
The relevant language of the trust agreement in Flake was: 
Revocation and Amendment 
As long as the Undersigned is alive, he reserves the right, without the consent or approval of any 
other, to amend, modify, revoke, or remove from this Trust the property that he has contributed, 
in whole or in part, including the principal and the present or past undisbursed income from such 
principal. (Emphasis [in Court's opinion]). 
Id. at |5. 
Vested Interest of Beneficiaries 
The interest of the beneficiaries is a present vested interest which shall continue until the Trust is 
revoked or terminated other than by death. 
Id. at 117. Interpreting this language, the Supreme Court held: 
This language at issue [in Flake] lacks any reference to a complete divestiture. The beneficial 
interest of Mrs. Flake was merely amended, and not completely divested as was the case in Banks. 
The dispositive issue in the present case is whether there was a complete divestiture of a beneficial 
interest as in Banks, or whether there was simply a change in the quality, or scope, of the 
beneficial interest. We held in Banks that revocation was required when terminating a vested 
beneficial interest. Here, we find that there is no requirement of revocation where the beneficial 
interest is simply modified or amended but not terminated. Therefore, Mrs. Flake's beneficial 
interest, as amended, was completely outlined in the 1998 Restatement, inasmuch as the 1998 
Restatement contained all of the operative provisions of the Almon J. Flake Family Trust. The 
purpose and primary effect of Article XIV in the 1987 Trust Agreement is to save the Trust from 
the doctrine of merger and to prove that the Trust is not illusory. 1 
Id. at | j22 (emphasis in Court's opinion). The Court's declaration that "[t]he dispositive issue in 
the present case is whether there was a complete divestiture of a beneficial interest as in Banks, or 
whether there was simply a change in the quality, or scope, of the beneficial interest" would seem 
to indicate that a trustor can amend a trust with the Banks language if the amendment only 
modifies, rather than eliminating, a beneficiary's beneficial interest. On the other hand, the Court 
noted that the language "subject to divestment" was not present in Flake, nor was there any 
"reference to a complete divestment." I t was the Supreme Court that italicized these terms in its 
opinion. 
While the language of the trusts regarding the vesting of beneficial interests is different, there is 
no logical distinction to be drawn between the language of the two trusts In Flake, an amendment 
terminating a beneficiary's interest in the trust would constitute a complete divestment whether or 
not the trust said the beneficiary's interest was "subject to divestment" as in Banks. Nevertheless, 
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with language identical to Banks could modify, but not delete, a beneficiary's beneficial interest in 
the trust. 
What prompted this article, and makes this more than just a mere academic analysis of two 
Supreme Court rulings, was a concern that there may be tens of thousands of trusts extant in Utah 
with language identical to that found in Banks. During a period of over ten years, spanning the 
1990's, one Utah lawyer created several thousand trusts using language identical to that 
interpreted by the Supreme Court in the Banks. This lawyer has since retired from the practice of 
law. Thus, when this lawyer's clients seek to update their trusts, another Utah lawyer will need to 
deal with trust language identical to that found in the Banks trust. Knowing how to revise a trust 
with language identical to that in Banks, without running afoul of that decision, is a key purpose of 
this article. 
Moreover, not only are there numerous trusts containing the precise language of the Banks trust, 
there are perhaps thousands more that contain very similar language. The form used in Banks was 
one that had been developed with input from a number of Utah lawyers. To the extent other 
lawyers used that same form language, or even to the extent they used language slightly different, 
such as the trust language in Flake, these two cases could torpedo amendments to those trusts as 
well. 
The lesson all estate planning lawyers must learn is thus twofold. First, each lawyer should take a 
careful look at his or her own forms. Note that the Court in Banks probably would have allowed the 
amendment had the trust used the following language: 
Interests of the Beneficiaries. The interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested interests 
subject to divestment which shall continue until this Trust is amended, revoked or terminated 
other than by death. As long as this Trust subsists, the Trust properties and all the rights and 
privileges hereunder shall be controlled and exercised by the Trustee named herein in their 
fiduciary capacity. 
The addition of the word "amended" will specifically allow divestment through amendments and 
would apparently resolve the problem the Supreme Court found with the Banks trust provisions. 
Whether the estate planning lawyer solves this problem as suggested or in some other way, 
however, it is an issue that demands careful attention. 
The second lesson for the estate planning lawyer is to be careful when amending someone else's 
trust (and perhaps even when amending one's own older trusts). In the case of the Banks trust, 
the reservation of the right to amend or revoke and the vesting of the interests of the beneficiaries 
were in two adjoining paragraphs of the trust agreement. In Flake, the revocation language was in 
Article XIII while the vesting language was in Article XIV. Since both the revocation and vesting 
provisions are common boilerplate provisions, they may show up together, as in Banks; closely 
connected, as in Flake; or separated by several pages, articles, sections, or paragraphs. Thus, if a 
lawyer is asked to amend another lawyer's trust agreement, the revising lawyer should carefully 
review the entire trust agreement. Simply determining that the trust is subject to a power to 
amend or revoke is no longer sufficient after Banks and, to a lesser extent, after Flake. For Utah 
estate planning lawyers, it is an unfortunate trap for the unwary, but the trap can be avoided by 
careful attention to detail. 
1. The amendment was made by removing certain pages from the trust agreement and replacing 
those pages with new pages stating the trustor's revised plan. Id. at |5. 
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I. Introduction 
Over the centuries that wills have been used to dispose of testators' property at 
death, the law of wills has developed to address issues that arose.1 Similarly, over the 
centuries that trusts have been used for non-testamentary purposes, the law of trusts has 
developed to resolve resulting issues.2 
In recent decades revocable trusts have become the most commonly used trust in 
the United States.3 To avoid estate administration, particularly in states in which 
administration involves cumbersome, time-consuming, and expensive court supervision, 
settlors make inter vivos transfers of assets that otherwise would be subject to 
administration on their deaths in trust.4 Typically, the trust instrument provides that the 
settlor may revoke the trust at any time, in which case its assets are to be returned to the 
settlor, and designates beneficiaries to whom the trust assets are to be distributed, or held 
for the benefit of in one or more now irrevocable trusts, following the settlor's death. 
Professor of Law, the University of Akron School of Law. B. Acct., 1977, The University of Oklahoma; 
J.D., with Honors, 1980, The University of Oklahoma. Professor Newman is an Academic Fellow of the 
American College of Trust and Estate Counsel. 
1
 See generally, THOMAS E. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS (2nd ed. 1953). 
2
 See generally, GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT & AMY MORRIS HESS, THE LAW OF 
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § § 2 - 7 (3rd ed. ). 
3
 See David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 67 
MISSOURI L. REV. 143, 186 (2002). Note that with inter vivos trusts being used so commonly as will 
substitutes in recent years, the fundamental question of whether a trust is revocable or irrevocable is being 
answered differently than it was in the past. Under the UTC, unlike at common law, trusts are revocable 
unless expressly made irrevocable. See UNEF. TRUST CODE § 602(a) & cmt. (2005). 
4
 "Pour over" wills that devise part or ail of the testator's probate estate to the revocable trust usually also 
are part of the plan. 
III. The Interest of a Non-Settlor Beneficiary in a Revocable Trust While the 
Settlor is Living 
Generally, during the lifetime of a testator, a devisee under the testator's will has 
a mere expectancy with respect to, and not an interest in, the testator's property.41 By 
contrast, traditionally a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust42 was viewed as 
receiving a beneficial interest in trust property upon creation of the trust.43 Because 
revocable trusts are used primarily to avoid estate administration and provide for the 
management of property in the event of the settlor's incapacity without the need for a 
court supervised conservatorship, the trend increasingly is to treat the interest of a 
remainder beneficiary in a revocable trust during the lifetime of the settlor as an 
expectancy.44 
A. Duties of the Trustee to Remainder Beneficiaries. A fundamental issue 
raised is whether the remainder beneficiary is entitled to information about the trust, and 
able to enforce it, while the settlor is living. If the settlor is competent, as a practical 
matter it often will be of little consequence whether a remainder beneficiary is owed 
enforceable duties. Often, a remainder beneficiary will not know of the trust or her 
interest in it, or will consider the trust and its assets as belonging solely to the settlor and 
not seek information about the trust or to enforce its terms. If a remainder beneficiary 
demanded information or otherwise attempted to enforce the trust over the objection of 
the settlor, the settlor could amend the terms of the trust to eliminate the remainder 
beneficiary's interest. If the settlor agreed with the remainder beneficiary's position with 
regard to the enforcement of the trust against a non-settlor trustee, the settlor could 
enforce the trust herself. Presumably, such reasons explain why there appear to be few 
cases in which a remainder beneficiary has attempted to enforce the terms of a revocable 
41
 See, e.g., Meeks v. Kirkland, 187 S.E.2d 296 (Ga. 1972). 
2
 Non-settlor beneficiaries of a revocable trust sometimes are permissible, or less frequently mandatory, 
distributees of income, principal, or both during the settlors lifetime. Because of the settlor's retention of 
complete ultimate control over the trust through the power to revoke or amend, however, and for the sake 
of simplicity, non-settlor beneficiaries of revocable trusts generally are referred to in this article as 
remainder beneficiaries. 
43
 See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT & AMY MORRIS HESS, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 
AND TRUSTEES § 104 (2d ed. 1983); First Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Tenney, 138 N.E.2d 15 (Ohio 1956). 
44
 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. a (2003); John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate 
Revolution and the Future of the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1108, 1113 (1984) (stating "[t]he 
owner who retains both the equitable life interest and the power to alter and revoke the beneficiary 
designation has used the trust form to achieve the effect of testation. Only nomenclature distinguishes the 
remainder interest created by such a trust from the mere expectancy arising under a will"). Consistent with 
that position, under the Restatement creditors of a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust may not reach 
her interest in the trust during the settlor's lifetime. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 56 cmt. b (2003). 
Note, though, that in a recent Colorado case, a remainder beneficiary's interest in the revocable trust of a 
living settlor was considered in determining the division of property of the beneficiary and the beneficiary's 
spouse in their divorce. In re Marriage of Gorman, 36 P.3d 211 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001). Shortly after 
Gorman was decided, however, it was effectively overruled legislatively. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-
113(7)(b)(). 
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trust while the settlor is living. More fundamentally, given that the settlor of a revocable 
trust has complete ultimate control over the trust and its assets, the right to enforce the 
trust, at least while the settlor has capacity, should belong only to the settlor.46 For that 
reason, the general rule under the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC") is that during the 
settlor's lifetime, the trustee of a revocable trust owes no duties to remainder 
beneficiaries, who thus may not enforce the trust.47 
That result is consistent with viewing revocable trusts as the functional equivalent 
of wills and subjecting them to the law of wills. During a testator's lifetime, devisees 
under her will have no interest in her assets and thus no enforceable rights with respect to 
their management. That is the case even if the testator has become incapacitated. If the 
settlor of a revocable trust becomes incapacitated, however, the analogy to a testator and 
devisees with mere expectancies breaks down. 
For one such case, holding that remainder beneficiaries lacked standing to sue the trustee of a revocable 
trust for breach of duty during the settlor's lifetime, see Hoelscher v. Sandage, 462 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa App. 
1990). In Linthicum v. Rudi, 148 P.3d 746 (Nev. 2006), remainder beneficiaries whose interests were 
eliminated by the settlor amending the terms of a revocable trust challenged the validity of the amendment 
by alleging that the settlor lacked capacity and acted under undue influence. In upholding the lower court's 
granting of the successor trustee's motion to dismiss, the Nevada Supreme Court held that remainder 
beneficiaries of a revocable trust have only contingent interests that do not vest until the settlor's death, and 
thus do not have standing to challenge the trust during the settlor's life. Similarly, in Moon v. Lesidar, 230 
S.W.3d 800 (Tex. App. 2007), a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust was held to lack standing to sue, 
after the settlor's death, a non-settlor cotrustee of the trust with respect to a sale of stock by the settlor to 
the cotrustee. See also Lewis v. Star Bank, N.A., 630 N.E.2d 418 (Ohio App. 1993) (holding that remainder 
beneficiaries of a revocable trust could not sue the trustee after the settlor's death with respect to conduct of 
the trustee before the settlor's death). 
46
 In a Florida case, a competent settlor's revocation of her revocable trust was challenged by the trustee on 
the ground that the settlor was acting under undue influence. Florida Nat. Bank v. Genova, 460 So.2d 895 
(Fla. 1984). In upholding the revocation, the Florida Supreme Court held that undue influence cannot bar a 
competent settlor from revoking a revocable trust. Id. Relying, in part, on Genova, a lower court in a 
subsequent Florida case rejected the attempt of the guardian of an incompetent settlor of Totten trust 
accounts to disaffirm the trusts. Ullman v. Garcia, 645 So.2d 168 (Fla. App. 1994). For criticism of broad 
dictum in Ullman arguably indicating that a conservator of an incompetent settlor of a revocable trust could 
not pursue a breach of trust claim against the trustee of a traditional revocable trust, see RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 74 cmt. a(2) and e (2003). 
47
 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (2005). See Stanton v. Wells Fargo Bank, 152 P.3d 115, 122 (Mont. 2007) 
(applying a Montana statute similar to § 603(a) of the UTC). For a discussion of whether, under the UTC, 
the trustee owes duties to remainder beneficiaries during the settlor's incapacity, see infra notes __-__ and 
accompanying text. In re Malasky, 736 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2002), a case not decided under the UTC, involved a 
joint revocable trust the decedent and his wife had created and of which they served as cotrustees. Children 
of the decedent from a prior marriage were remainder beneficiaries. Id. at 152. Following the decedent's 
death, the children objected to the surviving spouse/trustee's accounting for the period from the creation of 
the trust until the decedent's death. The court held that the children, "having no pecuniary interest in the 
revocable trust until decedent's death, lack[ed] standing to object to the account..." Id. at 153. By contrast, 
a Florida court, applying New York law, held that remainder beneficiaries of a revocable trust could pursue 
a claim against the trustee of the trust, who was not the settlor, with respect to the administration of the 
trust during the settlor's lifetime. See Siegel v. Novak, 920 So.2d 89 (Fla. App. 2006). Similarly, in Cloud 
v. U.S. Natl Bank of Oregon, 570 P.2d 350 (Or. 1977), remainder beneficiaries were able to bring a claim 
against the trustee of a revocable trust after the settlor's death for disbursements that allegedly were 
improperly made to the settlor after she had become incapacitated, or that were made to her as a result of 
requests she made while under undue influence. 
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For example, assume that the terms of a revocable trust provide that if the settlor 
becomes incapacitated, the trustee shall make distributions to one or more other 
beneficiaries. A settlor who creates and funds such a trust is attempting to accomplish 
more than providing for the management of her property without the need for a 
guardianship, if she becomes incapacitated, and disposing of her property at death 
without an estate administration. Accordingly, section 603(a) of the UTC, as initially 
promulgated, provided that the trustee's duties are owed exclusively to the settlor only 
while the settlor has capacity.48 Section 603(a), however, has not been well received.49 As 
a result, in 2004 it was amended to place brackets around its language making its rule 
applicable only while the settlor has capacity to revoke the trust.50 The accompanying 
comment notes that enacting jurisdictions are free to strike the incapacity limitation on 
the section's general rule, in which case the trustee's duties would be owed exclusively to 
the settlor regardless of whether the settlor had capacity to revoke the trust.51 At least 
when the terms of the trust provide for others to be current beneficiaries of trust income 
or principal if the settlor becomes incapacitated, and particularly if distributions to others 
are mandated in that circumstance, the UTC's original approach to section 603(a) is the 
appropriate one. If the trustee's duties in such a case are owed exclusively to the settlor, 
the trustee apparently could ignore the settlor's clear intent that others be current 
beneficiaries of the trust, and such other beneficiaries not only would be unable to 
enforce the trust, they might not even know of their interests in it. 
48
 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (2000). 
49
 From a review of four charts collectively titled, "Significant Differences in States' Enacted Uniform 
Trust Codes," prepared as an unofficial in-house National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) document, it appears that of the first 20 jurisdictions to have enacted a version of the 
UTC, 12 provide that the duties of the trustee of a revocable trust are owed exclusively to the settlor even if 
the settlor lacks capacity (Kansas, Nebraska, Maine, Virginia, South Carolina, Oregon, North Carolina, 
Florida, Alabama, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and North Dakota); seven provide that the trustee's duties also are 
owed to other beneficiaries if the settlor lacks capacity (Wyoming, New Mexico, Utah, Tennessee, New 
Hampshire, Missouri, and Arkansas); and one provides that the trustee's duties are owed only to the settlor, 
but allows other beneficiaries to enforce the settlor's intent to benefit them (the District of Columbia). The 
charts may be accessed through links on a NCCUSL UTC website: 
http://utcproj ect.org/utc/DesktopDefault. aspx. 
50
 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (2004). 
51
 Id. cmt. In explanation, the comment noted not only the desire to treat revocable trusts similarly to wills, 
but also the issue of how to determine the settlor's capacity, or lack thereof, if the trustee's duties are owed 
to other beneficiaries if the settlor becomes incapacitated. That issue has been addressed by Missouri's 
version of the UTC, which provides, in relevant part: 
1. While a trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity to revoke the trust, rights 
of the beneficiaries are subject to the control of, and the duties of the trustee are owed exclusively 
to, the settlor. 
2. A settlor is presumed to have capacity for the purposes of subsection 1 of this 
section until either the settlor is adjudicated totally incapacitated or disabled or the trustee has 
received an affidavit of incapacity... 
5. In this section, an "affidavit of incapacity" means a written certificate furnished 
by at least one licensed medical doctor that states that the settlor lacks capacity to revoke the trust. 
Mo. STAT. ANN. § 456.6-603 ( ) . 
52
 For further discussion of this issue, see Alan Newman, The Ohio Trust Code and Revocable Trusts: 
Duties of the Trustee While the Settlor is Living, 17 PROB. L. J. OF OHIO 103 (Jan./Feb. 2007). 
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Moreover, if the settlor becomes incapacitated and the trustee's duties are owed 
exclusively to the settlor, presumably the trustee would be accountable only to the 
settlor's guardian, or agent under a durable power of attorney, for a breach. If the 
guardian or agent recovered damages from the trustee, the recovery often should belong 
to the trust for ultimate distribution of any amounts remaining at the settlor's death to the 
trust's remainder beneficiaries. If the trustee's duties are owed exclusively to the settlor, 
however, arguably any such recovery would belong to the settlor to be managed by the 
guardian or agent during the settlor's life, with what remains at the settlor's death 
distributed under the terms of the settlor's will. While this issue may be of little or no 
consequence if the settlor's will pours over the residuary estate to the trust, settlors of 
revocable trusts do not always employ pour over wills, but occasionally provide for 
different dispositions of their probate estates and trust assets.5^ 
If the settlor becomes incapacitated and the trustee thereafter owes duties to the 
trust's remainder beneficiaries as well as to the settlor, a breach by the trustee while the 
settlor was incapacitated would be actionable by both the settlor's conservator or agent 
and by the remainder beneficiaries. Less clear is whether the remainder beneficiaries 
could hold the trustee accountable for breaches that occurred while the now incapacitated 
settlor had capacity. Under the UTC, arguably they could not, as it provides that "[w]hile 
a trust is revocable and the settlor has capacity to revoke the trust, rights of the 
beneficiaries are subject to the control of, and the duties of the trustee are owed 
exclusively to, the settlor."54 If no duties are owed to remainder beneficiaries while a 
settlor has capacity to revoke the trust, a breach of the trustee's duty that occurs while the 
settlor has capacity would seem to be actionable only by the settlor (or her conservator or 
agent). A UTC comment, however, indicates otherwise-
Following the death or incapacity of the settlor, the beneficiaries would have a 
right to maintain an action against a trustee for breach of trust. However, with 
respect to actions occurring prior to the settlor's death or incapacity, an action by 
the beneficiaries could be barred by the settlor's consent or by other events such 
as approval of the action by a successor trustee.55 
Because the comment's implicit assumption - that after the settlor has become 
incapacitated, remainder beneficiaries may maintain an action against the trustee for 
Ohio's recently enacted version of the UTC addresses this issue by providing that the allocation of such a 
recovery between the settlor, if living, the settlor's estate, if the settlor is not living, and the revocable trust 
is left to the discretion of the court. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5806.03(A) (West 2007). The comments to 
the UTC address it by noting that an action brought by the conservator or agent of an incapacitated settlor 
would be to have property restored to the trust. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603 cmt. (2005). That may not always 
be the case, however. To illustrate, if the trustee breached its duty by not making payments on mortgage 
indebtedness of an incapacitated settlor on property specifically devised by the settlor's will to a non-trust 
beneficiary, the recovery should not belong to the trust. 
54
 UNEF. TRUST CODE § 603(a) (2005). As discussed in note _ , supra, § 603(a) was amended in 2004 to 
place brackets around the language limiting its general rule to settlors who have capacity to revoke their 
trusts. 
55
 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603 cmt. (2005). 
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breaches that occurred while the settlor had capacity - arguably is inconsistent with the 
UTC itself, a court might reject its position.56 
B. Revocation or Amendment. With the proliferation in the use of 
revocable trusts in recent years have come many cases in which the issue was whether the 
settlor had effectively exercised her reserved power to revoke or amend.57 Generally, 
wills law is not applied in resolving such issues. 
Two recent Utah Supreme Court decisions illustrate the extent to which some 
courts will strictly apply trust law to the issue of whether a revocable trust, used as a will 
substitute, has been revoked or amended. In Banks v. Means,5* the trust instrument, which 
named the settlor's children as joint beneficiaries following her death,59 provided that the 
settlor "reserves the right to amend, modify or revoke this Trust in whole or in part.. .On 
the revocation of this instrument in its entirety, the Trustee shall deliver to the 
[settlor].. .all of the Trust property."60 The instrument further provided that: "The 
interests of the beneficiaries are presently vested subject to divestment which shall 
continue until this Trust is revoked or terminated other than by death."61 Years after 
creating the trust, the settlor executed an amendment to its terms that provided for the 
trust assets to be distributed to her sister on her death.62 If the settlor's sister predeceased 
her, the trust assets were to be distributed to the settlor's children.63 
When the settlor died, her children's challenge to the validity of the amendment 
was upheld.64 The court acknowledged that the settlor had reserved the power to revoke 
or amend the trust, but found that not only had she created vested interests in her 
children, she had specifically provided that while those interests could be divested, they 
were to continue until the trust was revoked or terminated.65 Thus, the court concluded 
that "a complete revocation was required to divest the beneficiaries of their vested 
56
 See American Ins. Co. v. Cuyahoga Community College District, 774 N.E.2d 802 (Ohio Ct. CI. 2002). 
57
 See generally, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 cmts. h and i and rptr. notes thereto (2003) 
(characterizing the case law in this area as "somewhat unclear and troublesome"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 cmt. e (2003); Annotation, Exercise by Will 
of Trustor's Reserved Power to Revoke or Modify Inter Vivos Trust, 81 A.L.R.3d 959 (1977). Note that 
action taken by a settlor to revoke a revocable trust in accordance with the terms of the trust will be 
effective to do so even if title to trust assets is not formally transferred back to the settlor before her death. 
See State Bank of Parsons v. First Nat. Bank in Wichita, 504 P.2d 156 (Kan. 1972). 
58
 52 P.3d 1190 (Utah 2002). 
5 9 /^ .a t l l91 . 
60Id. 
61
 Id In an earlier decision, In re Estate ofGroesbeck, 935 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1997), Utah's Supreme Court 
had held that "a revocable trust can be created, without being deemed illusory, as long as title to the 
property passes to the trustee and vested interests are created in the beneficiaries, even if these interests are 
subject to divestiture." Banks, at 1193. In Banks, the settlor's sister unsuccessfully argued that the provision 
in the trust instrument specifying that vested interests were created in the children was intended to establish 
that the trust was not illusory, not to restrict the settlor's ability to divest the children's interests. Id. 
62
 Ma t 1192. 
63Id. 
64
 Id. at 1191. 
65
 Id at 1193-94. 
11 
interests." Because the amendment did not revoke the trust, it was ineffective to affect 
the children's interests. The rationale for the court's holding emphasizes the traditional 
distinction between revocable trusts, under which remainder beneficiaries have vested 
interests (though subject to divestment by exercise of the settlor's power of revocation) 
during the settlor's lifetime, and wills, under which devisees have expectancies rather 
than interests in the testator's property during her lifetime: 
Once the settlor has created the trust he is no longer the owner of the trust 
property and has only such ability to deal with it as is expressly reserved to him in 
the trust instrument. Thus, a settlor has the power to modify or revoke a trust only 
if and to the extent that such power is explicitly reserved by the terms of the trust. 
Furthermore, the creation of a trust involves the transfer of property interests in 
the trust subject-matter to the beneficiaries. These interests cannot be taken from 
[the beneficiaries] except in accordance with a provision of the trust instrument.67 
The Utah Supreme Court is not alone in limiting the ability of settlors of 
revocable trusts to revoke or modify them on the ground that remainder beneficiaries of 
such trusts have interests defined by, and subject to change only in accordance with, the 
terms of the trust instrument.68 Such decisions, while supported by traditional trust law 
doctrine, not only are intention defeating, but also exalt form over substance in ignoring 
the practical reality that settlors of revocable trusts commonly use them as will substitutes 
and consider the trust assets as their own, without limitation. For such reasons, the UTC 
relaxes considerably the rules followed in some jurisdictions xmder which, if the terms of 
the trust prescribe a method for revoking or amending it, the settlor may do so only by 
employing the method so specified.69 
Under the UTC,70 a revocable trust may be revoked or amended by "any.. .method 
manifesting clear and convincing evidence of the settlor's intent,"71 unless the terms of 
the trust not only specify a method, but also expressly make it exclusive. Further, even 
66/d. atll93. 
67
 Id. at 1192-93 (citations and quotation marks omitted). The court's decision in Banks created significant 
concern among Utah estate planners. See Charles M. Bennett, Can You Ame\nd that Revocable Trust? Utah 
Estate Planning Lawyers Face a Trap for the Unwary, 17 UTAH BAR J. 32 (Aug./Sept. 2004) (speculating 
that 'there may be tens of thousands of trusts extant in Utah with language identical to that found in 
Banks"). A year after Banks, the Utah Supreme Court, while not overruling Banks, limited its effect 
significantly. See In the Matter of the Estate of Flake, 71 P.3d 589 (Utah 2003) and its discussion in Mr. 
Bennett's Utah Bar Journal article cited above. See also Hoggan v. Hoggan, 169 P.3d 750 (Utah 2007). 
68
 See, e.g., In re Estate and Trust of Pilafas, 836 P.2d 420, 423 (Ariz. App. 1992) (stating that "[e]ven a 
revocable trust vests the trust beneficiary with a legal right to enforce the terms of the trust... The terms of 
the trust also limit the powers of the settlor and trustee over the trust corpus, even when the settlor declares 
himself trustee..."). 
69
 See, e.g., In re Reid, 46 P.3d 188 (Okla. App. 2002); Salem United Methodist Church v. Bottorff, 138 
S.W.3d 788 (Mo. 2004). If a trust may be revoked or amended, but its terms do not provide a method for 
doing so, the settlor may revoke or amend by any method that sufficiently evidences the settlor's intent. See 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 330 cmt. i (1959). 
70
 The new Restatement's rules are similar to the UTC's. See RESTATEMENf (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 cmts. 
h & i (2003). 
71
 UNBF. TRUST CODE § 603(c)(2)(B) (2005). 
72
 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(c)(2) (2005). 
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if the trust terms expressly provide an exclusive method of revocation or amendment, 
substantial, rather than strict, compliance will be sufficient.73 Specifically authorized 
(unless the terms of the trust expressly provide an exclusive alternative method) is a 
revocation or amendment by a later will or codicil, but only if it "expressly refers to the 
trust or specifically devises property that would otherwise have passed according to the 
terms of the trust."74 
The UTC's trust revocation and amendment rules, while clearly intent furthering, 
do not track those applicable to wills. For example, while the UTC recognizes the right of 
a settlor to specify an exclusive method of revocation or amendment, the methods of 
revoking or revising a will are set by statute. Further, the UTC is silent on the effect, if 
any, of the inability to find the original trust instrument on the death of a settlor of a 
revocable trust. In most jurisdictions, if a testator had possession of the original will and 
it cannot be located at her death, a presumption arises that the testator destroyed it 
intending to revoke it.75 Application of that presumption to revocable trusts would be 
problematic. Because a will generally has no legal effect until the testator's death, it can 
be presumed to have been revoked when it was in the testator's possession and cannot be 
located at her death without affecting property rights during the testator's lifetime. By 
contrast, if the original instrument creating a funded revocable trust was in the settlor's 
possession and cannot be located at her death, treating the trust as having been revoked 
would raise such questions as when it was revoked and what effect its revocation had on 
transactions the trustee had engaged in with respect to its property.76 
Another revocation issue that differs for wills and revocable trusts is the effect of 
a divorce on provisions in the instrument in favor of the testator's or settlor's spouse. 
73
 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(c)(1) (2005). 
74
 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603(c)(2)(A) (2005). Thus, a residuary clause in a will that disposes of the estate 
differently than does the trust instrument will not effect a revocation or amendment of the terms of the trust. 
See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 603 cmt. (2005). Many non-UTC cases have addressed the issue of whether a 
revocable trust can be revoked or amended by will or codicil. The decisions typically turn on such issues as 
whether the trust instrument specified the means by which the settlor could revoke or amend; if so, whether 
the specified means was followed; or whether the subsequent will or codicil simply made a general 
disposition of the decedent's estate without making a specific reference to the trust or its assets. See, e.g., In 
re Last Will and Testament of Tamplin, 48 P.3d 481 (Alaska 2002) (not allowed); In re Estate of Furst, 55 
P.3d 664 (Wash. App. 2002) (not allowed); One Valley Bank, Nat. Ass'n v. Hunt 516 S.E.2d 516 
(W.Va.1999) (not allowed); In re Estate of Davis, 671 NE 2d 1302 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (allowed); Estate 
of Sanders, 929 P.2d 153 (Kan. 1996) (not allowed); In re Estate of Lowry, 418 N.E.2d 10 (111. App. 1981) 
(allowed); Conn Gen'1 Life Ins Co, 262 N.W.2d 403 (Minn. 1977) (not allowed); Estate of Kovalyshyn, 
343 A.2d 852 (N.F. 1975) (not allowed). See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63 cmt. h (2003); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 7.2 cmt e (2003); John 
P. Ludington, Annotation, Exercise by Will ofTtrustor's Reserved Power to Revoke or Modify Inter Vivos 
Trust, 81 A.L.R. 3d 959 (1977). 
75
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1 cmt. j . (1999). 
For a statute reversing that common law presumption, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.26 (West 2007). 
76
 For a case in which the argument was made that the lost will presumption should be applied to a 
revocable trust, see In re Estate and Trust of Pilafas, 836 P.2d 420 (Ariz. App. 1992). In Pilafas, the court 
held that because the settlor had reserved the right to revoke the trust by a written instrument delivered to 
the trustee, he could not revoke it by physical act. Id. at 425. Consequently, the court did not decide 
whether the lost will presumption could be applied to a revocable trust. Id. 
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Most, if not all, jurisdictions have statutes under which provisions in a will for a spouse 
are revoked by a divorce or annulment of the marriage. 7 Such statutes are based on the 
assumption that a testator most likely would not intend for her former spouse to take 
under her will. If she did not revoke or revise her will to delete provisions in favor of her 
former spouse, the assumption is that the reason she did not do was oversight, 
inadvertence, or procrastination. Consistent with that rationale being equally applicable to 
revocable trusts, at least two courts have applied such wills statutes to revocable trusts. 
Neither court, however, broadly held that the jurisdiction's revocation-by-divorce wills 
statute applied to revocable trusts.79 While the preferable approach clearly is for 
legislation specifically applying to revocable trusts (and other will substitutes),80 under 
the Restatement wills revocation-by-divorce statutes ordinarily should be applied to 
revocable trusts. 
C. Lapse; Antilapse Statutes. In the absence of a statute to the contrary, if a 
will devisee predeceases the testator, the gift lapses (i.e., fails).82 Thus, unless the will 
provides otherwise, the devisee's gift is conditioned on the devisee surviving the testator. 
If the jurisdiction's antilapse statute applies, generally the gift will pass to the 
predeceased devisee's descendants, by representation.83 By contrast, generally, at 
common law, a condition of survivorship is not implied on a gift of a future interest in 
trust.84 Rather, upon creation of a trust, its remainder beneficiaries receive interests that, 
unless the instrument provides otherwise,85 pass as a part of the remainder beneficiary's 
estate to her intestate heirs or will devisees. When a revocable trust is used as a will 
substitute and a remainder beneficiary dies before the settlor, the question is thus raised 
77
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.1, rptr. notes 
(1999). 
78
 Miller v. First Nat. Bank & Trust Co., 637 P.2d 75 (Okla.1981); Clymer v. Mayo, 473 N.E.2d 1084 
(Mass. 1985). 
79
 In Miller, the court found that a pour over provision in favor of the trust in the decedent's will 
incorporated the trust by reference into the will. Miller, at 77-78. In Clymer, the court relied on the fact that 
the trust was unfunded (other than by being designated as the beneficiary of an insurance policy on the 
settlor's life and as the beneficiary of the settlor's retirement plan interest) in finding that the legislative 
intent with respect to the revocation-by-divorce wills statute was equally applicable to the trust. Clymer, at 
1093. See generally, Susan N. Gary, Applying Revocation-on-Divorce Statutes to Will Substitutes, 18 
QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 83 (2004). 
80
 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804 (1990). 
81
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 cmt. e(l) (2003). 
82
 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WELLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 5.5 cmt. a (1999). 
83
 See, e.g., UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-603 (1990). 
84
 See JESSE DUKEMINIER, STANLEY M. JOHANSON, et. a l , WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES, at 638 
(7th ed. 2005). 
85
 In Burkett v. Capovilla, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 817 (Cal. App. 2003), a revocable trust instrument, on a form 
prepared by a paralegal service, provided that upon the settlor's death, certain trust assets were to be 
distributed to the settlor's daughter. Id. at 818-19. A subsequent provision in the instrument provided that: 
"For all gifts under this instrument, the beneficiary must survive for sixty (60) days before entitlement to 
such gifts." Id. at 819. Applying a California statute under which the same rules of interpretation are 
applied to wills and trusts, the court rejected the argument that because trust beneficiaries acquire an 
interest in the trust immediately on its creation, the 60 day period should run from the date the trust was 
created. Id. at 820-21. Rather, the court construed the survivorship condition to require that the daughter 
survive the settlor by 60 days. Id. at 821. 
86
 See, e.g, First Nat'l Bank v. Anthony, 557 A.2d 957 (Me. 1989). 
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